FRANCES ALICE HOEY, PETITIONER, VS. AURELIO & COMPANY, INC., RESPONDENT.

Petitioner-appellant (defendant in the lower court) directly appeals
from a portion of the decision of the Court of First Instance in Civil Case No.
51949, sentencing her to pay the plaintiff (respondent-appellee herein) the sum
of P109,242.30 received from the latter by way of mortgage loans with legal
rate of interest from the filing of the complaint.  The court a quo had absolved
her from paying the amount of
P100,757.70, having found the same as usurious interests or exactions.

Petitioner seeks a re-examination of this Court’s doctrine in the
case of Angel Jose Warehousing Co., Inc. vs. Chelda
Enterprises^[1]
to the effect that the usurious lender can recover his capital in case of
usurious transactions, which doctrine was applied in the case below.

It is petitioner-appellant’s contention, among others, that a
usurious lender also forfeits his capital in view of Article 1957 of the New
Civil Code^[2]
which is a new provision, declaring “contracts and stipulations, under any
cloak or device whatever, intended to circumvent the laws against usury”
as void.  It is argued that respondent-appellee forfeited his principal loan of P109,242.30 since
it was found to be a usurious lender.

Respondent-appellee, on the other hand,
prays for the dismissal of this appeal in its verified answer for reasons
therein stated.  In its brief,^[3]
respondent-appellee also disputes the facts as found
by the lower court, insisting that the real facts were those presented by it below, viz, that the mortgages are legal and valid and that
the foreclosure of the same was in order, which makes petitioner-appellant
liable for all the claims in its complaint. 
Moreover, it has already appealed the lower court’s decision to the
Court of Appeals and the same is still pending.

The established rule in this jurisdiction is that when a party
appeals directly to the Supreme Court, and submits his case there for decision,
he is deemed to have waived the
right to dispute any finding of fact made
by the trial court.  The only questions
that may be raised are those of law.^[4]
Petitioner-appellant having appealed on a purely question of law, she is bound by the findings of fact of the court below.

Except for the fact that the appellant herein is the prevailing party in the court below, the situation
is similar to that in the case of Justo, et al. vs.
Hernando, et al.^[5]
The appellant in the said case
also directly appealed to this Court, raising only a question of law.  However, the appellee
raised questions of fact in his brief.  The Supreme Court was confronted with the
question of whether to decide the appeal, confining the issue
between the
parties only to the questions of
law raised by the appellant, or
whether to consider the issue as extending to the questions of fact raised by the appellee,
in which case, the appeal should be referred^[6]
to the Court of Appeals.  It was held and ordered therein that the
appeal be decided by the Court of Appeals. 
The above ruling was reiterated
in Ramos vs. Mañalac
and Lopez^[7], and Masangcay, et al.
vs. Valencia.^[8]

In the present case, the appellee did
not only dispute the facts in its
brief.  It has appealed the lower court’s
decision to the Court of
Appeals.  Following the ruling laid down
by this Court in the aforesaid
cases, and considering the provision of Section 2, Republic Act No. 5440,^[9]
effective 9 September 1968, further amending Republic
Act No. 296 (otherwise known as
the Judiciary Act of 1948), this
Court is constrained to refer
this appeal to the Court of Appeals.  In
view hereof, We find it unnecessary to resolve the issue raised by the parties
in their respective briefs.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the herein appeal is remanded
to the Court of Appeals for consideration and decision.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Ruiz Castro, J., on leave.

^[1]
No. L-25704, 24 April 1968,
23 SCRA 119.

^[2]
Art. 1957 of the New Civil Code reads:

“Art. 1957.  Contracts and stipulations, under
any cloak or device whatever, intended to circumvent the laws against usury
shall be void.  The borrower may recover
in accordance with the laws on usury.”

^[3]
See pages 4-5, Brief for the
Respondent.

^[4]
Republic vs. Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, No.
L-21748, 26 September 1967,
21 SCRA 279 and other cases cited.

^[5]
No. L-3415, 11 June 1951, 89 Phil. 268.

^[6]
Underscoring supplied.

^[7]
No. L-2610, 16 June 1951,
89 Phil. 270

^[8]
No. L-9786, 31 August 1960,
109 Phil. 213.

^[9]
Sec. 2 of Republic Act No. 5440 provides in part:

“Sec.
2.  Section seventeen of the same Act, as amended, is hereby further amended
to read as follows:

‘Sec. 17.  Jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court.  ——.

‘The Supreme Court shall further have
exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on certiorari
as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of
inferior courts as herein provided, in –

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(4)  All other cases in which only errors or
questions of law are involved:  Provided,
however, That if, in addition to constitutional, tax or jurisdictional
questions, the cases mentioned
in the three next preceding paragraphs also involve questions of fact or mixed questions of
fact and law, the aggrieved party shall appeal to the Court of
Appeals; and the final judgment or decision
of the latter may be reviewed, revised,
reversed, modified or affirmed by the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari; ——” (Underscoring supplied)