SEVERINO TAJONERA AND/OR RINO’S SUPER CLUB AND RESTAURANT, PETITIONERS, VS. FERNANDO LAMAROZA, INOCENCIO CABALES, FEDERICO SANDOVAL, JOSE TUANO, LOLITO ESPINOSA, RUDY CANTOJAS, …

These two (2) petitions for certiorari with writ of
preliminary injunction are taken up jointly as they involve the same parties
and arise from the same causes.

There were six (6) cases instituted before Regional Office No. IV
of the Department (now Ministry) of Labor, five (5) of which were filed
separately by private respondent workers against petitioners for “unfair
labor practice, ille­gal dismissal, illegal deduction, underpayment, overtime
pay for holiday and rest day, violation of P.D. 525, breakage deduction in
salary, recovery of cash deposit and separation pay,” and the other one
was filed by petitioners for authority to shut down their business.  These cases were consolidated on August 2, 1976 and were set for
hearing on August 3, 1976.  Both parties and their respective counsel
were present thereat, and they agreed to reset the hearing on August 12, 1976, that private
respondents will submit their position paper on or before August 9, and that
counsel for petitioners will submit his answer/position paper on the date of
the hearing.^[1]

Private respondents submitted an affidavit^[2]
they execu­ted jointly with twelve other waiters/employees of Rino’s Super Club, and which states, among other things,
the following:

“We, the undersigned waiters/employees of Rino’s
Super Club and Restaurant, all Filipinos, of legal ages with our Residence
Certificates and other personal circumstances stated below, after being duly
sworn to according to law hereby depose and say:

“1.  That all of us were dismissed by the
respondents from our employment without any notice to us nor clearance from the
Depart­ment of Labor without ‘just cause’ in violation of P.D. 442 or the New
Labor Code.

“2.  That we do not know of any reason except that we
were in the process of forming a UNION to be able to have a good bargaining
power with the Management in order to remedy the Unfair Labor Practices which
we have been suffering from the management, such as, Col­lection of Cash
Deposits from employees, Delayed and Unpaid wages, Collection of Breakage,
Collection of customer’s unpaid bills from wages of the employees, by making us
construction laborers, non-payment of overtime, underpayment, holiday pay, and
Non-Payment of Allowance under P.D. 525 to those who are entitled and other
violations.

“3.  That we tried to get the explanation of the
management on our dismissal but the management instead tried to coerce our
representative into testifying in their favor in case we file a case against
them, and that the management will charge us of abandonment if we persist on
prosecuting our claims against them.

“4.  That on the same day of our dismissal we were
immediately replaced by a new group of personnel which they have hired through
another firm also owned by the respondents in order to escape from their
liability under the law.

“5.  That the amount representing our cash
bonds/deposits were actually deducted from our wages as such and only the
receipts were given to us instead of our salaries by the respondents and it is
not true that they have no knowledge about such deposits.

“6.  That we are even told that any case we filed
with the Department of Labor will not prosper as the respondents have ways and
means and connections with High Government officials including the Department
of Labor to delay our case and obtain dismissal because most of these officials
are their customers.”

As per agreement, the cases were again called for hearing on August 12, 1976, but neither
petitioners nor counsel appeared, nor did they submit any answer or position
paper.

On October 4, 1976,
Officer-in-Charge Vicente Leogardo, Jr. of Regional
Office No. 4 issued his Order holding that the respondents were dismissed by
reason of their union acti­vities and without prior clearance having been
issued by the Labor Department.  The
petitioners were ordered to reinstate private respondents to their former
positions with full back-wages from the date of termination up to their actual
reinstatement.  The issue of illegal
deductions, etc. were referred to the Labor Regulation Section of the
Department (now Ministry) of Labor for determination.

Petitioners appealed the said order of October 4, 1976 to the
Secretary (Now Minister) of Labor and stated in their memorandum of appeal that
private respondents staged an illegal walk-out against management which in
effect is an abandonment of their respective jobs; that they told the
respondents to return to work otherwise a damage suit will be filed against
them, but the respondents arrogantly took upon themselves to file several
complaints against the management; and that management never filed any
clearance to terminate the respondents because management then still clung to
the belief and hope that these employees might have just been misled and find
out later on that what they have done was wrong.

Petitioners likewise emphasized that they never received any
position paper from complainants, so they never bothered to submit any pleading
or position paper; that they were deprived of due process for they were never
required to submit memorandum; and that there was no judge, no witness, no
transcript of records to talk about or to be made the basis of the Order of Mr.
Leogardo, Jr.

On March 31, 1977,
finding the appeal to be frivolous and dilatory, then Acting Secretary Inciong denied the same and ordered the immediate issuance
of a writ of execution.  On July 5, 1977, when the writ of
execution was being served upon petitioners, they executed a compromise
agreement^[3]
admitting their pecuniary liability to respondents in the amount of P37,620.00.

Instead of complying with the compromise agreement, peti­tioners
appealed to the Office of the President and maintained their stand that they
were denied due process, and that the writ of execution was based on an incomplete
judgment which cannot be carried out or executed.  Hon. Ronaldo
Zamora, in his capacity as Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, ordered
the stay of execution pending appeal. 
Petitioners, on the other hand, filed an appeal bond in the amount of P40,000.00.  On January 20, 1978, the Office of the
President, through respondent Zamora affirmed in toto
the order of the then Acting Secre­tary Inciong, with
the finding that the compromise agreement governed the liabilities of
petitioners, but the latter failed to abide with the terms and conditions set
forth therein and that petitioners, in appealing the order subject of that
agree­ment, revived the executory character of the
order appealed from pursuant to the said agreement thus rendering the appeal
moot and academic.

Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the Order of
respondent Zamora and reiterated
their defense of their having been denied due process and claimed that
respondents injected fear and duress upon the person of Severino
Tajonera in forcing him to sign the agreement.

On August 10, 1978,
respondent Jacobo Clave, then Presi­dential Executive
Assistant, denied the reconsideration prayed for and held that the issues
raised in the motion were merely reiterative of the issues already passed upon
and resolved by the Office of the President.

In the meantime, pending the resolution of the appeal from the
order of reinstatement, the matter of money claims was set for conciliation and
conference on December 21, 1976.  Neither petitioner nor counsel appeared.  The conference was reset to January 13, 1977 and this time,
petitioners came late; but they agreed to have an ocular inspection, by some
Labor officials, of the premises with assurance that the employees’ service
records will be made available.  However,
for some unknown reasons, petitioners failed to produce the records of the
employees as promised.

Private respondents submitted their memorandum of claim^[4]
with computations, in addition to the receipts and payroll summaries.  Petitioners did not submit any evidence
relative to the monetary claims.

On October 25, 1977,
Regional Director Francisco Estrella awarded the
money claims to private respondents in various amounts based on the evidence
presented.  The corresponding writ of
execution was issued on February 20,
1978 bearing the amount of P47,027.00 representing the total amount
of the claim to be paid to private respondents. 
Petitioners filed a memo­randum of appeal with urgent petition to lift
the writ of exe­cution on the ground of justice and equity, claiming that they
were never given the chance to rebut or present evidence contrary to private
respondents’ position; that they were never furnished the orders of October 25,
1977; that as borne out by the records in the Department of Labor, the one who
received the order by the name of “Nelin Esquerdo” was not known to both petitioners and
counsel.

Petitioners were required to file an appellants’ bond in the
amount of P47,027.00.  Acting on the
appeal, respondent Inciong decided to give petitioners
a chance to be heard and summoned them by telegram for a conference on July 11, 1978 but still they failed
to appear.  It was on July 18, 1978 when counsel for
petitioners came and it was agreed that the former will submit his position
paper and evidence not later than July
24, 1978.  But contrary to
the agreement, said counsel submitted a supplemental position paper praying
that the case be placed under arbitration. 
Counsel for private respondents was forced to manifest and move that the
case be submitted for resolution in view of the dilatory tactics employed by
peti­tioners.  On July 28, 1978, Deputy Minister Inciong dismissed the appeal and directed the immediate
execution of the order of October 25,
1977.

An alias writ of execution was issued on.  September
25, 1978 for failure of petitioners to comply with the directives
contained therein.

The first petition for certiorari, G. R. No. L-48907, was
filed prior to the resolution of the appeal from the order dated October 25 1977 of Director Estrella while the second petition, G. R. No. L-49035, was
filed after the dismissal of the appeal and after the issuance of the alias
writ of execu­tion.

The first petition alleged that respondent Vicente Leogardo, Jr. went beyond his authority when he took cognizance
of the consolidated cases of unfair labor practice and money claims since the
only persons authorized by the code to hear cases of that nature are the Labor
Arbiters and members of the National Labor Relations Commission; that assuming
he has the authority to do so, his questioned order of October 4, 1976, thereby
segregating the issues of reinstatement and backwages
from the other issues of overtime pay, underpayment, etc., denotes no other
than an incomplete judgment in contravention of governing jurisprudence in this
matter; that when a judg­ment is conditional or incomplete, it is not final and
cannot be executed; that respondent Leogardo Jr.
expressly spelled out the amount to be paid as backwages
to the employees, when none of these amounts and specifications were made in
his order of October 4, 1976.

The second petition also alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part
of Regional Director Estrella when he ruled on the
money claims which authority exclusively belong to the National Labor Relations
Commission; that petitioners were never notified or at least given a hint of
the so-called conference and the investigation to be conducted; that the
specific and concrete computation of claims for each individual person made by
respondent Estrella, denotes a glaring example of a
patent violation of due process wherein petitioners would be deprived of
property without an opportunity to be heard; and that the Deputy Minister of
Labor’s statement that petitioners failed to appear at the scheduled hearing is
not true since no hearing was actually conducted but only a conference and/or
ocular inspection, a conciliation and investigation; and the case was not tried
on the merits.

The rule is that jurisdiction is conferred by law and the
objection to the authority of the tribunal to take cogni­zance of a case may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings. 
However, considering the attendant circumstances in the cases at bar,
petitioners are now barred from claiming lack of jurisdiction at this stage
with their active participation.  They
never questioned the authority of respondents Leogardo
Jr. and Estrella throughout the duration of the
proceedings when they have the chance to do so. 
They never mentioned lack of jurisdiction in their memorandum of appeal,
in their motion for reconsideration or in their position paper.  They are now estopped
from raising such objection.  It has been
held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent and after failing to obtain such
relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdic­tion.^[5]
The Court frowns upon and does .not tolerate the undesirable practice of some
litigants who submit voluntarily a cause and then accepting the judgment when
favorable to them and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.

As to the alleged deprivation of petitioners of the procedural
due process, We find no merit in this contention.  They had ample opportunity to present their
evidence not only during the conciliation stage but also before then Deputy
Minister Inciong who called for conference to give
petitioners another fair chance to ventilate their grievances and to sub­mit
their defenses, if there are any. 
Although there was no actual hearing conducted, petitioners were
afforded time to explain their side. 
There were no refutations made nor was there any hint on the record that
they can present any meri­torious defense which would warrant a reversal of the
questioned orders.

What the law prohibits, is, not the absence of previous notice
but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard.  Petitioners have no reason to impute lack of
due process because they were “heard” on their memorandum of appeal
and motion for reconsideration.  They,
therefore, had sufficient opportunity for them to inform the tribunal concerned
of their side of the controversy.  What
due process contemplates is freedom from arbitrariness, and what it requires is
fairness or justice, the substance rather than the form being paramount.^[6]
The circumstances tend to show that the petitions were dilatory in
character.  And from what has been
stated, the liability of petitioners appears clear, much more so with the stern
but salutary requirement in the Constitution as to the promotion of social
justice and protection to labor.

The Labor Code provides that proceedings before the adju­dicatory
bodies of the Ministry of Labor are not governed by the technical rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity and are summary in nature.  While a day in court is a matter of right in
judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings, since they
are based on different principles.

There is nothing irregular or anomalous when the writ of
execution contained the specific amounts of money to be paid by petitioners to
private respondents.  The said amounts
were based on the record submitted by the employees which were not disputed by
petitioners since they failed to present their timely objection to the submission
of the same.

Petitioners’ assertion that the order of October 4, 1976 is a nullity for being an
incomplete judgment, is not tenable. 
They apparently are confused as to the connotation if incomplete
judgment.  The said order is not an
incomplete judgment but a partial judgment which is allowed under the Rules of
Court.  If there are several claims, a
partial decision regarding one may be rendered, and decision regarding the
others may be deferred.  The order of October 4, 1976 totally resolves all
the issues regarding the unfair labor practice charge but defers action on the
respondents’ monetary claim, which is an entirely distinct matter.  The said order terminates the action so
resolved, and relative thereto, execution may lie.

In brief, petitioners failed to disclose what evidence they have
to rebut the claim of private respondents. 
There was no showing how they will disprove the charge of private
respondents that they were unceremoniously dismissed for their attempt to form
a union.  They did not state the nature
of their evidence to controvert the monetary claims of private respondents, and
lastly, they failed to establish by prepon­derance of evidence that private
respondents are not entitled to the relief prayed for.  In view thereof, the Court is of the opinion
that petitioners are guilty as charged and private respondents should be given
what is due them.

It appearing that the Super Club and Restaurant has closed and
ceased operation and reinstatement is no longer possible, the dismissed employees
shall be entitled to separation pay equivalent at least to one month salary or
to one month salary for every year of service, whichever is higher, a fraction
of at least six months being considered as one whole year.  The dispositive
portion of the assailed order of October 4, 1976 should be modified by
directing the employer Super Club and Restaurant to grant separation pay to
private respondents instead of reinstating them with full backwages.

The appellants’ bond in the amount of P40,000.00 filed by
petitioner on August 2, 1978 shall be applied to the pay­ment of separation
pay, and the money claims awarded in the assailed order of October 25, 1977
shall likewise be charged against the bond in the amount of P47,027.00 filed by
petitioner on April 17, 1978.

WHEREFORE, the petitioner Super Club and Restaurant is
hereby ordered to grant separation pay to private respondents and to award the
money claims adjudged in their favor in the order of October 25, 1977 in
conformity with the aforestated directive.  The temporary restraining orders issued in
both cases are hereby lifted.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and Plana, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, (Chairman), and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ., in the result.

^[1]
p.  80, Rollo
in G. R. No. L-48907.

^[2]
p. 12, Ibid

^[3]
See reverse side of Annex D-1, p. 23, Rollo.

^[4]
Annex C, p. 60, Rollo.

^[5] Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23
SCRA 35.

^[6] Maglasang vs. Ople, 63
SCRA 511-513.