HILARION SARCEPUEDES, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE.

This is an appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of
Appeals convicting the appellant of direct assault upon a person in
authority.

On September 2, 1947, in the municipality of San Enrique, Negros
Occidental, Hilarion Sarcepuedes laid hands on Lucrecia L. Bustamante,
a teacher-nurse, in the school building of the town by hitting her
twice on the face with his raincoat and violently pushing her to the
window. The assault took place because Lucrecia had ordered the closing
of a pathway across her land thru which Hilarion and his wife used to
pass in going to and from the school, closing which Hilarion deeply
resented. It seems that Hilarion Sarcepuedes sought Lucrecia
Bustamante at the school premises to demand an explanation. One word
led to another and to the criminal employment of force already
described.

Articles 148 and 152 as amended, of the Revised Penal Code were
applied to the matter by the Court of Appeals. Said provisions of law
read as follows:

“ART. 148. Direct Assaults.— Any person or
persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or
intimidation for the attainment of any of the purpose enumerated in
defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition, or shall attack, employ
force or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any
of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or
on occasion of such performance, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos,
when the assault is committed with a weapon or when the offender is a
public officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands upon a
person in authority. If none of these circumstances be present the
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.

ART. 152. Person in authority.—Who shall be deemed as such.—In
applying the provisions of the proceeding and other articles of this
Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an
individual or as a member of some court or governmental corporation,
board or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority.

In applying the provisions of articles one hundred forty-eight and one
hundred fifty-one of this Code, teachers, professors, and persons
charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private
schools, colleges, and universities, shall be deemed persons in
authority. (As amended by Com. Act No. 576.)”

The appellant contends that the offended party was not a person in
authority. According to the Court of Appeals Lucrecia L. Bustamante
was, on the day of the commission of the offense, a teacher-nurse of
the 3an Enrique Elementary Public School, among her official duties
being to give health instruction to the pupils, to instruct teachers
about how to give first aid treatment in the school clinic and to look
after the sanitary facilities of the school. The contention must
consequently be overruled, since a teacher is expressly included in
article 152 among the officials deemed to be persons in authority.

Again it is argued on behalf of the defendant that the articles do
not apply, because Lucrecia L. Bustamante was not assaulted while
engaged in the performance of her official duties. It appearing that at
the time of the illtreatment the was about to pierce an earring hole on
the ear-lobe of a school child in the school clinic and that such work
was included in her mission of giving treatment to the school pupils,
the appellate court did not make a mistake on this particular issue. It
is unquestioned that this defendant knew Lucrecia was a teacher-nurse.

Explaining that the motive for the offense was a dispute totally
foreign to Lucrecia’s educational labors, the appellant insists that he
may not be punished under Article 14& because the attack was not
“on occasion” of Lucrecia1s performance of her official work. However,
inasmuch as we have found that Lucrecia was hurt while performing her
ordinary Government tasks, the motive for the aggression becomes
immaterial. (U.S. vs. Baluyot 40 Phil. 385) She was pounced
upon “while engaged in the performance” of her official duties, within
the meaning of Article 14S.

The penalty imposed, i.e., from one year, eight months and one day to four years nine months and eleven days of prision correccional
plus a fine of P500, is in accordance with law, inasmuch as the offense
was attended by the aggravating circumstance of disregard of the sex of
the offended party. Like the Court of Appeals we feel that the penalty
is rather excessive for this sudden outburst of temper; but the remedy
lies in the hands of the Executive.

Finding no legal error in the appealed decision, we have to affirm it, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Feria, Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes and Jugo, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.