CONSOLACION ROSETE, CHARITO ROSETE, MARY LO ROSETE, AND ELIZABETH ROSETE, ALL MINORS, ASSIsTED BY THEIR MOTHER EUGENIA CARAG, AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS.…
Listen, read along, or open presentation mode.
Rosete versus Rosete
The Case
This is a case about four minor children who went to court to be recognized as the illegitimate children of a man who, they said, had courted and lived with their mother while already married to another woman. They sued Pablo Rosete in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, asking for a judicial declaration of their filiation and paternity so that they could claim support under the law. The case matters to a reviewee for two reasons. First, it shows how our law treats the recognition of illegitimate children, and the kind of evidence that will persuade a court. Second, and just as important for procedure, it is a quiet but firm reminder that an appeal from the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court does not always go straight to the Supreme Court, even when the appellant would prefer it that way.
Procedural History
The children, all minors, assisted by their mother Eugenia Carag as guardian ad litem, filed their complaint in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on the eighth of August, 1956. After trial, that court rendered judgment on the eighteenth of August, 1958, in favor of the children. It discredited the evidence of the defendant and believed the evidence for the plaintiffs. It compelled Pablo Rosete to recognize the four minors as his illegitimate children, with all the rights and privileges the law extends to persons of that status, and ordered him to pay three hundred pesos in attorney's fees plus the costs of suit.
The defendant, dissatisfied, appealed directly to the Supreme Court. In his brief he raised, among others, the claim that the trial court had denied him a fair trial and his constitutional right not to be compelled to testify against himself, because he was not allowed to appear merely through counsel and was compelled to write on a piece of paper portions of a letter allegedly written by him. He also attacked the trial court's appreciation of the evidence, asking that he be absolved and the complaint dismissed.
The Supreme Court did not decide the merits. It observed that the appeal involved largely questions of fact, and that the constitutional questions raised were not substantial. It held that the appeal fell within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, and ordered the case certified to that court for determination in accordance with law.
Facts
Sometime in January, 1945, Pablo Rosete, who was legally married to another woman with whom he had several children, met Eugenia Carag in Cagayan province. According to the complaint, he fell in love with her, courted her seriously with a promise of marriage, and prevailed upon her to live with him. The four plaintiffs were conceived and born during the time their mother cohabited with the defendant.
The children alleged that the defendant had been supporting them, but that the support was insufficient for their sustenance, education, and other indispensable needs. They sought to establish their filiation and paternity precisely so that they could claim support under the law.
Pablo Rosete denied everything material. He said he never had any love affair with Eugenia Carag, that she was a woman wont to have love affairs and had cohabited with several men, that the plaintiffs were not his children but children had by her with other men, and that he had never maintained or supported them, much less recognized them as his own. He set up the defenses that the complaint stated no cause of action and no factual allegations on which the prayer for recognition could stand, and counterclaimed for damages. At trial, Eugenia Carag testified for the plaintiffs. The defendant testified for himself, and his wife Gregoria Basa, together with Leopoldo Alovara and Victoriano Latupan, testified in his favor. The trial court chose to believe the mother and disbelieve the defendant.
Issues
- Whether or not the appeal from the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court was taken to the proper court, the appellant having appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
- Whether or not the trial court denied the defendant a fair trial and his constitutional right not to be compelled to testify against himself.
- Whether or not the trial court erred in crediting the testimony of the children's mother and in disregarding the evidence offered by the defendant and his witnesses.
Applicable Provisions
Section 38-E of Republic Act Number 409, the Charter of the City of Manila, as amended by Republic Act Number 1461, which created the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, provides:
Section 38-E. Decisions and orders of the Court shall be appealed in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as appeals from the courts of first instance.
This provision fixes the route of appeal from the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, and it is the provision on which the Supreme Court rested its ruling that the appeal belonged to the Court of Appeals.
Section 2 of Republic Act Number 2613, amending the Judiciary Act of 1948, provides:
Section 2. The Court of Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases, actions, and proceedings arising under the provisions of law governing the relations between capital and labor, and over all cases, actions, and proceedings brought to it from the courts of first instance, except those cases, actions, and proceedings mentioned in section seventeen of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, and those which are assigned by law to the Supreme Court.
This provision is the basis for the Court's holding that an appeal involving largely questions of fact, with no substantial constitutional question, falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the appeal was not properly before it. Since the decisions and orders of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court are appealed in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as appeals from the courts of first instance, the appeal had to follow the ordinary route. It appearing that the present appeal involved largely questions of fact, and the constitutional questions raised not being substantial, the Court found and held that the case came within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 2 of Republic Act Number 2613.
On the second issue, the Court did not treat the alleged denial of a fair trial and the alleged compulsion to write on a piece of paper as substantial constitutional questions. That characterization is precisely why the appeal could not be kept in the Supreme Court on the strength of those claims.
On the third issue, the Court did not weigh the evidence itself. Because the appeal turned largely on questions of fact, the appreciation of the testimony of Eugenia Carag and of the defendant and his witnesses belonged to the Court of Appeals, to which the case was certified for determination in accordance with law.
Doctrine
First, an appeal from the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court is taken in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as an appeal from a court of first instance. It is not a direct appeal to the Supreme Court.
Second, where an appeal involves largely questions of fact and the constitutional questions raised are not substantial, appellate jurisdiction lies with the Court of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. A party cannot convert a factual appeal into a Supreme Court case by dressing it in constitutional language.
Third, the recognition of an illegitimate child may be compelled by judicial decree, and the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the mother and of the defendant and his witnesses is a question of fact for the appellate court to review.
Disposition
The Supreme Court did not rule on the merits; it ordered the case certified to the Court of Appeals for determination in accordance with law.
Remember This
Remember the line that an appeal from the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court is taken in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as an appeal from a court of first instance, so a factual appeal belongs to the Court of Appeals. Examiners use this case in procedure and jurisdiction questions, and as an illustration of a compelled recognition of an illegitimate child.