MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORP., PRINCESS CRUISE LINES AND MR. MARLON R. ROÑO, PETITIONERS, V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION) AND JUAN CARLOS QUIJANO, RESPONDENTS.
BRUSELAS, JR. J.:
“WHEREFORE, the appeal filed by respondents is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The decision dated 13 December 2010 (sic) is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.”[3]
Likewise assailed is the Resolution[4] dated 28 June 2013 which denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
The pertinent and relevant facts, as culled from the documentary submissions, are as follows:
The respondent Juan Carlos Quijano (Quijano) was employed by the petitioner Magsaysay Maritime Corp. (MMC) for and in behalf of its foreign principal, petitioner Princess Cruise Lines (PCL), as Bar Steward under a ten-month contract[5] dated 15 April 2011. He had a basic monthly salary of US$332.00, guaranteed overtime pay of US$343.00 per month and leave pay of US$50.00 per month. One month after he boarded the vessel Crown Princess-Hotel, Quijano noticed blood on the tip of the cotton bud while cleaning his left ear. After he consulted the ship doctor, he took a series of medications while on board. On 10 December 2011, he disembarked from the vessel and arrived in the country on 12 December 2011. He immediately reported to the company-designated physician on 13 December 2011 for an examination. Quijano was examined thrice between 13 December 2011 and 20 December 2011 under the care of an ENT specialist and was advised to take a Computed Tomography (CT) scan of his cranium. On his last visit on 20 December 2011, the company-designated physician noted that the CT scan showed “unremarkable” result and he was advised to continue his medications. His condition had been declared to be not work-related.
Unsatisfied with the findings of the company-designated physician, Quijano decided to consult another doctor, Dr. Charlotte M. Chiong, at the UP-Philippine General Hospital (PGH) for a second opinion. Dr. Chiong diagnosed Quijano with a skull base tumor. The Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) impression showed that he had “left temporal fossa menigioma and left acoustic schwannoma” and the CT scan revealed that Quijano had “otomastoiditis, left possible middle and external ear cholesteatoma formation“.[6] Because of the said findings, Quijano underwent “transtemporal subtotal petrosectomy excision of the skull base and CP angle tumor, left under general anesthesia” last 21 March 2012. After the surgery, the histopathologic report showed that Quijano had “adenoid cystic carcinoma with bone involvement“[7] which required radiation therapy. In a Medical Evaluation Report[8] dated 01 August 2012, Dr. Elinor Diola-De Jesus declared Quijano to be “not fit for further sea duty permanently in whatever capacity with a permanent total disability.” On 04 June 2012, Quijano filed a complaint for permanent total disability compensation, sickness allowance, refund of medical expenses and attorney’s fees against the petitioners. Because of a failure to settle the case amicably, the parties were directed by the Labor Arbiter to file their respective position papers.
In his position paper[9], Quijano averred that he had been on board ocean-going cruise ships since August 2006 and had never experienced illness or injury while on board except with his last contract with the petitioners. The pain that he had suffered in his left ear was not caused by a forceful cleaning. He immediately consulted the ship doctor Dr. Laura Teichmann and his condition had been assessed as “refractory left sided otitis externa with possible extension into the middle and inner ear” and was prescribed medicines for temporary relief and treatment.[10] Aside from the pain in his left ear, Quijano had also experienced Bell’s palsy, myalgia, fatigue and intermittent episodes of dizzines or vertigo. Such health condition had been assessed by the ship doctor as a result of having been working outdoors in very hot, humid weather.”[11] Quijano alleged that his inability to continue his employment and consequent disability had been connected to or aggravated by his work. The aggravation had been caused by insufficient medical attention and that, despite his deteriorating condition, he was still required to report for work. Consequently, the senior ship doctor, Dr. Mark Mason ordered Quijano’s medical repatriation.
Upon his arrival in the Philippines, he immediately reported to the company-designated physician Dr. Esther G. Go who had examined and had treated him for less than a month. Thereafter, he was told, “ok na tenga mo, continue lang antibiotic at ear drops.”[12] Quijano knew the real condition of his condition when he consulted Dr. Chiong and further examinations revealed that he had a malignant skull base tumor. While Quijano was under treatment he regularly reported to the petitioners’ office and informed them about his medication and medical expenses. The petitioners assured him that he would be reimbursed of his expenses. Quijano had incurred P420,000.00 for the surgery[13] and the radiation therapies and other treatments at the Philippine Oncology Center Corp. had cost him P61,800.00.[14] Despite submission of pertinent documents for reimbursement, petitioner MMC paid Quijano only P40,000.00. As to his sickness allowance, he was given only the amount of US$100.00.
The petitioners, for their part, averred that Quijano could not validly claim for full disability benefits under the POEA Standard Contract because he had failed to show proof that his illness was work-related. First, he had embarked on an ordinary cruise line and, second, he had not been exposed to harmful working conditions that may have caused or aggravated his condition. Quijano’s illness or chronic otitis externa and media, which occurred sometime a month after he embarked the vessel, could be attributed to his improper grooming. The petitioners insisted that the presumption of work-relatedness had been negated by the fact that the company-designated physician declared Quijano’s illness to be ‘not work-related’. Consequently, Quijano had no factual and legal bases to be reimbursed of his medical expenses. Anent the sickness allowance, the petitioners asserted that Quijano had already been paid as shown on the vouchers[15] attached to their position paper. The petitioners further asserted that Quijano erroneously impleaded petitioner Marlon Roño being merely an officer of petitioner MMC which had a separate and distinct personality from its officers/stockholders.
Via her 26 March 2013 decision, the Labor Arbiter held that Quijano was entitled to permanent total disability benefits in the sum of US$60,000.00, moral damages, reimbursement for medical expenses, sickness allowance and attorney’s fees. The Labor Arbiter ratiocinated as follows:
“In the instant case, the only piece of evidence submitted by the respondents in support of the contention that the complainant’s illnesses are not work-related is the above-mentioned final report of the company-designated physician stating that “patient’s ear condition is not work-related.” It is doubtful that the report in question is a well-grounded, fair and objective assessment of the complainant’s condition. While the above-quoted provision of the POEA SEC provides for a maximum 120-day period (which was increased to 240 days in Vergara vs. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., GR No. 172933, October 6, 2008) within which the companydesignated physician is required to assess the seafarer’s fitness for work or the degree of his disability, the company-designated physician in the instant case declared the complainant’s condition to be not work-related in a record-breaking span of seven (7) days. Never has a company-designated physician dealt with a seafarer’s medical problem so swiftly. Moreover, under the above-quoted provision of the POEA SEC, the company-designated physician is tasked to determine the seafarer’s fitness for work or degree of disability, which the company-designated physician in the instant case completely failed to do. Furthermore, as stated earlier, the company-designated physician in the instant case reported that the complainant’s CT scan was “unremarkable” (records, p. 85); two (2) months later, a second CT scan revealed that the complainant had cancer (records, p. 41). Following the ruling in Andrada vs. Agemar Manning Agency, GR No. 194758, October 24, 2012, the abovementioned report of the company-designated physician cannot be given any weight since it is not supported by diagnostic tests and procedures. All told, the company-designated physician’s declaration that the complainant’s condition is not work-related is not convincing and falls far short of substantial evidence. Thus, the disputable presumption that the complainant’s cancer is work-related has not been overcome. It must therefore be concluded that the complainant’s illnesses – acoustic schwannoma – is work-related. As there is no question that he may no longer work as a seafarer, there is no reason why he may not recover permanent and total disability compensation.
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It is common knowledge that time is of the essence in the treatment and management of cancer. In the instant case, the medical report (records, p. 77) dated October 13, 2011 rendered by a physician who examined the complainant in France shows that the latter was advised to undergo a CT scan should his condition fail to improve. The ship doctor made the same recommendation in the above-quoted report dated December 9, 2011. It was only on or about December 16, 2011 that the respondents, through the company-designated physician, arranged for a CT scan to be undertaken by the complainant. As stated earlier, the respondents did not submit the result, or report, on that CT scan. By the time the complainant underwent a second CT scan at the UP-PGH, the cancer had metastasized, or spread, to his bone (records, pp. 40-41). It cannot be gainsaid under the circumstances, that in violation of paragraph 2, Section 20 of the POEA-SEC, which was quoted earlier, the respondents failed to give the complainant timely, competent and adequate medical attention, which resulted in the rapid deterioration of his health. This, and the company-designated physician’s swift and cursory handling of the complainant’s illness, which is contrary to public policy, justify an award of moral damages in his favor.”[16]
On appeal, the petitioners argued that the medical findings of the company-designated physician and other doctors deserve to be given credence because they had spent sufficient time and effort in carrying out an extensive management for the treatment of Quijano’s illness. While the petitioners were cognizant of the illness suffered by Quijano, the same did not ipso facto entitle the latter to permanent disability benefits without compliance with the grading provided under the POEA-SEC or being considered permanently unfit under the CBA. The petitioners asserted that, absent proof showing that the findings of the companydesignated physician had been biased and self-serving, Quijano miserably failed to overcome the assessment of their doctor that his illness was not work-related.
In the assailed decision rendered by the NLRC, the appeal of the petitioners was denied for lack of merit. The NLRC emphasized that, regardless of the ear condition or illness of Quijano not being listed as an occupational disease, the same was disputably work-related; thus, the petitioners had the burden to establish that there was no causal connection between the job and the illness of Quijano. As to the medical expenses and sickness allowance, the NLRC declared that Quijano was entitled to sickness allowance while he underwent medical procedures and treatments in line with the finding that Quijano’s illness was work-related. The reimbursement of medical expenses was also found to be with substantial basis upon submission of valid and convincing proof of the actual amount incurred. The award of moral damages and attorney’s fees in favor of Quijano was also sustained by the NLRC for being justified because the petitioners failed to give him seasonable and proper medical attention which resulted in the fast decline of his health. Consequently, Quijano’s claim for disability benefits was found to be with factual and lawful bases.
Aggrieved, the petitioners come to us via this petition for certiorari which ascribes to the NLRC the following acts allegedly amounting to grave abuse of discretion, to wit:
I.
IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO US$60,000.00.
II.
WHEN IT HELD PETTIONERS LIABLE FOR FURTHER MEDICAL REIMBURSEMENTS AND SICKNESS ALLOWANCE DESPITE THE COMPANY-DESIGNATED PHYSICIAN’S FINDING THAT SEAFARER’S ILLNESS WAS NOT WORK-RELATED.
III.
WHEN IT AWARDED ATTORNEY’S FEES EQUIVALENT TO 10% OF THE TOTAL MONETARY AWARD AND MORAL DAMAGES DESPITE THE FACT THAT PETITIONERS NEVER ACTED WITH BAD FAITH IN DEALING WITH PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE DENIAL OF HIS CLAIMS.”
The petitioners are fundamentally assailing the findings of both the Labor Arbiter and NLRC and anchor their objection to the grant of disability benefits to Quijano upon the declaration of the company-designated physician that Quijano’s illness was not work-related. They claim that Quijano rendered his services as Bar Steward in an ordinary cruise line where he was not exposed to harmful working conditions that may have caused or aggravated his condition; that nothing in his duties as Bar Steward would show any relation or risk factor that may result to his illness.
The petition has no merit.
The appellate court’s jurisdiction to review a decision of the NLRC in a petition for certiorari is confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.[17] In certiorari proceedings under Rule 65, questions of fact are not generally permitted, the inquiry being limited essentially to whether or not the respondent tribunal acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.[18] Further, the factual findings of the NLRC affirming those of the Labor Arbiter, when devoid of any unfairness or arbitrariness, are accorded respect if not finality by us.[19]
Because the employment contract between the petitioners and Quijano was signed on 15 April 2011[20], deemed read and incorporated into the same are the provisions of the 2010 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Amended Standard Terms and Conditions governing seafarers[21]. Section 20(A) of the said memorandum reads:
“SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
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3. In addition to the above obligation of the employer to provide medical attention, the seafarer shall also receive sickness allowance from his employer in an amount equivalent to his basic wage computed from the time he signed off until he is declared fit to work or the degree of disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician. The period within which the seafarer shall be entitled to his sickness allowance shall not exceed 120 days. Payment of the sickness allowance shall be made on a regular basis, but not less than once a month.
The seafarer shall be entitled to reimbursement of the cost of medicines prescribed by the company-designated physician. In case treatment of the seafarer is on an out-patient basis as determined by the company-designated physician, the company shall approve the appropriate mode of transportation and accommodation. The reasonable cost of actual traveling expenses and/or accommodation shall be paid subject to liquidation and submission of official receipts and/or proof of expenses.
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4. Those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work related.”
We note the fact that Quijano was initially diagnosed with having “chronic otitis externa and media, left” by the petitioners’ company-designated physician during the 8-day medical evaluation. A further medical procedure through CT scan revealed that Quijano was probably suffering from “acoustic schwannoma” which, after surgery, was found to be “adenoid cystic carcinoma with bone involvement” per histopathologic report[22] cited by Dr. Elinor Diola-De Jesus.
Quijano’s ear condition was intensively evaluated by Dr. Elinor Diola-De Jesus, a specialist in the field of ear, nose, throat, head and neck surgery. The pertinent portion of her evaluation is herein quoted, to wit:
“Histopathologic reports revealed: Adenoid Cystic Carcinoma with Bone Involvement. Positive for tumor specimens labeled mastoid-Left, carotid-Left, zygomatic-left, facial nerve-left, Eustachian-left, tegmen-left, jugular-left and temporal-left.
At present, the patient is undergoing adjuvant radiation therapy at the Philippine Oncology Center Corp.
Adenoid cystic carcinoma is often slow-growing but locally aggressive and particularly prone to recurrence. Poor prognostic features include neural spread and positive surgical margins which was seen on the patient. This would require follow-up appointments and imaging studies every 3 to 6 months. He is presently suffering from loss of speech and profound hearing loss on the left ear. Profound unilateral hearing loss makes hearing in background noise difficult. It also negatively affects hearing by making it more difficult for the patient to determine the direction, distance and movement of sound sources. His facial nerve was sacrificed during the operation which leaves him symptoms of facial nerve injury, such as lagopthalmos or inability to close the eyelids completely which leads to corneal drying and ulceration. As a deck steward, Seafarer Juan Carlos Quijano can no longer attend or interact with the passengers of different nationalities on board. Had his medical condition on board been addressed earlier, the aggravation of his condition would have been avoided. Stress, long-working hours and other working factors on board his last vessel of assignment may have contributed to the aggravation of his condition. With all these impediments, he is not fit for further sea duty permanently in whatever capacity with a permanent total disability.”[23]
Thus, Quijano had Adenoid Cystic Carcinoma (ACC) with bone involvement or malignant tumor of the temporal bone which is a more serious disease and not merely “acoustic schwannoma“. In fact, Quijano underwent adjuvant radiation therapies at the Philippine Oncology Center Corp.[24] to destroy any remaining cancer cells or to prevent the recurrence thereof.
The cause of ACC is not known. The disease, however, is not presumed to be inherited as is the case with other cancers. According to the Adenoid Cystic Carcinoma Organization International, the reasonable working hypothesis is that ACC, like most cancers, is the result of environmental factors that cause normal cells to acquire genetic changes, leading to uncontrolled growth.[25] Carcinoma of the temporal bone is rare and it includes cancers arising from skin of the pinna that spread to the temporal bone; primary tumors of the external auditory canal (EAC), middle ear, mastoid, or petrous apex and metastatic lesions to the temporal bone.[26] When otitis involves the middle ear, located just behind the eardrum, it is called otitis media, or ear infection.[27] Chronic otitis externa and media (which was the initial diagnosis on Quijano’s ear condition) and cholesteatoma are common in patients with temporal bone cancers and have been implicated as etiologic factors.[28] Further, malignancies of the temporal bone arise most commonly from the pinna and lateral concha because these sites are likely to have undergone many years of sun exposure.[29]
Carcinoma of the temporal bone is not one of the diseases enumerated under Sec. 32-A of the POEA Amended Standard Terms and Conditions. However, Sec. 20(A)(4) of the same contract clearly provides a disputable presumption in favor of the compensability of an illness suffered by a seafarer during the term of his contract.[30] This disputable presumption works in favor of the seafarer pursuant to the mandate that the well-being of Filipino contract workers shall be protected.[31] Hence, unless contrary evidence is presented by the petitioners as employers of Quijano, this disputable presumption stands.
The petitioners harp on the opinion of the companydesignated physician that Quijano’s “left ear condition is not work-related.” As observed by the NLRC, the companydesignated physician’s medical report simply stated that a cranial CT scan was made and that the result was unremarkable. The said result was, however, not attached to the report nor submitted by the petitioners to be part of the record. Further, the NLRC pointed out that the ENT specialist’s medical opinion which purportedly supported the company-designated doctor’s opinion, was also not attached to the report.
The Job Description[32] which listed Quijano’s duties and responsibilities as Bar Steward is not conclusive to support the petitioners’ assertion that he was not exposed to harmful working conditions that may have caused or aggravated his condition. Apart from the tasks that were specifically described to be performed by Quijano, he was also required ‘to respond to any additional work requests as may be necessary’. While the petitioners strongly aver that Quijano was working under suitable working conditions, they failed to describe those additional tasks that Quijano was expected to perform. Further, the nature of his job being in constant exposure to environmental factors such as the sunlight, air pressure and humidity and extreme weather conditions may have caused the normal cells to acquire genetic changes, leading to the uncontrolled growth of the malignant tumor. It can be inferred also from the submissions that Quijano’s illness was aggravated because his condition was not addressed immediately with proper medication or procedure to detect an early sign of cancer. Although the symptoms of his disease have manifested while on board, Quijano was still required to work for around six months despite his condition.[33] At this point, it can be gleaned that the petitioners failed to overthrow the presumption that there was reasonable connection between the working conditions and the illness suffered by Quijano and that the working conditions may have aggravated his illness.
It bears noting that the company-designated physician failed to make a declaration whether Quijano was fit to resume his work as seafarer or determine the grade of his disability. The report merely stated that there was no causal connection between his work and his illness. The compensability of Quijano’s illness having been established, the opinion of the petitioners’ company- designated doctor that the illness was not work-related no longer holds any particular significance. According to Dr. Elinor Diola-De Jesus, Quijano suffered from loss of speech and profound hearing loss on the left ear. Said hearing loss makes it more difficult for him to determine the direction, distance and movement of sound sources. Quijano also suffered from facial nerve injury such as lagopthalmos or inability to close the eyelids completely which may affect his visual sense. These conditions could consequently prevent Quijano from performing his usual occupation which includes attending to and interacting with passengers of different nationalities on board the cruise ship and even in carrying out ordinary tasks. Given that Quijano was unable to work for more than 120 days, the failure of the company-designated doctor to pronounce him fit to work within the 120-day period entitles him to permanent total disability benefit in the amount of US$60,000.00.[34]
Sec. 20 (A) of the 2010 POEA Amended Terms and Conditions recognizes the right of a seafarer to seek a second medical opinion and the prerogative to consult a physician of his choice. In fact, it allows a third opinion in case the seafarer’s doctor disagrees with the assessment of the company-designated physician. Therefore, the provision should not be construed that it is only the company-designated physician who could assess the condition and declare the disability of Quijano. The provision does not serve as a limitation but rather a guarantee of protection to overseas workers like Quijano.
Although the employer is not the insurer of the health of his employees, he takes them as he finds them and assumes the risk of liability.[35] The quantum of evidence required in labor cases to determine the liability of an employer for the illness suffered by an employee under the POEA Amended Terms and Condition is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but mere substantial evidence or “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”[36]
Anent the sickness allowance, we opine that the petitioners’ contemporaneous act of extending to Quijano his sickness allowance under Sec. 20(A) of the 2010 POEA Amended Terms and Conditions is an admission that Quijano is entitled to it, since an employer is liable for the payment of sickness allowance only when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract.
As to the award of moral damages, the same is properly granted there being showing of bad faith or malice on the part of the petitioners. The record shows that Quijano was required to perform his job while he was suffering the symptoms of his illness. When Quijano was examined on 13 October 2011 in France, the doctor advised that he should undergo a CT scan but it was only after he was repatriated that the company-designated doctor arranged for a CT scan sometime 16 December 2011. After the CT scan was conducted, Quijano was not adequately informed of the results thereof; thus, his condition was understated. The company-designated doctor failed to conduct adequate and immediate medical attention to properly address Quijano’s condition which eventually developed into a severe case of adenoid cystic carcinoma with bone involvement or malignant tumor of the temporal bone. In order to confirm his true state of health, Quijano had to seek another medical opinion and consequently shouldered all the expenses incurred in his surgery and subsequent radiation therapies and medications. Quijano submitted the pertinent documents to the Claims Department of the petitioner MMC but was paid only P40,000.00 despite the assurance that he would be reimbursed of his medical expenses.
Lastly, the claim for attorney’s fees may be granted following Article 2208 of the New Civil Code which allows its recovery in actions for recovery of wages of laborers, actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability laws. Circumstances show that Quijano demanded from the petitioners the payment of his disability benefits but the same went unheeded. Left with no other recourse, Quijano filed the instant case to recover what is rightfully his under the law. Plainly, he was compelled to litigate due to petitioners’ failure to satisfy his valid claim. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, Quijano is entitled to attorney’s fees of ten percent (10%) of the total award at its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment.[37]
In fine, the court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the NLRC because we see ample evidence that support the labor tribunal’s conclusion that Quijano was entitled to permanent, total disability benefits. Again, the findings of facts and conclusion of the NLRC are generally accorded not only great weight and respect but even clothed with finality and deemed binding as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, we find no grave abuse on the part of the NLRC in its exercise of discretion. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.[38]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Salazar-Fernando (Chairperson) and Barrios,[*] JJ., concur.
[*] Actg. Third Member vice J. Gaerlan per Office Order No. 270-14-RSF dated 06 June 2014
[1] Dated 31 May 2013 in NLRC-LAC (OFW-M)-05-000444-13, Rollo, p. 35.
[2] Rollo, p. 52.
[3] Rollo, p. 49.
[4] Rollo, p. 69.
[5] Annex “F”, Rollo, p. 133.
[6] See Medical Abstract, Rollo, p. 137.
[7] See Medical Evaluation Report dated 01 August 2012, Rollo, p. 142.
[8] Id.
[9] Rollo, p. 111.
[10] See Medical Referral dated 09 December 2011, Rollo, p. 135.
[11] Id.
[12] See Affidavit par. 14, Rollo, p. 125.
[13] Rollo, p. 140.
[14] Rollo, p. 144.
[15] Rollo, p. 110.
[16] Rollo, pp. 63-66.
[17] Odango vs. NLRC, GR No. 147420, 10 June 2004, 431 SCRA 633.
[18] Quiambao vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 128305, 28 March 2005, 454 SCRA 17.
[19] Bolinao Security and Investigation Service, Inc. vs. Toston, GR No. 139135, 29 January 2004, 421 SCRA 406.
[20] See Annex “F”, Rollo, p. 133.
[21] POEA Memorandum Circular No. 10, Series of 2010.
[22] Supra note 7.
[23] Supra note 7.
[24] See Rollo, p. 144.
[25] http://www.accoi.org/faq/what-acc/, date visited: 07 May 2014.
[26] http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/845777-overview#a0101; Moody Antonio, MD and Meyers, MD, MBA; Updated on 05 March 2012; Date visited: 13 April 2014.
[27] Updated by: Neil K. Kaneshiro, MD, MHA, Clinical Assistant Professor of Pediatrics, University of Washington School of Medicine. Also reviewed by David Zieve, MD, MHA, Medical Director, A.D.A.M. Health Solutions, Ebix, Inc.; Updated on 01 August 2012;
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/001336.htm; Date visited: 11 April 2014.
[28] http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/845777-overview#a0102; Moody Antonio, MD and Meyers, MD, MBA; Updated on 05 March 2012; Date visited: 13 April 2014.
[29] Supra note 26.
[30] “4. Those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work-related.”
[31] See Executive Order No. 247 dated 21 July 1987.
[32] Rollo, p. 107.
[33] See Medical Evaluation Report dated 01 August 2012, Annex “N”, Rollo, p. 142.
[34] Abante vs. KJGS Fleet Management Manila, et al., GR No. 182430, 04 December 2009, 607 SCRA 734.
[35] Fil-Star Maritime Corporation vs. Rosete, GR No. 192686, 23 November 2011, 661 SCRA 247.
[36] Government Service Insurance System vs. Besitan, G.R. No. 178901, 23 November 2011, 661 SCRA 186.
[37] Valenzona vs. Fair Shipping Corporation, GR No. 176884, 19 October 2011, 659 SCRA 642.
[38] United Coconut Planters Bank vs. Looyuko and Go, G.R. No. 156337, 28 September 2007, 534 SCRA 322.