ROMEO ALARCON, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

The charge is estafa thru falsification
of an official or public docu­ment.  The
Court of First Instance of Manila found petitioner herein guilty thereof and
sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 1 year, 10 months and 21
days of prision correccional,
as minimum, to 5 years 2 months and 7 days also of prision
correccional, as maximum, with the accessories of
the law, to pay a fine of P2,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.  The
Court of Appeals affirmed.  The case is
now before us for review.

Following are the facts:

“x x x that on January 30, 1959, Alarcon
paid the ar­rastre fee in the sum of P36.75 as per
receipt Exhibit G, for four cases of camphor chests from Hongkong;
that on February 2, 1959 by delivery permit Exhibit C, containing a falsified
certification by a fictitious customs examiner (Exhibit C-1) that he had
examined the cargo and authorized delivery thereof and without the permit
having been processed and audited as required by standard procedure nor custom
duties and taxes paid, the accused Romeo Alarcon who
is a representative of Magpayo & Basa Brokerage (Exhibit J) requested for, and obtained from
Guillermo Enriquez, a checker of the Manila Port Service, the four cases of
camphor chests and gate pass Exhibit E after Alarcon’s
companion exhibited falsified written authority from the consignee to withdraw
the goods and in proof thereof signed at the back of the delivery per­mit,
right hand margin, Exhibit C; that when the truck which Alarcon
hired arrived at Gate 1, he gave the gate pass to the gatekeeper Vicente Bagason, who let the truck pass as evidenced by the
latter’s signature (Exh. E-2); that Alarcon was in the truck that brought the cargo to 101 Mayon Street, Quezon City, and
later paid the truck driver P40.00 for his services; that the cargo consisted
of four cases contain­ing four sets of camphor chests as shown in the
photograph Exhibit L, which were subsequently recovered from Mrs. Soledad Montalbo at 101 Mayon Street who
gave the state­ment, Exhibit K adopted by the defense as Exhibit 1, that the
accused Romeo Alarcon upon receipt from her of the
delivery permit undertook to secure the release of the cargo for P200,00, the
accused to take care of everything including customs duties and taxes; that Rufino Achacoso whose name
appears as the consignee denied having imported the articles listed in the
delivery permit Exhibit C, or having executed the application for permit to
import commodities for personal use, Exhibit B, or owning res­idence
certificate Exhibit A which was necessary in the execution of the application,
Exhibit B, which residence certificate is different from his as to number,
place and date of issue and contains false data regarding his place and date of
birth and residence."

Petitioner’s claim that he neither forged the delivery permit nor
caused it to be forged, is ruled out, because: 
(1) Rufino Acha­coso,
whose name appears as the consignee, did not import the cam­phor chests in
question.  (2) Petitioner’s averment that
when he got hold of the falsified delivery permit it was already falsified, was
"based on evidence for the defense which was not given credence by the
trial court" and by the Court of Appeals. 
(3) To procure release of the goods, petitioner used said falsified
delivery permit and his companion had to exhibit another falsified
document – a written authority from the supposed consignee – to withdraw
the goods.  It was on the basis of these
forged papers that Guillermo Enriquez, a checker of the Manila Port Service,
released the goods to peti­tioner and gave him the corresponding gate
pass.  (4) Petitioner, at the time, was a
representative of Magpayo & Basa
Brokerage.  Yet, he acted by
himself.  He did not merely work for the
release of the camphor chests from the Manila Port Service.  Be gave the gate pass to the gatekeeper;
hired the truck which took out the camphor chests; went with the truck and
accompanied the shipment to 101 Mayon Street, Quezon City where said camphor chests were recovered;
himself paid the truck driver P40.00 for his services.

Considering the patent
irregularity of the transaction, the extra­ordinary interest in the goods
displayed by petitioner and the circum­stances of the case, no reasonable and fairminded man would say that said petitioner – a customs
broker’s representative – had no knowledge of the falsification.  A rule, well-buttressed upon reason, is that, in the absence of
satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged
document, is the forger or one who caused the forgery, and, therefore guilty of
falsification.^[1]

Correctly, the trial court declared:

"The professed innocence and good faith of the accused is
inherently incredible and negated by the circumstances of the case and by the
evidence for the prosecution.  There is
no question that the delivery permit (Exhibit C) is falsified, because the signature
above the words ‘Customs Examiner’ is fictitious and the certification stamped
thereon that the goods detailed in the permit has been examined by the Customs
Examiner and their release authorized implying re­lease by the No-Dollar Import
Office and payment of customs duties and taxes; and without such certificate
and signature, the checker of the Manila Port Service would not have issued the
gate pass (Exhibit E) which enabled the accused and his confederate to obtain
the release to them of the camphor chests detailed in the delivery permit,
without said chests being examined and processed by the Customs people nor
Customs duties and taxes paid thereon. 
The guilty participation of the defendant is further shown by his
payment of the arrastre service (Exhibit G) as ad­mitted
by him and under the suspicious circumstances surrounding the whole
transaction.  x x x"

The judgment of the Court
of Appeals under review, confirming that of the trial court, is hereby
affirmed.  Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Regala, Bengzon, Zaldivar, and Castro, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, J., took no part.

^[1]
People vs. de Lara, 45 Phil. 754, 760-761; People vs. Cu Unjieng, 61 Phil. 906, 922; People vs. Canta, 40 O.G. No. 15, 11 Supp. pp. 46, 48-52; People vs.
Loteyro, et al., 50 O.G. No. 2 pp. 632, 635; People vs.
Dala, 50 O.G. No. 6, pp. 2675, 2677; People vs.
Manan­sala, G.R. No. L-13142, January 30, 1959.