FELIMON C. MARQUEZ, RICARDO SUAREZ AND ANASTACIO ROXAS, PETITIONERS, VS. GAVINO R. ALEJO, LUIS CRUZ, PEDRO D. OFIANA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF THE PROVINCE OF BUL…

Appeal from the order* of the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan dismissing Special
Proceedings No. 340-V for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction.  The appeal was elevated to
the Court of Appeals.  It was certified
to this Court by the Court of Appeals as it involves only questions of law.

The Court of Appeals resolution** reads:

“It appears that at the instance of private respondents Gavino R. Alejo and Luis Cruz the provincial
fiscal of Bulacan filed a complaint for
falsification of public documents by public officers against petitioners Felimon C. Marquez and Ricardo Suarez, then municipal mayor
and treasurer of Obando, Bulacan, respectively (I.S. No. 2389).  A complaint for estafa
through falsification of public document was also filed against petitioner Anastacio Roxas (I.S. No.
2390).  After conducting an
investigation, the provincial fiscal issued a resolution dismissing the charges
against petitioners for lack of sufficient evidence to warrant criminal
prosecution.

“Private respondents then filed a petition for review and/or
appeal with the Secretary of Justice who in a 3rd Indorsement
dated July 14, 1966,
through the Chief State Prosecutor, requested the investigating fiscal to make
a thorough reinvestigation of the cases in view of an apparent inconsistency in
the resolution dismissing the same. 
However, said fiscal in his 4th Indorsement
dated August 1, 1966,
disclaimed any inconsistency. 
Nonetheless, he conducted several hearings on the requested
reinvestigation.

“Prior to the hearing set for May 10, 1967, petitioners filed
with the CFI of Bulacan a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the provincial fiscal
from proceeding with the reinvestigation of the charges lodged against
them.  Finding the petition sufficient in
form and substance, the respondent court issued on May 9, 1967, a temporary restraining order enjoining the
provincial fiscal from continuing with the reinvestigation.

“After trial respondent court on December 6, 1968, issued an order dismissing the petition
and dissolving its restraining order.

“Petitioners have appealed to this Court claiming that:

“I

“THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE IS ‘A NECESSARY AND
INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO THIS CASE’ (PAGE 2, ORDER APPEARING ON PAGE 188 OF
RECORDS; ALSO APPENDIX ‘A’)

“II

“THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE THIRD INDORSEMENT
OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE DATED JULY 14, 1966 (EXHIBIT D) TAKEN AS A WHOLE IS
NOT A REQUEST FOR REINVESTIGATION BUT AN ORDER TO REINVESTIGATE BASED ON THE
ALLEGED FINDING OF ‘APPARENT INCONSISTENCY.’

“III

“THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE RESOLUTION OF
RESPONDENT-APPELLEE PROVINCIAL FISCAL IN I.S. NOS. 2306, 2389 and 2390 DATED
DECEMBER 15, 1965 (EXHIBIT C) DISMISSING THE SAID CASES SHOULD BE MAINTAINED.

“IV

“THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THRU HIS STATE PROSECUTOR,
ENCROACHED UPON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE RESPONDENT-APPELLEE PROVINCIAL FISCAL
PEDRO D. OFIANA OF HIS DUTY, WHICH IS NOT ADMINISTRATIVE IN NATURE.

“V

“THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT ASSUMING ARGUENDO
BUT VIGOROUSLY DENYING THAT THE REMEDIES TAKEN BY RESPONDENTS-APPELLEE GAVINO
R. ALEJO AND LUIS CRUZ ARE PROPER, NEVERTHELESS, THE SAME ARE NULL AND VOID FOR
LACK OF NOTICE TO THE PETITIONERS, WHO WERE DEPRIVED OF THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW
OR THEIR DAY IN COURT, AND WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE ORDERLY ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE.

“VI

“THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES GAVINO R. ALEJO AND LUIS CRUZ
WITH THE AID OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
ARE USING THE STRONG ARM OF THE LAW IN AN OPPRESSIVE AND VINDICTIVE MANNER.

“VII

“THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE INDORSEMENT OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THRU HIS
CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR, DATED JULY 14,
1966 (EXHIBIT D) IS NULL AND VOID AND THE RESPONDENT-APPELLEE
PROVINCIAL FISCAL OR HIS ASSISTANTS SHOULD PERMANENTLY BE ENJOINED FROM
PROCEEDING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SAME.

“VIII

“THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN DISMISSING
THE PETITION DATED MAY 6, 1967
AND IN DISSOLVING AND SETTING ASIDE THE RESTRAINING ORDER DATED MAY 9, 1967.”

Upon consideration of the foregoing assignment of errors and the
issues as stated in their brief, we believe that petitioners-appellants raise
no factual issues but only questions of law. 
Thus, the dismissal of their petition on the ground of failure to
include the Secretary of Justice as a necessary and indispensable party in this
suit poses a legal issue.  Similarly legal in nature is the question of
whether or not the Secretary of Justice is authorized to ask a fiscal to
reinvestigate a case after the
latter has made a finding that there is insufficiency of evidence to warrant
criminal prosecution.

As the issues in this appeal involve questions of law, the Supreme
Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the same (Uytiepo
vs. Aggabao, L-28671, Sept. 30, 1970, 35 SCRA 186,
192).

WHEREFORE, pursuant to the
provisions of Section 17 in connection with Section 31 of Republic Act No. 296,
as amended, and Section 3 of Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court, this case
is hereby certified to the Supreme Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.”

At the outset, it
will be noted that the legal issues presented
to this Court for resolution were formulated when the 1964 Rules
on criminal procedure were still
in force and effect.  These rules have been superseded by the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure.  Section 4,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court now squarely covers the issues.  It provides thus –

Sec. 4. 
Duty of investigating fiscal
– If the investigating fiscal finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he
shall prepare the resolution and corresponding information.  He shall certify under oath that he has
examined the complainant and his witnesses, that there is reasonable ground to
believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, that the accused
was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him and
that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting
evidence.  Otherwise, he shall recommend
dismissal of the complaint.

In either case, he shall forward the records of the case to the provincial
or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor within five (5) days from his
resolution.  The latter shall take
appropriate action thereon within ten (10) days from receipt thereof,
immediately informing the parties of said action.

No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an
investigating fiscal without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city
fiscal or chief state prosecutor.

Where the investigating assistant fiscal recommends the dismissal
of the case but his findings are reversed by the provincial or city fiscal or
chief state prosecutor on the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter
may, by himself, file the corresponding information against the respondent or
direct any other assistant fiscal or state prosecutor to do so, without conducting another preliminary investigation.

If upon petition by a proper party, the Minister of Justice
reverses the resolution of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor,
he shall direct the fiscal concerned to file the corresponding information
without conducting another preliminary investigation or to dismiss or move for
dismissal of the complaint or information. 
(Emphasis supplied)”

Under
the above-quoted Rule, which was taken from Pres. Dec. No. 911^[1], and is supported by Previous rulings of this
Court^[2], the Minister (now Secretary) of Justice is
empowered to order or perform the very acts questioned by petitioners in this
case.  As held in Crespo v. Hon. Mogul^[3], on the rights and duties of fiscals:

“It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either
commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal.  The institution of a criminal action depends
upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. 
He may or may not file the complaint or information, follow or not
follow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence,
in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.  The reason for
placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal
is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons.  It cannot be controlled by the complainant.  Prosecuting officers under the power vested
in them by law, not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting
persons who, according to the evidence received from the complainant, are shown
to be guilty of a crime committed within the
jurisdiction of their office.

It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the
fiscal determines the existence of a prima
facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case.  The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal’s discretion and control of the criminal
prosecution.  It is not prudent or even permissible for a Court to compel the fiscal to
prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an
information, if he finds that the evidence relied upon by him is
insufficient for conviction.  Neither has the Court any power to order the fiscal to prosecute or file an information within a certain period of time, since this
would interfere with the fiscal’s discretion and
control of criminal prosecutions.  Thus,
a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence
has authority to do so, and Courts that grant the same commit no
error.  The fiscal may reinvestigate a case and subsequently move for the
dismissal should the re-investigation show either that the defendant is
innocent or that his guilt may not be established beyond reasonable doubt.  In a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal
who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant,
those of the fiscal’s should normally prevail.  On the other hand, neither an injunction,
preliminary or final nor a writ of prohibition may be issued by the Courts to
restrain a criminal prosecution except in the extreme case where it is
necessary for the Courts to do so for the orderly administration of justice or
to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive
manner.

However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without
any limitation or control.  The same is
subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state
prosecutor as the case may be and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary
of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion
of the fiscal.  Consequently the
Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an
information be filed in Court.” (Emphasis supplied)

Once the case is filed in court, however, the court acquires complete jurisdiction over the
case.  As Crespo
ruled:

“The rule therefore in
this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in
Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or
acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.  Although the fiscal retains the direction and
control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in
Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.  The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it.  The determination of the case
is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence.  A motion to dismiss the case filed by the
fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the
same. 
It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of
the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation^[4]“. 
(Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, in view of the supervening developments,
above-stated, the petition (appeal) is hereby dismissed.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera,
Paras, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

* Issued by
Judge Juan de Borja.

** Penned by
Justice Mariano Serrano, with the concurrence of Justices Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr. and Ricardo C. Puno.

^[1]
(1976)

^[2]
Estrella vs. Orendain, Jr., G.R. No. L-19611, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 640; Oliveros v. Villaluz, G.R. No. L-33362, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 327; Caeg v. Abad Santos, G.R. No. L-40044, March 10, 1975, 63 SCRA 96; Noblejas v. Salas, G.R. Nos. L-31788 & L-31792, Septem­ber 15, 1975, 67 SCRA 47; Vda. de Jacob v. Puno, G.R. No. L-61554-55, July 31, 1984, 131 SCRA 144

^[3]
G.R. No. 53373, 30 June 1987

^[4]
Ibid.