THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. BENJAMIN Z. YELO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental modifying its decision in a criminal case after the case
had been dismissed.

It appears that on March 25, 1947, the city attorney of Bacolod
filed with the municipal court an information charging Benjamin Z. Yelo, the
present appellant, with slight physical injuries. Having been found guilty of
the offense charged, he was sentenced to pay a fine of P25 and costs. From that
decision the defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance where the
information filed with the municipal court was reproduced.

On December 23, 1947, the latter court dismissed the case in an
order which reads as follows:

“ORDEN

“Al Ilamarse a vista esta causa, el acusado asistido de su
abogado, Sr. Amado B. Parreño, ha comparecido. El Fiscal, Sr. Sola manifesto que
esta causa ha sido iniciada por la Fiscalia de la Ciudad de Bacolod y en vista
de que ningun Fiscal de dicha oficina ha comparecido, pidio la posposicion de la
vista de la misma.

“Esta causa se halla ante este Juzgado en grado de apelacion y
la querella se reprodujo el 23 de Junio, 1947. La vista de la misma ha estado
posponiendose: la primera vez el Noviembre 20 y la segunda vez el Noviembre
27.

“En el dia de hoy, ninguno de los testigos del gobierno ha
comparecido y menos el ofendido Aguinaldo Absalon.

“Se deniega la peticion y se sobresee esta causa con las costas
de oficio.

“El Sr. Amado B. Parreño, abogado de la defensa, manifesto acto
continuo que el acusado es policia de la Ciudad de Bacolod y ha sido suspendido
de su cargo desde la fecha de la presentacion de la querella, o sea, 25 de Marzo
de este año; habiendo sido sobreseida la misma, alego que, por virtud del Art.
2272 del Codigo Administrativo Revisado, tiene derecho no solamente a ser
repuesto en el cargo sino tambien a recibir el salario correspondiente desde la
fecha de su suspension hasta su reposicion y pidio, en su virtud, que el Juzgado
dicte una orden al efecto.

“Como se pide, se declara al referido acusado con derecho a
recibir el salario correspondiente a todo el tiempo de su
suspension.”

On the same date, immediately after the promulgation of the
above-quoted order, the city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration. Judge
Arellano, presiding over the court, refused to reconsider the dismissal of the
case. But he set aside and declared null and without effect the order in so far
as it provided for the payment of the salary of the accused during the period of
his suspension.

It is the contention of the appellant that the lower court had
no jurisdiction to make this modification in its judgment.

Section 2272 of the Revised Administrative Code reads:

“When a chief or member of the municipal police is accused in
court of any felony or violation of law by the provincial fiscal, the municipal
president shall immediately suspend the accused from office pending fianl
decision of the case by the courts and, in case of acquittal, the accused shall
be entitled to payment of the entire salary he failed to receive during his
suspension if the court should so provide in his sentence.”

This provision authorizes the court ot order the payment of the
entire salary of a suspended member of the police force if he is acquitted.
Granting, for the purpose of argument, that the dismissal of the case at bar
operated as an acquittal and terminated hte case definitely, it is our opinion
that the court below retained the jurisdiction to eliminate form its order,
within fifteen days from the date the defendant was notified thereof, the
payment of the defendant’s back compensation. Judgment for this payment lies
within the court’s sound discretion, is of civil or administrative character,
and does not come within the jeopardy provision of the Constitution. With the
possible exception that a judgment of acquittal may not at any time after the
discharge of the accused be changed without his consent, the power of the courts
to revise, correct and change the sentences before the expiration of the period
for appeal and before anything has been done, was recognized in United States
vs. Vayson, 27 Phil., 447, in which the subject was treated at great length with
abundant citations of authorities. In the Vayson case and in the cases therein
cited, the authority of the court to increase or mitigate the penalty imposed on
the accused before the judgment became final and before it was put in operation
was affirmed. One of the cases cited with approval was Ex parte Lange, 85
U. S., 163; 21 Law. ed., 872, in which this rule was laid down: “The general
power of the court over its own judgments, orders and decrees, during the
existence of the term to which they are first made, is undeniable.”

The Solicitor General contends that the dismissal of the case
was arbitrary and unlawful and urges us to revoke the order and to decree the
remand of the case for further proceeding. It is enough to say in this
connection that the Government not having appealed the order, assuming, without
deciding, that it was appealable, the Court can not entertain the appellee’s
prayer.

The appealed order is affirmed with the costs of appeal against
the appellant.

Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto Bengzon,
Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.