NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. NORTHWEST AIRLINES PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, LOUISE MATEU AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, RESPONDENTS.

On April 8, 1960, respondents Northwest Airlines Philippines Employees
Association, Antonio Suarez, Brigido Sibug, and Louise Mateu filed with
respondent Court of Industrial Relations a joint petition for injunction^[1] against petitioner Northwest Airlines,
Inc. alleging, inter alia, that respondents Suarez, Sibug, and Mateu are
employees of petitioner company; that on January 28, 1958, respondents Suarez
and Sibug filed with respondent Court an unfair labor practice case docketed as
Case No. 1553-ULP, and respondent Mateu also filed with the same court an unfair
labor practice case docketed as Case No. 1205-ULP against petitioner company;
that Case No. 1205-ULP was amicably settled, while in Case No. 1553-ULP,
respondents Sibug and Suarez were ordered reinstated to their positions, under
the same terms and conditions before their dismissal;^[2] that on February 29, 1960, respondents
Suarez, Sibug, and Mateu received from petitioner company a notice of
termination of their services on May 1, 1960 in Manila, but that if they wished
to, they could be reemployed in Tokyo; that said termination of employment is
contrary to the decision of respondent Court in Case No. 1553-ULP and to the
settlement entered into between the parties in the case of respondent Mateu in
Case No. 1205-ULP; that petitioner company is making said termination of
employment because they have filed cases against it with respondent Court; that
by re-employing respondents in Tokyo as an alternative to their dismissal,
petitioner company seeks to have them outside of the protection of Philippine
labor laws; that petitioner company will terminate their employment unless they
accede to re-employment in Tokyo on May 1, 1960, and the same will terminate
their employment unless they accede to in Case No. 1553-ULP; and that great and
irreparable injury will be sustained by respondents, in case their employment is
terminated by petitioner company, or if they refuse to accede to being
re-employed in Tokyo. Respondents, therefore, prayed that pending final
determination of the case, respondent Court issue a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining petitioner company from carrying out the termination of
their employment.

On April 26, 1960, petitioner company received notice of hearing from
respondent Court as to Case No. 1553-ULP, set for April 28, 1960. The notice of
hearing did not mention Case No. 1205-ULP. Pursuant thereto, the parties through
their respective counsel, appeared before respondent Court on said date. At the
hearing, petitioner company manifested that having received notice of hearing as
to Case No. 1553-ULP only, it was limiting its appearance to said case. Hearing
proceeded accordingly, both parties presenting their respective evidence.

On April 30, 1960, respondent Court granted a writ of preliminary injunction
to respondents Association, Suarez, Sibug, and Mateu, in an order which
reads:

“ORDER

“Complainants Northwest Airlines Philippine Employees Association (NAPEA),
Antonio Suarez, Brigido Sibug, and Louise Mateu pray that a preliminary
injunction be issued against respondent Northwest Airlines, Inc., to enjoin it
from terminating the services of Antonio Suarez, Brigido Sibug, and Louise Mateu
before judgment.

“The facts are these: Suarez, Sibug, and Mateu are employees of the company.
On January 28, 1958, Suarez and Sibug filed Case No. 1553-ULP and on February
11, 1957, Mateu filed Case No. 1205-ULP, all against the company. While Case No.
1205-ULP was amicably settled and Mateu continued in the services of the
company, in Case No. 1553-ULP, Suarez and Sibug were ordered reinstated as
flight attendants of the company.

“On February 29, 1960, respondent company sent a notice to Suarez, Sibug, and
Mateu that their services would be terminated an May 1, 1960, unless they accept
re-employment in Tokyo (Exhibits A and B).

“By re-employing the complainants in Tokyo, as an alternative of their
dismissal, the respondent places them outside of the protection of the
Philippine Labor Laws and violates the decision in Case No. 1553-ULP and the
settlement in Case No. 1205-ULP.

“Respondent claims that Suarez was offered another position in Manila but
that he refused to accept because, being supervisory, it is a non-union job. By
accepting the same, Suarez would lose the protection of his union.

“Since an injunction may be granted in order to preserve the status quo until
the title can be determined (Golding vs. Balatbat, 36 Phil., 941) this Court,
after notifying the respondent and hearing both parties and after a bond in the
amount of P1,000.00 has been filed by complainants, hereby orders the respondent
to desist and refrain from terminating the services of Suarez, Sibug, and Mateu
and in case it has already dismissed them, to put them back to their former
positions, under the same terms and conditions before their dismissal, pending
the termination of this litigation, or unless a contrary order is issued by this
Court.

“SO ORDERED.”

On May 4,1960, petitioner company filed separate motions for reconsideration
in Cases Nos 1553-ULP and 1205-ULP. In his motion for reconsideration relating
to Case No. 1205-ULP, he alleged that (1) said case had been dismissed in 1957,
which dismissal is final and respondent Court “had no jurisdiction” to issue the
order of April 30, 1960; (2) that there was no hearing on said case and hence,
there is also no jurisdiction to issue said order; and (3) there was no previous
award or order in said case, and no labor dispute was alleged in respondents’
petition for injunction which, if proven, could be the basis for issuance of
preliminary injunction. To said motions for reconsideration, respondents filed a
reply on May 7, 1960 alleging that the records will show that their petition for
injunction filed on April 8, 1960 referred not only to respondents Suarez and
Sibug, but also to respondent Mateu as may be seen from the caption of said
petition; that while the clerical error committed in the notice of hearing
received by petitioner company made it appear that only Case No. 1553-ULP was
being heard, the records will show that the matter being heard was “the
injunction petition and not the unfair labor practice cases”; that petitioner
cannot claim lack of notice, because it was duly informed by the allegations
contained in said petition for injunction which it had received and to which it
replied; and that the injunction with reference to respondent Mateu is
preliminary and, therefore, interlocutory in nature and is improper for
reconsideration and should be brought only in the hearing on the merits. On May
13, 1960, respondent Court denied said motions for reconsideration in its
resolution en banc of the following tenor:

“RESOLUTION

“These are motions filed by counsel for respondents for the reconsideration
of the Order of Trial Court dated April 30, 1960. After a careful perusal of the
records as well as the arguments of both parties, the Court en banc fails
to find sufficient justification for altering or modifying the aforesaid
Order.

“BOTH MOTIONS DENIED.

“SO ORDERED .”

On September 2, 1960, petitioner company filed with this Court the present
petition for certiorari, insofar only as Louise Mateu (Case No. 1205(1)-ULP) is
concerned, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
respondent Court pending the determination of the case on its merits from
executing its order of April 30, 1960 with respect to respondent Louise Mateu.
In due time, we issued the preliminary injunction prayed for.

We find merit in petitioner-company’s contention that respondent Court acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction in granting the writ of preliminary
injunction insofar as respondent Mateu is concerned. The writ was granted on a
mere verified motion presented as an incident in Case No. 1205-ULP which was
dismissed on May 30, 1957.

As far as can be gathered from the records before us, that case involved the
propriety or legality of the deductions made by the company from the salary of
respondent Mateu covering medical bills advanced by the company in Tokyo for
Miss Mateu. Claiming that the deductions were not authorized by law, Miss Mateu
filed said Case No. 1205-ULP. Miss Mateu having questioned the deduction, the
company felt it could not under the law withhold a part of the employee’s wages
as it was strictly not a debt due but a disputed obligation. Hence, the company
refunded the deduction and the parties amicably settled the case. Respondent
Court upon agreement of the parties dismissed the case on May 30, 1957, in an
order which reads:

“ORDER

“It appearing that respondents, thru their counsel, and with the conformity
of the herein complainant (respondent Mateu herein), moved for dismissal cf the
above-entitled case on the ground that they have already amicably settled the
same, let this case be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED.

“SO ORDERED.”

As it appears, the only matter involved in that Case No. 1205—ULP was the
payment of medical expenses incurred by Miss Mateu while in Japan. At most, it
concerned the question as to who was liable for such payment, the employee or
the company, and whether the same was deductible from the employee’s salary.
Nothing was mentioned nor was there anything from the pleadings or the order of
dismissal from which it could be inferred about the continuance or
discontinuance of Miss Mateu in the service of the company. Upon the other hand,
the present petition for injunction seeks to enjoin petitioner company from
terminating the employment of respondent Mateu on entirely different ground.
There is clearly no connection whatsoever between the two cases, both in issue
and subject matter. True it is, that under Section 17 of Commonwealth Act No.
103, the Court of Industrial Relations may, on application of an interested
party, and after due hearing, “alter, modify in whole or in part, or set aside
any such award, order or decision, or reopen any question involved therein”
during the effectiveness of said decision or award, and that if the effectivity
is not therein specified, any of the interested parties may terminate the
effectiveness of the decision or award three (3) years thereafter. But this
applies only where the subsequent matter is incidental or related to the
original or main case and not where, as in the instant case, the new controversy
has absolutely no relation or is alien to the original or main case. To hold
otherwise would be to grant to respondent Court excessive or broad powers, not
conferred or contemplated by the statute. The question of employment and lay off
of respondent Mateu, it is recalled, was never an issue in the original or main
Case No. 1205-ULP filed and dismissed in 1957. In the circumstances, it would be
unfair to restrain petitioner company by injunction from terminating her
(Mateu’s) employment in a case filed merely as an incident to a main case of an
entirely different issue and subject matter.

Wherefore, the herein petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted and
the order of respondent Court (dated April 30, 1960) as well as its resolution
en banc (of May 13, 1960) affirming said order insofar as respondent Louise is
concerned, are hereby set aside, without prejudice to the right of respondent
Mateu to question her lay-off in a separate appropriate proceeding. The
preliminary injunction heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. No
costs. So ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., and Paredes,
JJ., concur.

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[1] As incident to Case No. 1553-ULP decided by CIR
on June 4, 1958, and to Case No. 1205-ULP dismissed by CIR on May 30, 1957.

[2] Reinstatement was reaffirmed by Supreme Court
in G. R. No. L-14202, dismissed for lack of merit in Resolution of August 20,
1958.