RONALDO ALDANA, REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, ALICIA ALDANA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. MATIAS M. GARCIA II, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 19, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BACOOR, PE…
DIMAAMPAO, J.:
“When this case was called for trial, Private Pros. Atty. Michael Vernon Guerrero presented accused Joy Dawa as a hostile witness in order to qualify her as a state witness.
Considering that it’s already 12:20 noon when her direct testimony was finished, Atty. Nichole Gonzales, counsel for accused Ronald Aldana, will conduct his cross-examination questions on said witness on the next scheduled hearing.
WHEREFORE, set the cross-examination of accused Joy Dawa on NOVEMBER 14, 2013, and additional setting will be on DECEMBER 05, 2013, both at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.”[3]
The precursor facts are not in dispute.
Petitioner Ronaldo Aldana was charged with the crime of Parricide for allegedly killing his wife Charlotte Mackay Aldana on 6 November 2004 inside their house in Cavite. Joy Dawa (Dawa), the housemaid of petitioner and the deceased victim, was also indicted as an accomplice in the commission of the crime.
While the case was on trial, the prosecution filed an Omnibus Motion to Discharge accused Joy Dawa as a State Witness and Motion to Present her as Witness for the Hearing on the Petition for Bail.[4] In its Order dated 7 December 2011, the court a quo deferred the resolution of the said Motion and instead set the date for the presentation of Dawa to qualify herself as a state witness. On 14 August 2013, the court a quo allowed Dawa to testify notwithstanding the opposition interposed by petitioner. In the same breath, petitioner’s oral motion for reconsideration was denied.
Unfazed, petitioner is now before Us raising this solitary ground—
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON THE PART OF THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT WHEN HE ISSUED THE ASSAILED ORDERS DURING THE 14 AUGUST 2013 HEARING.
The Petition is barren of merit.
The issue in this case is not a hard row to hoe— Did the court a quo gravely abuse its discretion when it allowed Dawa to testify as a hostile witness sans her judicial affidavit?
We answer in the negative.
“Grave abuse of discretion” is well-defined and not an amorphous concept that may easily be manipulated to suit one’s purpose.[5] The term “grave abuse of discretion” has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a “capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.” The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an “evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.” Furthermore, the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to “truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void.” From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that such act was patent and gross.[6] Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.[7]
In the case at bench, We discern no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court a quo when it approved the prosecution’s plea to allow Dawa to take the witness stand notwithstanding the non-submission of her judicial affidavit prior to the scheduled hearing. Section 9(a) of SC A.M. No 12-8-8 explicitly provides that a judicial affidavit is required in criminal actions where the maximum imposable penalty does not exceed six years—
“Sec. 9. Application of rule to criminal actions.—
Here, petitioner was inculpated for the crime of Parricide which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code—
“ART. 246. Parricide. – Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.”
There is no ambiguity in the wording of the aforequoted provision. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed. There is no room for interpretation, but only application.[8]
As aptly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, since the maximum imposable penalty in the parricide case which is more than six years is beyond the ambit of Sec. 9(a) of SC A.M. No 12-8-8, the court a quo unerringly ruled in allowing Dawa to testify despite the absence of her judicial affidavit.
In epitome, the Judicial Affidavit Rule finds no application in the factual milieu of the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Ybañez, and Manahan, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-17.
[2] Id., p. 114.
[3] Rollo, p. 114.
[4] Id., pp. 30-36.
[5] Rodolfo M. Agdeppa v. Honorable Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 146376, 23 April 23 2014.
[6] Ibid., citing Yu v. Reyes-Carpio, 652 SCRA 341, 348 (15 June 2011).
[7] San Fernando Rural Bank, Inc. v. Pampanga Omnibus Development Corporation, 520 SCRA 564, 592 (4 April 2007).
[8] Aloysius Dait Lumauig v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 166680, 7 July 2014.