SALVADOR SERRA SERRA, HEIRS OF GREGORIO SERRA SERRA, REPRESENTED BY CARMELO IMAZ, AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF GREGORIO SERRA SERRA, MARGARITA SERRA SERRA, FRANCISC…

Serra versus Serra

The Case

This is a consolidated special civil action in which the heirs of Gregorio Serra Serra, led by Salvador Serra Serra and represented by Carmelo Imaz as special administrator of the estate, sued to protect their possession of three parcels of land in Negros Occidental: Lot 1316 of the Kabankalan Cadastre and Lots 2685 and 717 of the Ilog Cadastre. The Serras had long been in possession under claim of ownership and held existing certificates of title. The Hernaez family, on the other hand, obtained reconstituted certificates of title over the same lots through a petition for reconstitution of allegedly lost originals, and then secured a writ of possession from the trial court. The Serras asked the Supreme Court to annul the writ of possession, to restrain the Hernaezes and their lessee from dispossessing them, and to restore them to possession. The case matters because it draws the outer limits of a writ of possession: that summary remedy cannot be used to oust actual possessors under claim of ownership in a mere reconstitution proceeding.

Procedural History

The Hernaezes filed a petition for reconstitution of allegedly lost original certificates of title before the Court of First Instance of Bacolod City, docketed as Cadastral Case No. 17. The petition was granted, and reconstituted certificates were issued. The Serras then filed a motion for cancellation of those reconstituted titles in the same cadastral case. The motion was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, presided by Judge Carlos Abiera, where the lots are situated. Judge Abiera denied the motion for cancellation without a formal hearing. The Serras moved for reconsideration, but the denial was sustained. The Hernaezes then moved for execution and for possession, and the Himamaylan court issued a writ of possession.

The Serras challenged the writ before the Court of Appeals by petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals gave due course and issued a preliminary injunction upon a bond. Later, however, the appellate court dissolved that injunction, and it denied reconsideration. The Serras came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. L-34080.

While that petition was pending, the Serras filed a separate complaint before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against Felipe Garaygay and the Southern Negros Development Corporation, docketed as Civil Case No. 10040, concerning sugarcane harvested from the disputed lots and the sugar quedans covering them. An executive judge issued a preliminary injunction, but the case was raffled to Judge Nestor Alampay, who dissolved it. Judge Alampay later issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the Serras themselves. The Serras challenged both orders before the Supreme Court in a second petition, docketed as G.R. No. L-34693. The Court consolidated the two petitions and heard them together.

Facts

On December 27, 1967, Primitivo, Rogaciana and Luisa Hernaez filed a petition for reconstitution of allegedly lost original certificates of title in the name of their predecessor-in-interest, Eleuterio Hernaez, covering Lot 1316 of the Kabankalan Cadastre and Lots 2685 and 717 of the Ilog Cadastre. The petition was supported by a certification of the Register of Deeds that no certificates of title had been issued covering the properties. On April 6, 1968, the petition was granted, and reconstituted original certificates of title were issued. These were later cancelled upon presentation of a declaration of heirship, and transfer certificates of title were issued in the names of the Hernaezes.

Upon learning of these titles, Salvador Serra Serra, for himself and his co-heirs, filed an adverse claim with the Registry of Deeds and moved in the cadastral case for cancellation of the reconstituted titles. The Serras claimed that they held valid existing certificates of title and had been in actual possession of the properties since before the war. The motion was forwarded to the Himamaylan court. Judge Abiera denied the motion for cancellation without conducting a formal hearing. The Serras received the order only later and moved for reconsideration, but the denial was sustained. The Hernaezes then moved for execution of the order granting reconstitution and to be placed in possession, and the trial court issued a writ of possession.

The Serras went to the Court of Appeals, which initially enjoined the writ but later dissolved its injunction, allowing the writ of possession to be enforced and the Serras to be dispossessed. Meanwhile, in the separate case against Garaygay and the sugar central, the trial court dissolved the injunction that had protected the Serras and instead issued an injunction against them, restraining them from harvesting, hauling and selling sugarcane from the disputed lots. Hence the consolidated petitions.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion when it lifted the writ of preliminary injunction it had previously issued, thereby giving effect to the writ of possession and dispossessing the Serras.
• Whether or not the trial court properly issued the writ of possession in favor of the Hernaezes after denying the Serras' motion for cancellation of the reconstituted certificates of title.
• Whether or not the trial court's orders dissolving the injunction in favor of the Serras and issuing an injunction against them were issued with grave abuse of discretion, in violation of the status quo ordered by the Supreme Court.

Applicable Provisions

Article 433 of the New Civil Code provides:

Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property.

This provision bears on the case because the Serras possessed the lots under claim of ownership, so the Hernaezes could not oust them by a mere summary motion for a writ of possession but had to resort to judicial process.

Section 18 of Republic Act No. 26 provides:

In case a certificate of title, considered lost or destroyed, be found or recovered, the same shall prevail over the reconstituted certificate of title, and, if both titles appear in the name of the same registered owner, all memoranda of new liens or encumbrances, if any, made on the latter, after its reconstitution, except the memorandum of the reservation referred to in Section seven of this Act, shall be transferred to the recovered certificate of title.

This provision bears on the case because it shows that a reconstituted title does not confirm ownership and yields to a recovered or subsisting title, so reconstitution cannot be the basis for a writ of possession against actual possessors.

Section 19 of Republic Act No. 26 provides:

If the certificate of title considered lost or destroyed, and subsequently found or recovered, is not in the name of the same person in whose favor the reconstituted certificate of title has been issued, the register of deeds should bring the matter to the attention of the proper Court of First Instance, which, after due notice and hearing, shall order the cancellation of the reconstituted certificate of title and render, with respect to the memoranda of new liens or encumbrances, if any, made on the reconstituted certificate of title, after its reconstitution, such judgment as justice and equity may require.

This provision bears on the case because it prescribes a judicial proceeding, with notice and hearing, for cancelling a reconstituted title where another holds a subsisting title, confirming that the issue of ownership and possession must be litigated and not resolved summarily.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, when it lifted the preliminary injunction. That lifting gave effect to the writ of possession and dispossessed the Serras. The Court explained that the propriety of the writ of possession could not be resolved without also resolving the main petition pending in the Court of Appeals, and so it resolved that question as well.

On the second issue, the Court held that the writ of possession was not proper. The law specifies when a writ of possession may be issued: in a land registration proceeding, in an extrajudicial foreclosure of a realty mortgage, in a judicial foreclosure of mortgage under stated conditions, and in execution sales. The instant case fell under none of these. In a land registration case, a writ of possession may issue only pursuant to a decree of registration. It cannot be issued in a petition for reconstitution of an allegedly lost or destroyed certificate of title, because reconstitution does not confirm or adjudicate ownership. The Court stressed that a person who seeks reconstitution over property he does not actually possess cannot, by a mere motion for a writ of possession, which is summary in nature, deprive the actual occupants of possession. Possession and ownership should be threshed out in a separate proceeding. The Serras were possessors under claim of ownership, and actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. It was error for Judge Abiera to issue the writ of possession ousting them without a formal hearing.

The Court also rejected the argument that the reconstitution order had become final and could no longer be reopened. Under Republic Act No. 26, if no original title in fact exists, the reconstituted title is a nullity, and the order for its reconstitution does not become final because the court rendering it has not acquired jurisdiction. It may be attacked at any time. The same rule applies if there is in fact an earlier valid certificate of title in the name and possession of another. The Court further held that notice by publication is not sufficient as regards actual possessors; actual owners and possessors must be served with actual and personal notice of the petition for reconstitution.

On the third issue, the Court found that the trial court's orders in the separate case disturbed the status quo that the Supreme Court had ordered preserved, and it restrained further interference with the Serras' possession and directed the return of the value of the sugarcane covered by the quedans released to Garaygay.

Doctrine

A writ of possession is available only in the cases specified by law: in a land registration proceeding pursuant to a decree of registration, in an extrajudicial foreclosure of a realty mortgage, in a judicial foreclosure of mortgage under the stated conditions, and in execution sales. It cannot be issued in a petition for reconstitution of an allegedly lost or destroyed certificate of title, because reconstitution does not confirm or adjudicate ownership. A person who seeks reconstitution over property he does not actually possess cannot, by a mere summary motion for a writ of possession, deprive the actual occupants of possession; possession and ownership must be threshed out in a separate proceeding. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership, and under Article 433 of the New Civil Code the true owner must resort to judicial process for recovery. Where no original title in fact exists, the reconstituted title is a nullity, the order for reconstitution does not become final for lack of jurisdiction, and it may be attacked at any time. Actual owners and possessors must be served with actual and personal notice of a petition for reconstitution; notice by publication is not sufficient as to them.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the petitions, set aside the challenged resolutions and orders, and restrained the respondents from further dispossessing the Serras, restoring them to possession of the disputed lots.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a writ of possession cannot issue in a reconstitution proceeding, because reconstitution does not adjudicate ownership, and actual possessors under claim of ownership cannot be ousted by a summary motion. Examiners use this case to test the limits of a writ of possession and the rule that notice by publication does not bind actual possessors in reconstitution proceedings.