G.R. No. L-3001. June 17, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. BENITO ATIENZA AND JULIAN CLOSA, DEFENDANTS. JULIAN CLOSA, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANT.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Julian Closa were charged with murder for the killing of one Pedro
Mendoza. Atienza pleaded guilty when arraigned and took the witness
stand to prove two mitigating circumstances, namely: drunkenness and
lack of instruction. He was sentenced to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day
of imprisonment by the trial court. He did not appeal. The trial court
proceeded as to his co-accused Julian Closa. After trial Closa was
found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, with the accessory
penalties provided by law, to pay the heirs of the deceased Pedro
Mendoza the sum of P1,000, as indemnity, and to pay one-half of the
costs. He was credited with one-half of: the preventive imprisonment
suffered by him. He is now appealing from that decision.
The trial in this case was conducted rather irregularly, due either
to negligence or oversight on the part of the court officials. After
the prosecution had rested its case it was discovered that the two
defendants had not yet been arraigned. The provincial fiscal called the
attention of the court to that fact. The two accused were then
arraigned and it was upon this arraignment that Atienza entered his
plea of guilty. The trial court declared all the proceedings up to the
arraignment as null and void. The fiscal moved to reproduce the
evidence already submitted and said that he would be glad to present
again all his witnesses. The Court said that it was unnecessary and
decreed reproduced all the evidence already submitted. Counsel of the
appellant Closa said that he had no objection.
After a careful review of the record in this case, we find the
following facts as fully established: Due to a grudge that he
entertained against Pedro Mendoza, appellant Closa in the evening of
November 16, 1948, invited his close friend and co-defendant Benito
Atienza to go with him. to Mendoza’s house and kill him. On the way to
Mendoza’s house, the two passed by the house of Dominador Mendoza and
they asked Dominador if he had seen Pedro Mendoza. When answered in
the negative, the two accused proceeded westward in the direction of
Mendoza’s house which was less than a kilometer from the house of
Dominador. The two defendants found Mendoza sleeping alone in his
house. While Atienza remained in the kitchen, Closa quietly and
stealthily approached his sleeping victim and struck him several blows
with his bolo called “sinampalok” (Exhibit C). Then Atienza left the
kitchen and entering the room where Mendoza was lying down also
inflicted blows on tie prostrate victim with his bolo (Exhibit B). In
all, Mendoza received sixteen wounds, of which those in the abdomen
were necessarily mortal and caused Mendoza’s death.
Very early the
following morning the two defendants, on their way home, passed by the
house of Glicerio Lopez and were seen by the latter as they were
coming from the direction of the house of Pedro Mendoza. Not long
thereafter, Atienza arrived at the house of his grandfather, Jose
Atienza, woke up the inmates who were his relatives and told them that:
“They had killed somebody.” His clothes were then blood-stained.
In the course of the investigation conducted by the municipal
authorities, Atienza made two sworn statements, (Exhibits D and F)
which, are quite similar in their contents. In these statements Atienza
said that he had been invited by Closa to kill Pedro Mendoza and that
he actually accompanied the former in going to the house of Pedro
Mendoza whom may found sleeping and whom they boloed to death, Atienza
adding that after the killing Closa threatened him with death if he
revealed to anyone what they had done.
Closa also made a written statement (Exhibit E) where he states
that sometime in April, 1948, he had a misunderstanding or altercation
with we deceased Mendoza over a debt which Mendoza was trying to
collect from him in tbs presence of other persons, because of which he
felt humiliated; that on November 16, 1948, the day of the killing, lie
had a bolo, evidently similar to if not the same weapon mentioned by
Atienza in his statement, as having been used by Olosa in boloing the
deceased.
Appellant Closa put up the defense of alibi claiming that the whole
day of November 16, 1948, he was harvesting and threshing rice with
Sofronio Panganiban, his landlord, and that on that night he slept in
Sofronio’s house. The trial court rejected this story of the defense,
not only because it was not convincing but also because it appeared too
elaborate and too well planned and calculated to make it appear
impossible for Closa to have left the house of his landlord that day
and night. Moreover, the trial court found that assuming that Closa was
at the house of Panganiban that night of November 16, the place was
only a kilometer away from the house of Pedro Mendoza and that he could
easily have slipped out of the house unnoticed and committed the murder
and then returned to the house. We fully agree with, the finding and
reasoning of the trial court on-this point. And as the Solicitor
General points out, counsel for the appellant does not in his brief
touch upon this defense of alibi indicating that said counsel has not
found it to be a valid or reasonable defense.
Counsel for the appellant attacks the procedure followed in the
trial already referred where the two accused were arraigned after the
prosecution had rested its case, and he claims that the trial court
erred in considering such evidence, especially since the trial court
itself had declared all the proceedings had before arraignment as
null and void. The error, if any, is non-prejudicial. The interests of
the appellant have not suffered thereby. His counsel entered into trial
without any objection on the ground that his client had not yet been
arraigned. Said counsel cross-examined the witnesses for the
prosecution. When the fiscal offered to reproduce all his evidence by
presenting again his witnesses, instead of accepting said offer, he
agreed or rather did not object to having that same evidence for the
government declared by the court as reproduced. We hold that this error
or irregularity has not prejudiced the right or interests of the
appellant, and considering that appellant’s counsel had full
opportunity of cross-examining all the witnesses who took the witness
stand for the government and that furthermore he agreed to the
reproduction of the evidence for the prosecution, the error or defect
had been substantially or fully cured.
In conclusion, we find that the guilt of the appellant has been
established beyond reasonable doubt. It is true that no eye-witnesses
to the actual killing testified against the appellant in court.
However, there is abundant evidence pointing to appellant Closa as one
of the killers of Mendoza. As already stated, on the night of the
killing the appellant and Atienza passed by the house of Dominador
Mendoza, inquiring and looking for the deceased Pedro. From there they
went in the direction of the deceased’s house. Early the following
morning Closa and Atienza were seen coming from the direction of the
house of the deceased, and later Atienza informed’ the inmates in the
house of his grandfather that they, meaning he and Closa, had killed
somebody. Exhibits D and F, which are the extrajudicial confessions of
Atienza directly implicating appellant Closa, were introduced and
admitted in evidence during the trial without objection by the counsel
of the appellant. By such failure to object and the court proceedings
being a joint trial, those exhibits were admissible against and
affected appellant Closa, and constitute competent evidence to prove
his guilt (People vs. Bernadez, CA-G.R. No. L-479, April 30,
1947, 43 Off.Gaz., p. 2260). Furthermore, and this is important, when
Atienza was making the extrajudlcial statement implicating Closa, the
latter was present and kept silent, but did not protest or remonstrate
against the supposed false charge or implication. According to Rule
123, Section 8, of the Rules of Court, “Any act or declaration made in
the presence and within the observation of a party who does or says
nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for
action or comment if not true, may be given in evidence against him.”
The trial court found that the killing was attended by the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling. We agree with tie
Solicitor General that nighttime is absorbed in the treachery that
qualified the killing as murder.
With the modification that the indemnity imposed by the trial court
is increased to P6,000, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,
with costs.
Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, and Reyes, JJ., concur.