G.R. No. L-22545. November 28, 1969
BALDOMERO S. LUQUE AND OTHER PASSENGERS FROM THE PROVINCES OF CAVITE AND BATANGAS; AND PUBLIC SERVICE OPERATORS FILOMENA ABALOS, AND OTHERS, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. ANTONIO J. VI…
SANCHEZ, J.:
Challenged as unconstitutional, illegal and unjust in these
original proceedings for certiorari and mandamus are two substantially
identical bus ban measures: (1)
Ordinance No. 4986 of the City of Manila approved on July 13, 1964, entitled
“An Ordinance Rerouting Traffic on Roads and Streets in the City of
Manila, and for Other Purposes”, and (2) Administrative Order No. 1,
series of 1964, dated February 7, 1964, and Administrative Order No. 3, series
of 1964, dated April 21, 1964, both issued by Commissioner Enrique Medina (hereinafter
referred to as the Commissioner) of the Public Service Commission.
Original petitioners are passengers from the provinces of Cavite and Batangas
who ride in buses plying along the routes between the said provinces and Manila. Other petitioners are public service
operators operating PUB and PUJ public service vehicles from the provinces with
terminals in Manila, while the rest
are those allegedly operating PUB, PUJ or AC motor vehicles operating within Manila
and suburbs.
Ordinance 4986, amongst others, provides that:
“RULE
II. ENTRY POINTS AND ROUTES OF
PROVINCIAL PASSENGER
BUSES AND JEEPNEYS
1.
Provincial passenger buses and jeepneys (PUB and PUJ) shall be allowed to enter Manila,
but only through the following entry points and routes, from 6:30 A.M. to 8:30
P.M. every day except Sundays and holidays:
x x x
(m)
Those coming from the south
through F. B. Harrison shall proceed to Mabini; turn
right to Harrison Boulevard;
turn right to Taft Avenue
and proceed towards Pasay
City;
(n)
Those coming from the south through
Taft Avenue shall
turn left at Vito Cruz; turn right to Dakota; turn right to Harrison
Boulevard; turn right to Taft
Avenue; thence proceed towards Pasay City;
Loading and unloading shall be allowed only at Harrison
Boulevard, between A. Mabini
and Taft Avenue;
x x x
RULE III. FLEXIBLE
SHUTTLE BUS SERVICE
1.
In order that provincial commuters
shall not be unduly inconvenienced as a result of the implementation of these
essential traffic control regulations, operators of provincial passenger buses
shall be allowed to provide buses to shuttle their passengers from their
respective entry control points, under the following conditions:
(a)
Each provincial bus company or
firm shall be allowed such number of shuttle buses proportionate to the number
of units authorized it, the ratio to be determined by the Chief, Traffic
Control Bureau, based on his observations as to the actual needs of commuters
and traffic volume; in no case shall the allocation be more than one shuttle
bus for every 10 authorized units, or fraction thereof.
(b)
No shuttle bus shall enter Manila
unless the same shall have been provided with identification stickers as
required under Rule IV hereof, which shall be furnished and allocated by the
Chief, Traffic Control Bureau to each provincial bus company or firm,
(c)
All such shuttle buses are not
permitted to load or unload or to pick and/or drop passengers along the way but
must do so only in the following places:
x x x
(3) South
(a)
Harrison Boulevard,
between Dakota and Taft Avenue.”
Administrative Order No, 1, series of 1964, issued by the
Commissioner, in part, provides:
“2. All public utilities including jeepneys heretofore authorized to operate from the City of
Manila to any point in Luzon, beyond the perimeter of Greater Manila, shall
carry the words ‘For Provincial Operation‘ in bold and clear types on
both sides or on one side and at the back of the vehicle and must not be less
than 12 inches in dimension. All such
vehicles marked ‘For Provincial Operation’ are authorized to operate outside
the perimeter of Greater Manila in accordance with their respective certificates
of public convenience, and are not authorized to enter or to operate beyond the
boundary line fixed in our order of March 12, 1963 and July 22, 1963, with the
exception of those vehicles authorized to carry their provincial passengers
thru the boundary line up to their Manila terminal which shall be identified
by a sticker signed and furnished by the PSC and by the Mayors of the affected
Cities and municipalities, and which shall be carried on a prominent place of
the vehicle about the upper middle part of the windshield.
x x x
All such public utility vehicles authorized by this Order to enter
the City of Manila and to carry
their passengers thru the boundary line, are not permitted to load or unload or
to pick and/or drop passengers along the way, but must do so only in the
following places:
x x x
c. Vehicles coming from the SOUTH may load or
unload at the San Andres-Taft Rotonda; at Plaza
Lawton or at the Corner of Harrison and Mabini
Streets near the Manila Zoo.”
On April 21, 1964, the Commissioner issued Administrative Order
No. 3 which resolved motions for reconsideration (of the first administrative
order – Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1964) filed by several affected
operators. This order (No. 3), amongst
others, states that only 10% of the provincial buses and jeepneys
shall be allowed to enter Manila;
however, provincial buses and jeepneys
“operating within a radius of 50 kms. from the
Manila City Hall and whose business is more on the Manila end than on the
provincial end are given fifteen percent to prevent a dislocation of their
business; provided that operators having less than five units are not permitted
to cross the boundary and shall operate exclusively on the provincial
end,” This order also allocated the number of units each provincial bus
operator is allowed to operate within the City of Manila.
1. On the main, nothing new there is in the present petition. For, the validity of Ordinance 4986 and the
Commissioner’s Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1964, here challenged,
has separately passed judicial tests in two cases brought before this Court.
In Lagman vs. City of Manila
(June 30, 1966), 17 SCRA 579, petitioner Lagman was
an operator of PU auto trucks with fixed routes and regular terminals for the
transportation of passengers and freight on the Bocaue
(Bulacan) Parañaque (Rizal) line via Rizal Avenue,
Plaza Goiti, Sta. Cruz Bridge, Plaza Lawton, P.
Burgos, Taft Avenue, and Taft Avenue Extension, Manila. He sought to prohibit the City of Manila,
its officers and agents, from enforcing Ordinance 4986. His ground was that said ordinance was
unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires and null and
void. He alleged, amongst others, that
(1) “the power conferred upon respondent City of Manila, under said
Section 18(hh) of Republic Act No. 409, as amended,
does not include the right to enact an ordinance such as the one in question,
which has the effect of amending or modifying a certificate of public
convenience granted by the Public Service Commission, because any amendment or
modification of said certificate is solely vested by law in the latter
governmental agency, and only after notice and hearing (Sec. 16[m], Public
Service Act); but since this procedure was not adopted or followed by
respondents in enacting the disputed ordinance, the same is likewise illegal
and null and void”; (2) “the enforcement of said ordinance is
arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable because the city streets from which he
had been prevented to operate his buses are the cream of his business”;
and (3) “even assuming that Ordinance No. 4986 is valid, it is only the
Public Service Commission which can require compliance with its provisions
(Sec. 17(j), Public Service Act), but since its implementation is without the
sanction or approval of the Commission, its enforcement is also unauthorized
and illegal.” This Court, in a decision impressive because of its
unanimity, upheld the ordinance.
Speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, we ruled:
“First, as correctly maintained by respondents, Republic Act
No. 409, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila, is a special law and of later enactment than Commonwealth Act No. 548
and the Public Service Law (Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended), so that even
if conflict exists between the provisions of the former act and the latter
acts, Republic Act No. 409 should prevail over both Commonwealth Acts Nos. 548
and 146. In Cassion
vs. Banco Nacional
Filipino, 89 Phil. 560, 561, this Court said:
‘for with or without an express enactment it is a familiar rule of
statutory construction that to the extent of any necessary repugnancy between
a general and a special law or provision, the latter will control the former
without regard to the respective dates of passage.’
It is to be noted that Commonwealth Act No.548 does not confer an exclusive
power or authority upon the Director of Public Works, subject to the approval
of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and
regulations relating to the use of and traffic on national roads or
streets. This being the case, section 18
(hh) of the Manila Charter is deemed enacted as an
exception to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548.
x x x
Second, the same situation holds true with respect to the provision
of the Public Service Act. Although the
Public Service Commission is empowered, under its Section 16 (m), to amend,
modify or revoke certificates of public convenience after notice and hearing,
yet there is no provision, specific or otherwise, which can be found in this
statute (Commonwealth Act No. 146) vesting power in the Public Service
Commission to superintend, regulate, or control the streets of respondent City or
suspend its power to license or prohibit the occupancy thereof. On the other hand, this right or authority,
as hereinabove concluded, is conferred upon respondent City of Manila. The power vested in the Public Service
Commission under Section 16 (m) is, therefore, subordinate to the authority
granted to respondent City, under said section 18 (hh). x x x.
x x x
That the powers conferred by law upon the Public Service Commission
were not designed to deny or supersede the regulatory power of local governments
over motor traffic, in the streets subject to their control, is made evident by
section 17 (j) of the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 146) that
provides as follows:
‘SEC. 17. Proceedings of
Commission without previous hearing.
– The Commission shall have power, without previous hearing, subject to
established limitations and exceptions, and saving provisions to the contrary:
x x x
(j) To require any public service to comply with the laws of
the Philippines,
and with any provincial resolution or municipal ordinance relating
thereto, and to conform to the duties imposed upon it thereby, or
by the provisions of its own charter, whether obtained under any general or
special law of the Philippines.’
(Italics supplied)
The petitioner’s contention that, under this section, the
respective ordinances of the City can only be enforced by the Commission alone
is obviously unsound. Subsection (j)
refers not only to ordinances but also to ‘the laws of the Philippines’, and it
is plainly absurd to assume that even laws relating to public services are to
remain a dead letter without the placet of the
Commission; and the section makes no distinction whatever between enforcement
of laws and that of municipal ordinances.
The very fact, furthermore, that the Commission is empowered, but
not required, to demand compliance with apposite laws and ordinances proves
that the Commission’s powers are merely supplementary to those of state organs,
such as the police, upon which the enforcement of laws primarily rests.
Third, the implementation of the ordinance in question cannot be
validly assailed as arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable. Aside from the fact that there is no evidence
to substantiate this charge, it is not disputed that petitioner has not been
totally banned or prohibited from operating all his buses, he having been
allowed to operate two (2) ‘shuttle’ buses within the city limits.”[1]
The second case for certiorari and prohibition, filed by the same
petitioner in the first case just mentioned, is entitled “Lagman vs. Medina”
(December 24, 1968), 26 SCRA 442. Put at
issue there is the validity of the Commissioner’s Administrative Order No. 1,
series of 1964, also disputed herein. It
was there alleged, inter alia, that
“the provisions of the bus ban had not been incorporated into his certificate
of public convenience”; “to be applicable to a grantee of such
certificate subsequently to the issuance of the order establishing the ban,
there should be a decision, not merely by the Commissioner, but, also, by the
PSC, rendered after due notice and hearing, based upon material changes in the
facts and circumstances under which the certificate had been granted”; and
“the ban is unfair, unreasonable and oppressive.” We dismissed this
petition and upheld the validity of the questioned order of the Commissioner. On the aforequoted
issues, Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, speaking
for an equally unanimous Court, said –
“Petitioner’s claim is devoid of merit, inasmuch as:
1.
The terms and conditions of the
bus ban established by the Commissioner are substantially identical to those
contained in Ordinance No. 4986 of the City of Manila
‘rerouting traffic on roads and streets’ therein, approved on July 30, 1964. In G.R. No. L-23305, entitled ‘Lagman vs. City of Manila’, petitioner herein assailed the
validity of said ordinance, upon the ground, among others, that it tended to
amend or modify certificates of public conveniences issued by the PSC; that
the power therein exercised by the City of Manila belongs to the PSC; and that
the ordinance is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable. In a decision promulgated on June 30, 1966, this Court rejected
this pretense and dismissed Lagman’s petition in said
case.
2.
Petitioner’s certificate of public
convenience, like all other similar certificates, was issued subject to the
condition that operators ‘shall observe and comply [with] x x x all the rules and regulations of the Commission
relative to PUB service,’ and the contested orders – issued pursuant to
Sections 13 (a), 16 (g) and 17 (a) of Commonwealth Act 146, as amended –
partake of the nature of such rules and regulations.
x x x
4. The purpose of the ban – to minimize the
‘traffic problem in the City of Manila’ and the ‘traffic congestion, delays and
even accidents’ resulting from the free entry into the streets of said City and
the operation ‘around said streets, loading and unloading or picking up
passengers and cargoes’ of PU buses in great ‘number and size’ – and the letter
and spirit of the contested orders are inconsistent with the exclusion of Lagman or of those granted certificates of public
convenience subsequently to the issuance of said orders from the operation
thereof.
x x x
9. The theory to the effect that, to be valid,
the afore-mentioned orders must be issued by PSC, not merely by its
Commissioner, and only after due notice and hearing, is predicated upon the
premise that the bus ban operates as an amendment of petitioner’s certificate
of public convenience, which is false, and was not sustained by this Court in
its decision in G.R. No. L-23305, which is binding upon Lagman,
he being the petitioner in said case.”[2]
The issues raised by Lagman in the two
cases just mentioned were likewise relied upon by the petitioners in the case
now before us. But for the fact that the
present petitioners raised other issues, we could have perhaps written finis
to the present case. The obvious reason
is that we find no cause or reason why we should break away from our ruling in
said cases. Petitioners herein, however,
draw our attention to points which are not specifically ruled upon in the Lagman cases heretofore mentioned.
2. Petitioners’ other gripe against Ordinance 4986 is that it
destroys vested rights of petitioning public services to operate inside Manila
and to proceed to their respective terminals located in the City. They would want likewise to nullify said
ordinance upon the averment that it impairs the vested rights of petitioning
bus passengers to be transported directly to downtown Manila.
It has been said that a vested right is one which is “fixed,
unalterable, or irrevocable.”[3]
Another definition would give vested right the connotation that it is
“absolute, complete, and unconditional, to the exercise of which no
obstacle exists x x x.”[4] Petitioners’
citation from 16 C.J.S., pp. 642-643,[5]
correctly expresses the view that when the “right to enjoyment, present or
prospective, has become the property of some particular person or persons as a
present interest”, that right is a vested right. Along the same lines is our jurisprudential
concept. Thus, in Benguet
Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda[6]
we put forth the thought that a vested right is “some right or interest in
the property which has become fixed and established, and is no longer open to
doubt or controversy”; it is an “immediate fixed right of present and
future enjoyment”; it is to be contradistinguished from a right that is
“expectant or contingent.” The Benguet
case also quoted from 16 C.J.S., Sec. 215, pp. 642-643, as follows: “Rights
are vested when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the
property of some particular person or persons as a present interest. The right must be absolute, complete, and
unconditional, independent of a contingency, and a mere expectancy of future
benefit, or a contingent interest in property founded on anticipated
continuance of existing laws, does not constitute a vested right, So, inchoate
rights which have not been acted on are not vested.”[7]
Of course, whether a right is vested or not, much depends upon
the environmental facts.[8]
Contending that they possess valid and subsisting certificates
of public convenience, the petitioning public services aver that they acquired
a vested right to operate their public utility vehicles to and from Manila as
appearing in their said respective certificates of public convenience.
Petitioners’ argument pales on the face of the fact that the very
nature of a certificate of public convenience is at cross purposes with the
concept of vested rights. To this day,
the accepted view, at least insofar as the State is concerned, is that “a
certificate of public convenience constitutes neither a franchise nor a
contract, confers no property right, and is a mere license or privilege.”[9]
The holder of such certificate does not acquire a property right in the route
covered thereby. Nor does it confer upon
the holder any proprietary right or interest or franchise in the public
highways.[10]
Revocation of this certificate deprives him of no vested right.[11]
Little reflection is necessary to show that the certificate of public
convenience is granted with so many strings attached. New and additional burdens, alteration of the
certificate, and even revocation or annulment thereof is reserved to the State.
We need but add that the Public Service Commission, a government
agency vested by law with “jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all
public services and their franchises, equipment, and other properties”[12]
is empowered, upon proper notice and hearing, amongst others: (1) “[t]o
amend, modify or revoke at any time a certificate issued under the provisions
of this Act [Commonwealth Act 146, as amended], whenever the facts and
circumstances on the strength of which said certificate was issued have been
misrepresented or materially changed”;[13]
and (2) “[t]o suspend or revoke any certificate issued under the
provisions of this Act whenever the holder thereof has violated or wilfully and contumaciously refused to comply with any
order, rule or regulation of the Commission or any provision of this Act: Provided,
That the Commission, for good cause, may prior to the hearing suspend for a
period not to exceed thirty days any certificate or the exercise of any right
or authority issued or granted under this Act by order of the Commission,
whenever such step shall in the judgment of the Commission be necessary to
avoid serious and irreparable damage or inconvenience to the public or to
private interests.”[14]
Jurisprudence echoes the rule that the Commission is authorized to make
reasonable rules and regulations for the operation of public services and to
enforce them.[15]
In reality, all certificates of public convenience issued are subject to the
condition that all public services “shall observe and comply [with] x x x all the rules and regulations
of the Commission relative to” the service.[16]
To further emphasize the control imposed on public services, before any public
service can “adopt, maintain, or apply practices or measures, rules, or
regulations to which the public shall be subject in its relation with the
public service”, the Commission’s approval must first be had.[17]
And more. Public services
must also reckon with provincial resolutions and municipal ordinances relating
to the operation of public utilities within the province or municipality
concerned. The Commission can require
compliance with these provincial resolutions or municipal ordinances.[18]
Illustrative of the lack of “absolute, complete, and unconditional”
right on the part of public services to operate because of the delimitations
and restrictions which circumscribe the privilege afforded a certificate of
public convenience is the following from the early (March 31, 1915) decision of
this Court in Fisher vs. Yangco Steamship Comaany, 31 Phil. 1, 18-19:
“Common carriers exercise a sort of public office, and have
duties to perform in which the public is interested. Their business is, therefore, affected with
a public interest, and is subject of public regulation. (New Jersey Steam Nav.
Co. vs. Merchants Bank, 6 How., 344, 382; Munn vs. Illinois,
94 U.S. 113,
130.) Indeed, this right of regulation is so far beyond question that it is
well settled that the power of the state to exercise legislative control over
railroad companies and other carriers ‘in all respects necessary to protect
the public against danger, injustice and oppression’ may be exercised through
boards of commissioners. (New York etc.
R. Co. vs. Bristol, 151 U.S.,
556, 571; Connecticut etc. R. Co. vs. Woodruff, 153 U.S.
689.).
x x x
x x x The right
to enter the public employment as a common carrier and to offer one’s services
to the public for hire does not carry with it the right to conduct that
business as one pleases, without regard to the interests of the public and free
from such reasonable and just regulations as may be prescribed for the
protection of the public from the reckless or careless indifference of the
carrier as to the public welfare and for the prevention of unjust and unreasonable
discrimination of any kind whatsoever in the performance of the carrier’s
duties as a servant of the public.
Business of certain kinds, including the business of a common
carrier, holds such a peculiar relation to the public interest that there is superinduced upon it the right of public regulation. (Budd vs. New York, 143 U.S., 517, 533.) when
private property is ‘affected with a public interest it ceases to be juris privati only.’
Property becomes clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make
it of public consequence and affect the community at large. ‘When, therefore, one devotes his property
to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the
public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public
for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing
the use, but so long as he maintains the use he must submit to control.’ (Munn
vs. Illinois, 94 U.S., 113; Georgia R. & Bkg.
Co. vs. Smith, 128 U.S., 174; Budd vs. New York, 143 U.S., 517;
Louisville etc. Ry. Co. vs. Kentucky,
161 U.S., 677,
695.).”
The foregoing, without more, rejects the vested rights theory
espoused by petitioning bus operators.
Very little need be added to show that neither do bus passengers
have a vested right to be transported directly into the City of Manila. It would suffice if a statement be here made
that the alleged right of bus passengers, to a great extent, is dependent upon
the manner public services are allowed to operate within a given area. Because, regulations imposed upon public
services directly affect the bus passengers.
It is quite obvious that if buses were allowed to load or unload solely
at specific or designated places, a passenger cannot legally demand or insist
that the operator load or unload him at a place other than those specified or
designated.
It is no argument to support the vested rights theory that petitioning
passengers have enjoyed the privilege of having been continuously transported
even before the outbreak of the war directly without transfer from the
provinces to places inside Manila
up to the respective bus terminals in said City. Times have changed. Vehicles have increased in number. Traffic congestion has moved from bad to
worse, from tolerable to critical. The
number of people who use the thoroughfares has multiplied.
3. It is because of all of
these that it has become necessary for the police power of the State to step
in, not for the benefit of the few, but for the benefit of the many. Reasonable restrictions have to be provided
for the use of the thoroughfares.[19]
The operation of public services may be subjected to restraints and burdens,
in order to secure the general comfort.[20]
No franchise or right can be availed of to defeat the proper exercise of police
power[21]
the authority “to enact rules and regulations for the promotion of the
general welfare.”[22]
So it is, that by the exercise of the police power, which is a continuing one,
“a business lawful today may in the future, because of the changed
situation, the growth of population or other causes, become a menace to the
public health and welfare, and be required to yield to the public good.”[23]
Public welfare, we have said, lies at the bottom of any regulatory measure
designed “to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a
menace to public safety.”[24]
As a corollary, measures calculated to promote the safety and convenience of
the people using the thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular traffic,
present a proper subject for the exercise of police power.[25]
Both Ordinance 4986 and the Commissioner’s administrative orders
fit into the concept of promotion of the general welfare, Expressive of the
purpose of Ordinance 4986 is Section 1 thereof, thus – “As a positive
measure to relieve the critical traffic congestion in the City of Manila, which
has grown to alarming and emergency proportions, and in the best interest of public
welfare and convenience, the following traffic rules and regulations are hereby
promulgated.” Along the same lines, the bus ban instituted by the
Commissioner has for its object “to minimize the ‘traffic problem in the
City of Manila’ and the ‘traffic congestion, delays and even accidents’
resulting from the free entry into the streets of said City and the operation
‘around said streets, loading and unloading or picking up passengers and
cargoes’ of PU buses in great ‘number and size.'”[26]
Police power in both was properly exercised.
4. We find no difficulty in saying that, contrary to the assertion
made by petitioners, Ordinance 4986 is not a class legislation.
It is true that inter-urban buses are allowed to enter the City
of Manila, while provincial buses
are not given the same privilege, although they are allowed shuttle service
into the City of Manila. There is no point, however, in placing provincial
buses on the same level as the inter-urban buses plying to and from Manila and
its suburban towns and cities (Makati, Pasay, Mandaluyong, Caloocan, San Juan, Quezon City
and Navotas).
Inter-urban buses are used for transporting passengers only. Provincial buses are used for passengers and
freight. Provincial buses, because of
the freight or baggage which the passengers usually bring along with them,
take longer time to load or unload than inter-urban buses. Provincial buses generally travel along
national highways and provincial roads, cover long distances, have fixed trip
schedules. Provincial buses are greater
in size and weight than inter-urban buses.
The routes of inter-urban buses are short, covering contiguous municipalities
and cities only. Inter-urban buses
mainly use city and municipal streets.
These distinctions generally hold true between provincial
passenger jeepneys and inter-urban passenger jeepneys.
No unjustified discrimination there is under the law.
The obvious inequality in treatment is but the result flowing
from the classification made by the ordinance and does not trench upon the
equal protection clause.[27]
The least that can be said is that persons engaged in the same business
“are subjected to different restrictions or are held entitled to different
privileges under the same conditions.”[28]
Neither is there merit to the charge that private vehicles are
being unjustifiably favored over public vehicles. Private vehicles are not geared for profit,
usually have but one destination.
Public vehicles are operated primarily for profit and for this reason
are continually operated to make the most of time. Public and private vehicles belong to
different classes. Differences in class
beget differences in privileges. And
petitioners have no cause to complain.
The principles just enunciated have long been recognized. In Ichong
vs. Hernandez,[29]
our ruling is that the equal protection of the law clause “does not
demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as
to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal
protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to
those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do
not.”[30]
For the reasons given, the petition herein is denied. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
and Barredo,
JJ., concur.
[1]
At pp. 585-587.
[2]
At pp. 447-449.
[3]
Miller vs. Johnstown Traction Co., 74 A. 2d. 508, 511.
[4]
Hutton vs. Autoridad Sobre
Hogares de la Capital, 78 F. Supp. 988, 994; and
State vs. Hackmann, 199 S.W. 990, 991.
[5]
Petitioners erroneously cited the book and page reference as 16 C.J.C. 1173.
[6]
98 Phil. 711, 722.
[7] Cited
in heirs of Gabriel Zari vs. Santos
(1969), 27 SCRA 651, 662-663.
[8] See: Report of the Code Commission, pp. 165-166.
[9] Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. Public
Service Commission (1940), 70 Phil. 221, 234, citing cases; A.L. Ammen Transportation Company, Inc. vs. La Comision de Servicios Publicos (1941), 72 Phil, 459, 462-463; Rizal
Light & Ice Co., Inc. vs. Municipality of Morong,
Rizal (1968), 25 SCRA 285, 301-302, citing
Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Estate of F. Buan,
et al., L-11438 and Santiago Sambrano, et al. vs.
PSC, et al., L-11439 & L-11542-46, July 31,1958. See also: Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. vs. Austin
Taxicab Co. (1934), 59 Phil, 771, 772 and Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. vs. Sabellano (1934), 59 Phil. 773, 774, where we held that a
permit to operate a fleet of taxicabs or the granting of such permit is not one
of right, but it is a privilege granted by the State.
Of course, we also have the following rulings: (a) In Raymundo vs.
Luneta Motor Co. (1933), 58 Phil. 889, 892, where the
nature of a certificate of public convenience was passed upon in order to determine
whether or not it is liable to attachment and seizure by legal process, we
held: “A certificate of public
convenience granted to the owner or operator of public service motor vehicles,
it has been held, grants a right in the nature of limited franchise. (Public
Utilities Commission vs. Garviloch [1919], 54
Utah, 406.)”; (b) It has also been ruled that a certificate of public
convenience may be acquired by purchase, Luneta Motor
Company vs. A.D. Santos, Inc. (1962), 5 SCRA 809, 812-813.
[10]
Re East Penn Transportation Company, 41 PUR (NS), 316, 318.
[11]
Roberto vs. Commissioners of Department of Public Utilities, 160 N.E.
321, 322, citing Burgess vs. Mayor and Aldermen of Brockton, 235
Mass. 95, 100, 126 N.E. 456.
[12]
Sec. 13(a), Commonwealth Act 146, as amended.
[13]
Sec. 16(m), Commonwealth Act 146, as amended.
[14]
Sec. 16(n), Commonwealth Act 146, as amended.
[15] Batangas Transportation Co. vs. Orlanes,
52 Phil. 455, 460, See also:
Mejica vs. Public Utility Commission,
49 Phil. 774, 778; Pasay Transportation Co., Inc. vs.
Public Service Commission, 59 Phil, 278.
[16] Lagman vs. Medina,
supra, at p. 447.
[17]
Sec. 20(k), Commonwealth Act 146, as amended.
[18]
Sec. 17(j), Commonwealth Act 146, as amended.
[19] Pasay Transportation Co., Inc. vs. Public Service
Commission (1933), 59 Phil. 278, 280-281.
[20] Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726, 733.
[21] Surigao Electric Co., Inc. vs. Municipality
of Surigao
(1968), 24 SCR 898, 904.
“The fundamental rule that a
state or a municipal corporation cannot by act, franchise or any form of
contract divest itself of, or diminish in any respect, its police power is
applicable with respect to any grant, franchise or contract between a
municipal corporation and a railroad, street railway or bus company. Otherwise stated, the franchise, charter or
other contractual powers of a railroad, street railway or bus company
authorizing it to make certain uses of a city’s streets does not exempt it from
reasonable police regulation. This is
true, irrespective of any terms or conditions stated in the franchise, charter
or contract.” 7 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations,
1949 ed. (3rd edition), pp. 725-726.
[22]
City of Naga
vs. Court of Appeals (1968), 24 SCRA 594, 598.
[23] Calalang vs. Williams, supra, at p.
734.
[24] Calalang vs. Williams, supra, at p.
733.
[25]
Fritz vs. Presbrey, 116 A. 419, 421. See
also: Lincoln Park Coach Co. vs.
City of Detroit, 294 N.W. 149, 150,
citing cases.
[26] Lagman vs. Medina,
supra, at p. 447, citing PSC ‘s order of February 13, 1963.
[27] See: Felwa vs.
Salas (1966), 18 SCRA 606.
[28] Suddreth vs. City of Charlotte,
27 S.E. 2d. 650, 653.
[29] 101
Phil. 1155, 1164, citing 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.
[30] See
also: Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc. vs. Treasurer of Ormoc
City (1968), 22 SCRA 603, 606, citing Felwa vs.
Salas, supra; and People vs. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535, 542, citing
16 C.J.S. 997.