REYNALDO DE VERA, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE SANCHO A. DAMES II, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CAMARINES NORTE, BRANCH 38, RESPONDENT.

De Vera versus Dames

The Case

This is an administrative case brought directly before the Supreme Court by Reynaldo de Vera, a public school teacher and president of a teachers association, against Judge Sancho A. Dames II of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Norte, Branch 38. The complainant charges the respondent judge with serious misconduct, premature release of a decision, and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in three libel cases. The case matters because it draws the line between an erroneous judgment, which is not by itself a ground for discipline, and a baseless judgment rendered with incompetence or in circumstances that taint the judge's impartiality, which is.

Procedural History

The controversy began in the trial court of Judge Dames, who gave due course to three libel complaints filed against the complainant and eventually convicted him. The complainant sought inhibition of the judge, which was denied, and then went up to the Court of Appeals on a petition for prohibition, which was denied, although the appellate court deplored the premature release of the decision. On appeal from the judgment of conviction, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and acquitted the complainant. The complainant then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for removal dated November 1997, an original administrative action against the judge. The Office of the Court Administrator investigated and recommended a fine, and the case was resolved by the Supreme Court en banc.

Facts

On May 8, 1990, the complainant, as president of the Camarines Norte High School Teachers Association, wrote the schools division superintendent reporting treasure hunting and excavation within the school premises, in which a provincial prosecutor, Fiscal Oscar Villafuerte, and his kin were said to be involved. Because of that letter, Fiscal Villafuerte filed three libel cases against the complainant.

Judge Dames gave due course to the libel complaints instead of dismissing them on the ground of privileged communication. The complainant's counsel filed a memorandum seeking dismissal, but news spread that the judge had already convicted the accused and that judgment would be promulgated on June 25, 1993. As early as the last days of May 1993, the decision was prematurely released and published in a local newspaper. The complainant sought the judge's inhibition, which was denied, and the denial was likewise denied reconsideration. The complainant then went to the Court of Appeals on prohibition, which was denied, though the appellate court deplored the premature release. The judge himself filed a comment on that petition although he had not been ordered to do so.

On April 15, 1994, Judge Dames rendered a decision convicting the complainant of three charges of libel. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and acquitted the complainant, finding that the trial court's conclusions had no factual and legal justification. The Office of the Solicitor General itself had recommended reversal and acquittal. The complainant then filed this administrative petition, and the Office of the Court Administrator recommended a fine of 10,000 pesos.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge may be held administratively liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.
• Whether or not the respondent judge should have inhibited himself from the proceedings.
• Whether or not the penalty recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator should be imposed.

Applicable Provisions

Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it was based.

This is the constitutional standard the respondent judge failed to meet, because his decision stated conclusions without the facts and law supporting them.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the respondent's decision was indeed erroneous and baseless, but that rendering an erroneous or baseless judgment is not by itself sufficient to justify dismissal. There must be proof that the judgment was rendered with malice, corrupt motive, improper consideration, or bad faith. The Court found no clear proof of malice or corrupt motive. Nevertheless, the respondent must be sanctioned, because a judge must be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence, and has a duty to exhibit more than a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. The Court quoted its own teaching:

Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration are sufficient defenses protecting a judicial officer charged with ignorance of the law and promulgation of an unjust decision from being held accountable for errors of judgment on the premise that no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the administration of justice can be infallible.

On the second issue, the Court held that the respondent should have inhibited himself. It is an ironclad principle that a judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial. The respondent was shown to be a mahjong partner of one of the complainants in the libel case, for whom he had ruled favorably, so he could not be said to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial, and independent. He should have inhibited himself out of delicadeza, so that his integrity would not be stained with suspicion.

On the third issue, the Court agreed with the findings and recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator and imposed the recommended fine.

Doctrine

A judge cannot be disciplined for every erroneous order or decision in the absence of a clear showing of ill motive, malice, or bad faith. But this is not a license to be negligent or abusive in performing adjudicatory prerogatives. The absence of bad faith or malice will not totally exculpate a judge from charges of incompetence and ignorance of the law when the decision rendered is totally bereft of factual and legal bases. Every decision must comply with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. And a judge must not only be impartial but must appear to be impartial, inhibiting himself where a circumstance reasonably capable of inciting bias exists.

Disposition

The Court found the respondent judge administratively liable and imposed on him a fine of 10,000 pesos, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.

Remember This

Memorize the line: an erroneous or baseless judgment is not enough for dismissal, but the absence of malice does not exculpate a judge from incompetence and ignorance of the law when the decision is totally bereft of factual and legal bases. Examiners use this case on judicial ethics, on the constitutional duty to state the facts and the law in a decision, and on the rule that a judge must not only be impartial but must appear to be impartial.