SALVADOR NEBRAN, SR., NIEVES SIBIDA, RODING MABUTI, ROGELIO DOLIENTE, MELVIN NEBRAN, THEIR SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST AND ALL OTHER PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER THEM, PETITIONERS, V…
CORALES, J.:
Peralta v. Salvador Nebran, Sr., Nieves Sebida, Roding Mabuti, Rogelio
Doliente, Melvin Nebran, their successor-in-interest and all other
persons claiming rights under them”. The assailed Decision reversed the August 22, 2011 Decision[4]
of the Municipal Trial Court, Tanay, Rizal dismissing the complaint for
unlawful detainer while the questioned Order denied the Motion for
Reconsideration.
On June 20, 2013, this Court issued a Resolution[5] granting petitioners’ Motion for Extension of Time to file Petition for Review[6]
(motion for extension) filed on June 7, 2013. On June 28, 2013 and July
11, 2013, respondent Divina Peralta (Peralta) filed a Motion for Leave
of Court to Comment and Oppose the Motion for Extension of Time to file
Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court with Notice of
Change of Address[7] and Motion to Recall Resolution dated June 20, 2013 (motion to recall),[8]
respectively alleging that petitioners’ motion for extension of time
was belatedly filed. The questioned March 18, 2013 Order of the RTC was
received by their counsel, Atty. Zenon S. Suarez (Atty. Suarez), on May
2, 2013 and not on May 18, 2013 as evidenced by the registry return
receipt.[9] Hence, petitioners
had until May 17, 2013 to file the appropriate remedy. Since the motion
for extension of time was filed 20 days late, there was nothing more to
extend and the questioned March 18, 2013 Order of the RTC became final
and executory on June 20, 2013.[10]
On the other hand, petitioners filed on July 10, 2013 their Comment on the Opposition of Plaintiff-Appellee[11]
arguing that the Rules of Court give preference to the service of
pleadings, order or judgment to all the parties and in the alternative,
to the counsel on record. According to petitioners, only one of the
parties, Salvador Nebran, was sent a copy of the assailed Order, hence,
there was no full compliance with the requirement under the Rules.
Moreover, they alleged that contrary to Peralta’s assertion, Atty.
Suarez did not receive a copy of the questioned Order because at the
purported date of receipt by a certain Maegan Relles, the former had
transferred to another office.
We find the motion to recall filed by Peralta meritorious. It
must be stressed that in granting petitioners’ motion for extension of
time to file petition, We emphasized that the same was conditioned on
its timeliness. Under Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, a
petition for review shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of
petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration. Upon proper motion
and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees
and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary
period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen
(15) days only within which to file the petition for review. A perusal
of the records show that when Atty. Suarez filed the motion for
extension, the same was beyond the reglementary period. As shown by the
registry return receipt, he was furnished with a copy of the March 18,
2013 Order on May 2, 2013, thus, he has until May 17, 2013 to file the
petition or motion for extension of time. For failure to file the
appropriate remedy within the reglementary period, the March 18, 2013
Order became final and executory on June 20, 2013.[12]
However, petitioners insist that Atty. Suarez never received a
copy of the March 18, 2013 Order on May 2, 2013 because during the said
period he was confined at the hospital and had transferred to another
office. Notably, they notified this Court of the new address of Atty.
Suarez but failed to prove that they had informed the RTC of the said
change in address. Well-settled is the rule that if counsel moves to
another address without informing the court of that change, such
omission or neglect is inexcusable and will not stay the finality of the
decision.[13] Moreover, as
between the bare denial of an attorney of his receipt of the notice of
judgment and the positive assertion of a postal official whose duty it
is to send such notices, the choice is not difficult, for the attorney’s
denial certainly cannot prevail over the contrary statement of postal
officials based on official records. For one thing, postal officials
enjoy the presumption, without clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary, to have regularly performed their official duty and that they
have acted in good faith. All things are presumed to have been done
correctly and with due formality until the contrary is proved. For
another reason, mails are presumed to have been properly delivered and
received by the addressee “in the regular course of the mail.” These juris tantum
presumptions stand even against the most well-reasoned allegations
pointing to some possible irregularity or anomaly. It is petitioners’
burden to overcome the presumptions by sufficient evidence, and so far
We have not seen anything in the record to support their charges of
anomaly beyond their bare allegations.[14]
Furthermore, service of the March 18, 2013 Order to Atty. Suarez is considered notice to all the petitioners. The ruling in Ramos v. Lim[15] is instructive, viz.:
xxx
Should a party to a suit appear by counsel, service of every
judgment, order, or pleading subsequent to the complaint, written
motion, notice or similar papers shall be made upon his counsels or one
of them. Accordingly, notices of all kinds and all orders of the court
must be sent to the counsel. While notice to counsel is an effective
notice to the client, notice to a client and not to his counsel is not
notice in law.
x x x
Noteworthy, when a decision is already final and executory,
the same can no longer be the subject of an appeal. Thus, petitioners in
this case are already bound by the final and executory May 10, 2012
Decision and March 18, 2013 Order of the RTC and can no longer impugn
the same.[16]
It has been repeatedly enunciated that a client is bound by
the action of his counsel in the conduct of a case and cannot be heard
to complain that the result might have been different had he proceeded
differently. A client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. If such
grounds were to be admitted as reasons for reopening cases, there would
never be an end to a suit. It must be borne in mind that the right to
appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but is merely a
statutory privilege that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed
by the law.[17]
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Recall Resolution dated June 20, 2013 is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Villon (Chairperson) and Macalino, JJ., concur.
[1] See Amended Petition for Review, rollo, pages 92-107. The parties are referred to in the petition and in the rollo
as defendants/appellants and plaintiff-appellee. In accordance with the
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, they are referred to in this Resolution
as petitioners and respondent.
[2] Penned by Presiding Judge Gina F. Cenit-Escoto, ibid., pages 28-39.
[3] Ibid., pages 40-47.
[4] Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Ma. Socorro Almazan Vista, ibid., pages 172-175.
[5] Ibid., page 12.
[6] Ibid., pages 3-5.
[7] Ibid., pages 67-68.
[8] Ibid., pages 77-79.
[9] Ibid., page 70.
[10] Ibid., page 71.
[11] Ibid., pages 73-76.
[12] Supra, at note 10.
[13] Karen and Kristy Fishing Industry v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 172760-61. October 15, 2007.
[14] See Gold Line Transit v. Ramos, G.R. No. 144813. August 15, 2001.
[15] G.R. No. 133496. May 09, 2005.
[16] See Dominic Griffith v. Estur, G.R. No. 161777. May 7, 2008.
[17] See Lagua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 173390. June 27, 2012.