JUAN MERINO, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND CIRILO ALARCON, RESPONDENTS.

Petition
to review a decision of the defunct Court of Appeals.

On January
18, 1972, Juan
Merino filed a complaint for ejectment against Cirilo Alarcon in the City Court
of Manila. The court decided against Merino on April 14, 1972, so he appealed to the Court of
First Instance of Manila.

The Court of First Instance tried the case de novo
and in a decision dated January 9, 1973,
the court ordered the defendant to vacate the premises.

Defendant Alarcon filed a notice on February 16, 1973, that he was appealing the decision to the
Court of Appeals “the findings of facts that are not supported by
substantial evidence.” The notice stated that the decision was received by
his counsel only on January 17, 1973, in Baguio City where said counsel was receiving medical
treatment. Alarcon also filed a cash appeal bond in
the amount of P120.00, plus P5.00 legal research fee.

On March 7,
1973,
defendant-appellant Alarcon filed the Record on
Appeal. On March 31, 1973, Judge Mariano V. Agcaoili
who inherited the case upon the retirement of Judge Mariano V. Benedicto approved the Record on Appeal. However, on
April
12, 1973, Judge Agcaoili issued the following Order:

“On March
31, 1973, this Court
inadvertently approved the record on appeal in this case and at the same
time instructing the Clerk of this Court to transmit the record on appeal to
the Court of Appeals for appropriate
proceedings thereof. Inadvertently, because the attention of
the Court was not called by the Clerk
of Court of Branch XXX that this is an appealed case from the City Court.

“Under existing laws, the decision of this Court under the
circumstances is already final and not appealable to
the Court of Appeals. Moreover, it appears that on February 7, 1973 a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution has been filed and according to the Constancia
of the Clerk of Court the hearing and consideration of the said motion was
cancelled in view of the retirement of the Honorable Mariano V. Benedicto.

“WHEREFORE, let this case be scheduled for hearing on April 23, 1973 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning for the parties to
argue on whether or not this case is still appealable
and whether or not the motion for execution should be granted. Pending said
hearing, the approval of the said record on appeal is in the meantime
cancelled.”

On May 30, 1973,
Judge Agcaoili issued still another Order which reads
as follows:

“On March 31, 1973,
this Court approved the Record on Appeal filed by the defendant.

“On April 12, 1973,
an order was issued by this Court scheduling for hearing the matter on the
approval of said Record on Appeal on April
23, 1973 to enable the parties to argue on whether or not the
Motion for Execution should be granted and whether or not this case is still appealable.

“It appearing that this case was appealed to Branch XXX from
the decision of the City Court and, therefore, under existing laws, the
decision of this Court of Branch XXX is no longer appealable
to the Court of Appeals.

“In said hearing on April
23, 1973, the defen­dant failed to establish his right to appeal
this case in the Court of Appeals.

“WHEREFORE, the approval of the Record on Appeal aforesaid is
hereby recalled and cancelled, thereby nullifying the same.

“Correspondingly, let the Writ of Execution be issued,
enforcing the decision of this Court, dated January 9, 1973, ordering the
defendant and all those occupying Apartment No. 1209-B, situated at Vito Cruz
St., Singalong, Manila, to vacate imme­diately the
said premises on the ground that the owner thereof would repair the dangerously
damaged portion of the said apartment and declaring plaintiff as having a right
to repair his building and to pay the plaintiff attorney’s fees in the sum of
FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS.”

Alarcon thereupon went to the Court of
Appeals and sought the setting aside of the two Orders set forth above. The
Court of Appeals rendered the following judgment:

“WHEREFORE, the questioned orders dated April 12, 1973 and May 30, 1973 are hereby SET ASIDE and the order dated March 31, 1973 approving petitioner’s
record on appeal and appeal bond is hereby REVIVED. The writ of execution
issued on June 1, 1973 is
also hereby SET ASIDE and QUASHED. Respondent Court
is hereby directed to elevate the Record on Appeal of the case below to this
Court.”

Merino, who lost in the
Court of Appeals, asks Us to declare “that respondent Cirilo
Alarcon may no longer appeal by an ordinary appeal as
the decision sought to be appealed has already become final under the
provisions of RA 6031, amending Sec. 45 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, and
therefore, said decision is already executory.”

Republic Act No. 6031
which took effect on August 4, 1969, amended several provisions of the Judiciary
Act of 1948. It amended Section 45 so as to read as follows:

“SEC. 45. Appellate
Jurisdiction. – Courts of First Instance shall have appellate
jurisdiction over all cases arising in city and municipal courts, in their
respective provinces, except over appeals from cases tried by municipal judges
of provincial capitals or city judges pursuant to the authority granted under
the last paragraph of Section 87 of this Act.

Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on the
basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal
courts: Provided, That the parties may submit memoranda and/or brief with oral
argument if so requested: Provided, however, That if the cases was tried in a
city or municipal court before the latter became a court of record, then on
appeal the case shall proceed by trial de novo.

In cases falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
municipal and city courts which are appealed to the courts of first instance,
the decision of the latter shall be final: Provided, That the findings of facts
contained in said decision are supported by substantial evidence as basis
thereof, and the conclusions are not clearly against the law and jurisprudence;
in cases falling under the concurrent jurisdictions of the muni­cipal and city
courts with the courts of first instance, the appeal shall be made directly to
the court of appeals whose decision shall be final: Provided, however, that the
supreme court in its discretion may, in any case involving a question of law,
upon petition of the party aggrieved by the decision and under rules and
conditions that it may prescribe, require by certiorari that the case be
certified to it for review and determination, as if the case had been brought
before it on appeal.”

The issue is whether an ordinary appeal to review the facts was
available to Alarcon. Stated differently: did Judge Agcaoili act properly when he set aside the Record on
Appeal and ordered the execution of the decision?

The Court of Appeals in rendering the judgment aforequoted relied on an unpublished resolution of this
Court dated September 26, 1972
(and therefore En Banc) in the case of G.R. No. L-35462, Jose
Mota, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. In
said case this Court held:

“While, in view of the fact that the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila of May 27, 1971, in Civil Case No. 78478, which is being
appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals, did not affirm in full the
judgment of the City Court of Manila, which was appealed to it and tried by it de
novo, because the City Court of Manila was not yet a court of record
then, or, at least, did not record the proceedings in said appealed case, it
is quite clear that the appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals was rightly
made by record on appeal, under the authority of the first clause of Section 29
of the Judiciary Act as amended by R.A. 5433, appeals by petition for review under Republic Act 6031
(amending Sec. 45 of the Judiciary Act) being proper only cases wherein the cases are ori­ginally
tried by the municipal or city courts as courts of record
and under the exception in Section 29 of the Judiciary Act, as amended by Republic Act 5433, just mentioned, when
the judgment of the municipal or city court is affirmed in full, in the
exercise of sound dis­cretion and to avoid further delay in the disposition of
petitioner’s case on its merits, since anyway no substantial prejudice will
probably be caused to said peti­tion by his filing the petition for review
directed to be filed by respondent court,
the Court resolved to DENY the present petition, which means that,
within such reasonable period as the respondent court may grant petitioner,
after notice of this resolution, he may file the petition for review required
by respondent court, unless, after
respondent court is so informed of this resolution, it advises him to dispense
with the same and stand, instead, by his record on appeal, without prejudice to
the petitioner resorting to any appropriate remedy, in the event that he should
be adversely affected substantially, should respondent court insist that his appeal be by review by certiorari instead of by record
on appeal or writ of error.” (Underscoring supplied.)

The Court of Appeals did
not agree with this Court’s view expressed above but was constrained to defer
thereto realizing as it did its place in the judicial hierarchy.

Justice Guillermo S.
Santos who later joined this Court said:

“However, with due respect to the Supreme Court resolution in
the Mota case, there is much to commend in the view
of the learned trial judge that RA 6031 modified RA 5433 in the sense that
while under the latter–RA 5433–only final judgments or decisions of the CFI
entered in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction which affirms in full the
judgment of the Municipal Court or City Court are made final, the former–RA
6031– modified and extended the rule to the effect that the decisions of the
CFI in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
over inferior courts shall be final in all cases.

It should be noted that RA 6031, in providing that decisions of the
CFI shall be “final” does
not make any distinction whether
said decision is an affirmance, reversal or
modification of the judgment of the muni

cipal
or city court. Thus, we believe that RA 5433, insofar as it limits the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over final judgments or
decisions of the CFI, which affirm in full the judgment or decision of a
municipal or city court by way of a petition for review, has been modified and
enlarged by RA 6031, which is a later legislation in pari
materia, as both concern the appealability of decisions of the CFI in appealed cases. For
to limit appeals by petition for review only in cases where the CFI affirms in
full the judgment of the city or municipal court would render nugatory the
purpose of RA 6031 in providing for the finality of the judgment of the CFI
over appealed cases falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
municipal or city courts. Moreover, it should likewise be noted that the
procedure for the filing of a petition for review laid down by our Resolution
of August 12, 1971 does not limit the same to cases where the CFI affirms in
full the judgment of the municipal or city court.

The allegation that petition for review is proper only where a case
was originally tried by the municipal or city court as a court of record, does not also find support in RA 6031.
As aptly pointed out in Ampis vs. Sebastian, CA-G.R. No.
Sp. 91284, May 17, 1973, what RA 6031 provides is that–if the case was tried
in the city or municipal court before the latter became a court of record, then
on appeal the case shall proceed by trial de novo since there are
no records to be transmitted for the consideration of the CFI. In other words,
the circumstance that the municipal or city court was not a court of record
when the appealed case was tried before it does not affect the
“final” cha­racter of the judgment of the CFI. As clearly appears from a reading of RA 6031, the only
condition to the finality of the decision of the CFI is that the appealed case
falls the exclusive original jurisdiction of municipal and city courts.

Finally, policy-wise the requirement of a petition for review will
definitely help ease appellate court backlog and discourage dilatory
appeals–eighty five (85%) per cent of
which have been found, statistics wise, to be without merit. It will also do
away with the nagging doubts on the meaning of the clause–the decisions of the CFI which affirms in full the judgment of the lower court.”

Justice Ricardo C. Puno, incumbent Assemblyman from the National Capital Region
and Minister of Justice said:

“With all due respect to the pronouncement of the Supreme
Court in the Mota case, I most humbly submit that I
likewise share the view of the respondent Judge that Republic Act No. 6031
modified Republic Act 5433; that Republic Act 6031 operates to abolish the
distinction under Republic Act 5433 wherein only adjudications by the CFI
affirming in full the judgments of the municipal or city court became ipso
facto final; and that
decisions of courts of first instance rendered in the exercise of their
appellate jurisdiction should now be considered
finaI, be they
affirmation in toto, reversals, or
modifications of judgments of inferior courts, the condition to the finality of
the CFI’s decision being merely that the case appealed from falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior court.

This has been, and remains, the view of the writer of this
concurring opinion, and his past course of action as former CFI Judge adhered
to that conviction until he was made aware of the Mota Resolution.

As I join Mr. Justice Santos in deferring to the Mota ruling, I wish to echo the thoughts of Mr. Justice Montemayor in his dissenting opinion in the case of People
vs. Santos, et al. (56 OG 3546; 104 Phil. 551, 561-562) that while ‘the rule x x x is for judges of inferior
courts to abide by and follow the law as interpreted by this Tribunal,
regardless of their private opinions
and convictions’, they may seek guidance from the Supreme Court in the
re-examination of important legal questions. I therefore urge whomsoever may
not be favored by the decision of this Appellate Court to elevate this matter
to the Supreme Court for review on a pure question of law, and, in the words of
that learned jurist, thus afford the ‘Court of last resort an opportunity of
either reaffirming the old doctrine or abandoning it, and adopting a new one’,
and ‘perchance to attune their opinion to changing times, conditions and public
policy’.”

For the reasons expressed in the lucid opinions of Justices
Santos and Puno, We hereby abandon the doctrine laid
down in Mota. We hold that decisions of Courts
of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, in the exercise of their
appellate jurisdiction over cases triable exclusively
by courts inferior to them, shall be final in all cases. In fact as early as
Gutierrez vs. Magat, L-39739, October 3, 1975, 67
SCRA 262, the Second Division of this Court speaking through Mr. Justice Ramon
C. Aquino held that: “Section 45 of the
Judiciary Law as amended by Republic Act No. 6031 does not allow an appeal by
record on appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance in an
appealed case falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
municipal or city court.” (At p. 265.)

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
hereby set aside the orders of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April
12, 1973 and May 30,
1973, are hereby
reinstated. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Plana,
Escolin, Relova, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.,
concur.

Teehankee, J.,
files a brief concurrence.

Aquino, J.,
see concurrence.

De Castro, J., on sick leave.

Melencio-Herrera, J., with separate concurrence.

Vasquez, J., concurs in the views expressed by Justices Aquino and Melencio-Herrera.