SOUTHWOOD CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY AND/OR ALLAN SY AND CHARLYN SY, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND ADOLFO BOLIMA, RESPONDENTS.
CRUZ, J.:
In his position paper, private respondent averred that he was employed on July 5, 1996 as stay-in helper in Ana Ong Hardware owned by the Sy spouses and located at Pasig City; that when the business moved to Las Piñas City, Ana Ong Hardware’s name was changed to Southwood; that due to an illness last August 11, 1998, he informed the Sy spouses that he would resume work only on August 17, 1998; and that when he reported for work on that date, he learned that he was already dismissed.
On the other hand, Southwood and the Sy spouses (or “petitioners”, when collectively) denied employer-employee relationship with private respondent and asserted that the complaint was merely filed to harass the Sy spouses and extort money from petitioners. They contended that Southwood is owned by Ana Ong but is being managed by the Sy spouses; that private respondent was a laborer of a certain Vicente Magsakay, a building constructor, who had a project near Southwood; that upon private respondent’s plea, Allan Sy (or “Allan”) leased to the former a small room on the right side of the store; and that private respondent paid one-month advance rental but not the succeeding rentals, which led to the padlocking of the room by Allan.
On July 2, 1999, Labor Arbiter Fatima Jambaro-Franco rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for “lack of merit”. The dismissal was founded on the “failure of (private respondent) to introduce evidence showing that he had been an employee of (petitioners)”.
Private respondent appealed to the NLRC. Finding need for further hearing, the NLRC issued a resolution dated March 31, 2000, the decretal portion of which reads:
“PREMISES CONSIDERED the Decision on July 2, 1999 is hereby VACATED and records herein be REMANDED to Arbitration Branch of origin for immediate appropriate proceedings.
SO ORDERED.”
After conducting further hearing, Labor Arbiter Jovencio Mayor, Jr. rendered a decision dated July 10, 2001 dismissing the case for “lack of employer-employee relationship”. Private respondent appealed to the NLRC which, on September 30, 2002, rendered a decision (or “NLRC decision”) disposing, thus:
“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one ENTERED finding complainant’s dismissal illegal. Accordingly, in lieu of reinstatement, respondents are further ordered to pay the complainant his separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service, from date of hire in July 1995 up to finality hereof in addition to full backwages from August 17, 1998 to July 10, 2001.
SO ORDERED.”
Petitioners did not appeal the NLRC decision. After the Research and Information Unit made a computation of the judgment award totaling P245,117.72, the labor arbiter issued a writ of execution on June 24, 2003 for said amount.
Only then did petitioners institute the instant petition, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in (i) “rendering a decision which is null and void for want of notice and jurisdiction over (their) person x x x which is, in effect, a denial of due process of law”; and (ii) “rendering a decision which is contrary to law and to the facts obtaining in this case.”
Petitioners assert that they were denied due process on the theory that subsequent to the remand of the case to the labor arbiter, they did not receive any notice/court processes, including the NLRC decision. They assert that since they were denied their right to oppose/appeal the NLRC decision, the same is null and void; and that even assuming that it is valid, said decision is not yet final and executory. Petitioners further contend that the Sy spouses are not liable as they are not the owners of Southwood; and that the computation of the Research and Information Unit included 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay in contravention of the NLRC decision which merely awarded separation pay and backwages.
Commenting on the petition, private respondent avers that the instant petition was filed beyond the reglementary period and that he is entitled to the monetary claims. He asserts that petitioners’ allegation of want of notice is belied by the fact that on February 5, 2001, petitioners’ counsel, Atty. Rodolfo Galing (or “Atty. Galing”), filed a Comment/Objections to Complainant’s Formal Offer of Exhibits with Motion/Manifestation to Adopt the Allegations Contained in Respondents’ Position Paper dated February 23, 1999 in Lieu of Respondents’ Evidence (Annex “2”, Comment); and that copy of the NLRC decision was received by Atty. Galing on October 15, 2002 as evidenced by the xerox copy of the registry return receipt (Annex “1”, id.) signed by him.
We now resolve.
The essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense; what is repugnant to due process is the denial of the opportunity to be heard (Oil Natural Gas Commission vs. Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 26).
We note that petitioners filed before the labor arbiter a Comment/Objections to Complainant’s Formal Offer of Exhibits, etc. Consequently, petitioners were afforded, and had availed of, the opportunity to present their side after the case was remanded to the labor arbiter. In other words, they were not denied due process.
The remedy of certiorari is available where there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the person or tribunal issuing an order or judgment and there is no appeal or other speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law (Cuison vs. Court of Appeals, 289 SCRA 159). However, petitioners failed to establish the second requisite of certiorari.
Atty. Galing received a copy of the NLRC decision on October 15, 2002. As such, petitioners should have filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision on or before October 25, 2002 (Sec. 14, Rule VII, NLRC’s New Rules of Procedure). Petitioners did not file a motion for reconsideration; hence, said decision became final and executory (Centro Escolar University vs. NLRC [First Division], 276 SCRA 699).
Nevertheless, petitioners assert that they should have been served a copy of the NLRC decision either personally or by registered mail pursuant to Sec. 4(a), Rule III of the NLRC New Rules of Procedure, which provides:
“Section 4. Service of Notices and Resolutions. – (a) Notices of summons and copies of orders, resolutions or decisions shall be served on the parties to the case personally by the bailiff or the duly authorized public officer within three (3) days from receipt thereof by registered mail; Provided that where a party is represented by counsel or authorized representative, service shall be made on such counsel or authorized representative; provided further that in cases of decision and final awards, copies thereof shall be served on both the parties and their counsel; provided finally, that in case where parties are so numerous, service shall be made on counsel and upon such number of complainants as may be practicable, which shall be considered substantial compliance with Article 224 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended.” (Underlining Supplied)
As petitioners were represented by counsel (Atty. Galing), service of the NLRC decision on him is, pursuant to Sec. 4 (a), Rule III, id., considered service thereof on the former. Thus, in Curaza vs. NLRC (354 SCRA 451), it was held:
“x x x. We do not subscribe to petitioner’s view that paragraph (d), Sec. 4, Rule XII of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC requires that parties represented by counsel must also be served with notice of the decisions of the NLRC. x x x.”
x x x
“x x x. It is Sec. 3, Rule 1 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure which provides the rule for service of notices and resolutions of the commission. It states that for the purposes of computing the period of appeal, the same shall be counted from receipt of the decision, award or order by the counsel of record of the party. Thus, in UERM Employees Union-FFW vs. Minister of Labor and Employment, this Court ruled that when a party is represented by counsel, notices should be made upon the counsel of record at his given address, to which notices of all kinds emanating from the court should be sent.”
Besides, Sec. 7, Rule III, id., confers on lawyers and other representatives of parties appearing in labor tribunals the authority “to bind their clients in all matters of procedure.”
Furthermore, it is a well-established rule that “notice to counsel is notice to parties and when a party is represented by counsel, notices should be made upon the counsel of record at his given address, to which notices of all kinds emanating from the court should be sent” (Rural Bank of Alaminos Employees Union vs. NLRC, 317 SCRA 669; Sec. 2, Rule 13, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
At any rate, the NLRC decision has legal and factual support.
In illegal dismissal cases, it is the employer who has the burden of proof (Hyatt Taxi Services, Inc. vs. Catinoy, 359 SCRA 686). Failure to discharge such evidential burden would necessarily mean that the dismissal was not justified and, therefore, illegal (Quebec, Sr. vs. NLRC, 301 SCRA 627).
The NLRC found that petitioners failed to discharge their burden as they merely came out with bare “denial of employer-employee relationship” with private respondent without presenting “any credible support of their denial.” It ratiocinated, thus:
“Thus, we find the sworn statements of former co-employees of (private complainant) as well as former neighbors (Records, pp. 44-49) and the disclaimer of one Ronald Guevarra (Records, pp. 64-66), attesting under oath that he never signed any sinumpaang salaysay, referred to as Annex ‘B’ of (petitioner’s) position paper (Records, p. 38). We do understand the failure of (petitioners) to keep the necessary documents as required of them by law to keep. This is so because, they did not keep records as shown in the inspection report conducted in the subject establishment on September 20, 2001 (Records, p. 182). We give due consideration to this evidence presented for the first time on appeal which is within the discretion of the Commission following Art. 117, Sec. d of the Labor Code and art. 223 of the Labor Code. Respondents’ have been duly furnished copy of this evidence.”
As petitioners failed to prove the validity of private respondent’s termination, the NLRC correctly concluded that he was illegally dismissed.
Finally, petitioners object to the inclusion of 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay in the computation of the judgment award. They claim that those items were not included in the NLRC decision. We agree.
A judgment which has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and, hence, may no longer be modified in any respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes, all the issues between the parties being deemed resolved and laid to rest (Solidbank Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 379 SCRA 159). Corollarily, a writ of execution should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision (Villareal vs. Rarmo, 247 SCRA 493).
We note that, on its face, the writ of execution issued by the labor arbiter on June 24, 2003 does not indicate whether 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay were included in the computation of the judgment award. Assuming it does, however, petitioners’ remedy is to file a motion to quash the writ of execution before the labor arbiter and, if unsuccessful, to appeal the adverse resolution to the NLRC pursuant to Art. 223(a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines (Metro Drug Corporation Employees Association-Federation of Free Workers, 471 SCRA 45; Deltaventures Resources, Inc. vs. Cabato, 327 SCRA 521). Immediate recourse to courts is improper in accordance with the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies (id.).
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED due course, with the result that the decision dated September 30, 2002 of the National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Reyes, Jr., J. and Lanzanas, JJ., concur.