THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. PEDRO BELANDRES AND JACINTO MAÑACOP, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANTS.

Upon an information which charged the above-named accused with the complex
crime of robbery with rape, after proper proceedings, the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija found the appellants guilty of said crime and sentenced
each of them to an indeterminate penalty of from twelve (12) years of
prision mayor to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal with
the accessory penalties of the law, to indemnify Pedro Valdez in the sum of
P130, and to pay the costs. The lower court further sentenced Jacinto Mañacop
(alias Principe) to recognize any offspring Paulina Valdez may have as
a consequence of her rape by said appellant.

Upon petition of defendants, the lower court granted a new trial, during
which Juan Pascua, a fellow detention prisoner of appellants at the provincial
jail, in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, testified that he and other members of a
Hukbalahap unit were the ones responsible for the crime of which these accused
were convicted? but the court did not believe his testimony, and in a resolution
dated February 10, 1948, reaffirmed its previous decision of August 19,
1947.

Counsel for the accused appealed from said judgment to the Court of Appeals,
and the latter in turn, after careful consideration of the case, in a resolution
promulgated by its Fourth Division, came to the conclusion that, under the set
of facts proven herein and in view of the attendance of the.aggravating
circumstances of night-time and the taking advantage by the offenders of their
public positions, without any mitigating circumstance to offset the same, these
appellants should have been sentenced by the trial court to life imprisonment,
and in accordance with the provisions of Section 34 of Republic Act No. 296, the
Judiciary Law of 1948, it resolved to refrain from entering judgment herein and
to certify this case to this Court for final determination.

It appears that at about one o’clock In the morning of August 23, 1946, Pedro
Valdez, who, with his wife and daughter, was residing at Pinagbariohan,
municipality of Laur, province of Nueva Ecija, was awaken by voices of people
calling: “tao po, tao po.” Valdez got up, lighted a match and saw three persons
in front of the house, one of whom shouted that all the members of the household
should come down. Valdez recognized two of those persons, who were standing in
front of the stairway as municipal policemen of Laur. The third was a total
stranger to him. The appellant Jacinto Mañacop was carrying a long firearm,
while Belandres had a short one. Valdez lighted a kerosene lamp and he and his
family were ordered to come down under threats of being shot. Valdez, his wife
and daughter Paulina, then about 19 years of age, complied with the order, and
appellants, in the meantime, covered their faces. While Mañacop was guarding
Valdez, and the latter’s wife and daughter, Belandres went up the house and
stayed there for about twenty minutes. In the meantime, Mañacop brought Paulina
to a place about twenty meters distant from the house under a mango tree, and
taking off his mask, queried Paulina if her father had a gun. When she answered
in the negative, Mañacop told the girl that she would be shot if she would
refuse to abide by his wishes. Mañacop pushed her violently and when she felt,
he untied her drawers and placed himself on top of her and, under threat of
bodily harm, assaulted her criminally.

It was then that the other accused Belandres came down from the house to
relieve Mañacop, and Paulina , fearing that the other man who was coming towards
her from the house might also rape her, fled and escaped, running away until she
took refuge in the house of a couple, located in the poblacion of Laur.
When the criminals left the scene of their crime, Valdez and his wife returned
to their house to find all their things scattered and the sum of P130 missing
from their trunk. It was already daybreak when their daughter returned home,
weeping and telling them that she had been outraged by the accused Mañacop.

Under the influence of fear, Valdez did not report the incident immediately
to the proper authorities. Instead, the next morning he started to build another
house in the poblacion of Laur, while his family was staying in the
barrio, but sleeping in the house of a neighbor at night. Even if the new house
was not yet finished, Valdez moved his family to it after September 2, because
or that date, the accused Mañacop appeared in the barrio and pelted
Pedro Valdez with bullets.

The record further shows that a few days afterwards, and upon learning that
the municipal mayor was looking for him, Valdez went to see the town executive.
However, the mayor, upon noticing that Valdez, because of fear, could not make a
full disclosure of what happened to him, referred him to the chief of police for
further questioning. But Pedro Valdez could not freely state the facts to the
chief of police on account of the threatening attitude of these two appellants,
who were then present and were pointing their guns at the offended party during
the investigation, for which reason, Valdez had to seek cover behind the chief
of police.

Upon those circumstances, Valdez decided to lodge his complaint with the
Provincial Fiscal of Cabanatuan, who, in the light of the sworn statements made
by Valdez and his daughter Paulina, petitioned the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija that the original complaint be admitted, and the corresponding
preliminary investigation be conducted by the Court of First Instance. By an
order issued on September 25, 1946, the Judge of First Instance authorized the
filing of the information with the Court of First Instance and instructed the
Justice of the Peace, of Cabanatuan to conduct the necessary preliminary
investigation and to issue the warrant for the arrest of the defendants.

In this instance, counsel for defendants assigned several errors allegedly
committed by the trial court concerning its findings.

From the outset, the defense contends that the testimony of Paulina Valdez
can not be made the basis of the conviction of appellants, because of its
improbability. Paulina testified that upon reaching the mango tree, Mañacop
disclosed his identity to her by taking off his mask. It should be taken into
account that Mañacop was not unknown to her. He had been courting her and
according to Paulina, she did not reciprocate his feelings towards her on
account of the fact that he was a married man. Mañacop was, therefore, playing
the role of a rejected suitor, who, in his desire to humiliate Paulina Valdez,
and undoubtedly taking advantage of his position as a municipal policeman,
thought that he could, with impunity, accomplish his evil purpose of ravishing
the girl who dared to reject his offer of love, by staging a robbery. It is very
significant that, from the very beginning of the raid, Mañacop paid his
exclusive attention to his victim Paulina, while his co-accused Belandres went
up to the house to ransack and rob the same of personal properties and the sum
of P130 mentioned in the information.

While it is true that it is the right of the accused, through counsel, to
subject the prosecution witness to rigid questioning in order to bring forth the
truth, yet the exercise of such right has its limitations. After her ordeal on
the night of August 23, 1946, the merciless manner in which the
cross-examination of Paulina Valdez was conducted, when she was quizzed about
the details of the criminal assault upon her and her subsequent reaction, as if
she were expected to live over again her terrible experience, has the effect of
adding insult to injury. Paulina is not a woman of experience or of loose
morals, but a simple barrio girl, a maiden, the victim of a satyr, who
could not be reasonably expected that in her distress and abject misery, after
having been raped, should still think of finding out whether she had any blood
stains on her clothes or any substance in her body. As aptly remarked by the
Solicitor General—”Is it reasonable to expect from her so much worldly wisdom
and experience as to have realized the need of washing herself after she was
ravished?” And the trial Judge—who could have properly stopped this kind of
questioning,—after having observed Paulina Valdez on the witness stand, made
this finding:

“En este caso particular, Paulina Valdez, una sencilla campesina, declaro su
infortunio con una tal sincellez y aire de veracidad, que parecia inspirada tan
solo por el deseo deseo de decir la verdad; pues no habia ni siquiera hiel en su
palabra.”

The sufficiency of the lone testimony of Paulina Valdez to sustain the
conviction of the accused for the crime of rape, is also attacked by the
defense. Her testimony is so clear and free from serious contradictions that, as
ruled in People vs. Dazo (58 Phil. 420), there can be no doubt, In Our
opinion, of her veracity, particularly in view of the fact that she was
corroborated by her father Pedro Valdez, who stated that her daughter was taken
away on the night in question by appellant Mañacop, and when she returned home
at daybreak the next morning, she wept and told her parents that she had been
raped by Mañacop. This testimony of Pedro Valdez, according to People
vs. Momo (56 Phil., 86), may be considered corroborative of that given
by his daughter.

The lack of physical examination of Paulina Valdez is also alleged by the
defense fatal to the prosecution. We should not forget that Pedro Valdez and his
family were practically terrorized by the accused, who were members of the
police force of their town; We have stated elsewhere in this decision that they
were subdued by their fear of the offenders, and their feeling was intensified
by the antagonism shown by the very officials who should have given them
protection and help in their distress. Lack of; medical examination has been
held to be not an indispensable element in the prosecution of the crime of rape,
because according to the doctrine in People vs. Suarez (40 Off. Gaz.,
11th Suppl., No. 15, page 28), it all depends upon the evidence offered and as
long as such evidence convinces the court, a conviction by the crime of rape is
proper.

Regarding the defense of alibi put up by appellants, who had the backing of
almost all of the officialdom of Laur, evidence was presented to the effect that
these accused were on duty in the municipal building of Laur during the night of
August 22 until the following morning of August 23. The mayor and the chief of
police, testifying for the defense, said that at about 10 o’clock on the night
of August 22, 1946, they went to the municipal building to make their usual
rounds of inspection, and found the two appellants there. But, according to the
evidence, the mayor and the chief of police stayed in the municipal building for
ten or twenty minutes only, and another defense witness said that neither the
mayor nor the chief of the police came back to the municipal building after the
10 o’clock inspection of August 22. It appears, therefore, that if these two
appellants were seen by the mayor or the chief of police in the municipal
building at about 10 o’clock, their testimonies can not support their alleged
alibi after their round of inspection in the municipal building. They could not,
therefore, give credible testimony that these appellants stayed in the municipal
building during that night until the morning of August 23. On the other hand, we
have the testimony of appellant Mañacop who said that he mounted guard in the
municipal building from 8 o’clock to 12 o’clock midnight of August 22 and, from
then on, he was off duty until 7 o’clock in the morning of August 23. According
to the evidence for the prosecution, Belandres and Mañacop, with their firearms
and with another unknown person, visited the house of Pedro Valdez at about 1
o’clock in the early morning of August 23.

Furthermore, in their efforts to bolster up their alleged alibi, appellants
presented copies of the police blotter for August 22 and August 23, 1946, But
instead of supporting their contention, those documents (Exhibit 1-A and 2-A)
constitute the best refutation of their alibi, because Exhibit 1-A, the copy of
the police blotter for August 22, 1946, shows that policemen Pulante and
Agustin were the ones on guard duty in the municipal building from 7 o’clock
p.m. on August 22 to 7 o’clock a.m. on August 23, while appellants Belandres and
Mañacop, together with policeman Palara were on patrol from 7 o’clock p.m., of
August 22 to 12 o’clock a.m., of August 23.

Regarding the apparent delay in the prosecution of this case, while in
numerous decisions this Court has strongly condemned the unexplained delay in
instituting a criminal prosecution, because it creates suspicion about the
motives of the supposed offended party, unless it is explained (U. S.
vs. Reyes, 18 Phil., 495; U. S. vs. Cardona, 36 Phil., 438; U.
S. vs. Pagaduan, 37 Phil., 90; People vs. Gallego et al., 44
Phil., 192; People vs. Manguiat, 51 Phil., 406), yet it has also been
ruled in U. S. vs. Briones (28 Phil., 367), that—

“Such delay, when explained, however, is not sufficient to create a
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendants. The law justly provides the
period within which a criminal action may be brought in most cases. The fact
that the prosecution did not commence his action earlier is no proof that the
facts stated in the complaint are not true.” (Syllabus.)

As already stated, the circumstances surrounding this case are such that,
although the crime was committed early in the morning of August 23, 1946, the
criminal action was taken by the prosecution only on September 9, 1946, the date
of the original information, because of the inability of the offended party to
secure protection and help from the very officials who were called upon by law
to extend to Pedro Valdez and his family the facilities which they needed. The
offenders were officers of the law and had threatened Pedro Valdez and his
family with bodily harm if they should make a report of their offense to the
proper authorities. In fact, after the filing of the information by the
provincial fiscal, the latter had to make the necessary arrangements with the
Military police in Cabanatuan for the protection and security of the offended
parties during the pendency of this case in the lower court.

In view of all the above, We have come to the conclusion that these
appellants are beyond reasonable doubt guilty of the complex crime of robbery
with rape, defined and penalized in Article 294, paragraph 2 of which it
provides that “the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period
to reclusion perpetua” shall be Inflicted “when the robbery shall have
been accompanied by rape * * * .”

The offense under consideration has been perpetrated with the accompaniment
of the aggravating circumstance of night-time (People vs. Manaba, 58
Phil., 665) and the taking advantage by the offenders of their public position
(U. S. vs. Fernandez, 3 Phil., 380), without any mitigating
circumstance to offset the same. Following, therefore, the recommendation of the
Solicitor General, the penalty that should be meted out to these culprits shall
be in the maximum period of that provided in the above-quoted provision of the
Revised Penal Code, that is, reclusion perpetua.

Our attention is correctly invited by the Solicitor General, to the fact that
the trial court failed to provide for the payment of indemnity to Paulina
Valdez, as provided in No. 1 of Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code, which in
accordance with the decision rendered in People vs. Feliciano (77
Phil., 526), should be in the amount of P4,000, the appellant Belandres being
jointly liable therefor with his co-appellant Mañacop.

On the other hand, it appears that the lower court erred in sentencing
Mañacop to acknowledge the offspring, if any, of the offended party, pursuant to
No. 2 of Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code, notwithstanding the fact that he
is legally prevented from doing so on account of his married status (Civil Code,
Art. 135). Mañacop is, however, sentenced to support such offspring for which
the lower court failed to provide (People vs. Mañaba, supra; Civil
Code, art. 845).

The imprisonment penalty of these appellants is therefore increased, and each
of them is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and to jointly and
severally indemnify Paulina Valdez in the sum of four thousand pesos, without
subsidiary imprisonment on account of the nature of the main penalty. Appellant
Jacinto Mañacop shall support the offspring, if any, of the offended party. With
such modifications, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed. With costs.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor,
and Reyes, JJ., concur.

MORAN, C. J.:

Mr. Justice Paras, for the reasons given in this opinion, voted for the
modifications of the judgment appealed from, but, on account of his being on
leave at the time of the promulgation thereof, his signature does not appear
herein.