BENJAMIN, RAUL AND MIGUEL, ALL SURNAMED TECSON, PETITIONERS VS. HON. MARIANO C. MELENDRES, ETC., AND TOMASA BULOS VDA. DE TECSON, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE …

Tecson versus Melendres

The Case

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by Benjamin, Raul and Miguel, all surnamed Tecson, against Judge Mariano Melendres and Tomasa Bulos Vda. de Tecson, as administratrix of the testate estate of the late Pablo Tecson Ocampo. The petitioners ask the Supreme Court to annul two orders of the respondent court that allowed a judgment by default to be executed against them while their appeal from the denial of their motion to set aside that judgment was pending. The case matters because it fixes the remedy of a party who has been unjustly deprived of his day in court: he may move to set aside the judgment by default, appeal from the denial of that motion, and stay execution by filing a supersedeas bond. It teaches that a court which executes the judgment anyway acts in excess of jurisdiction.

Procedural History

The action began as a complaint for forcible entry filed by Tomasa Bulos Vda. de Tecson, as administratrix, against the petitioners in the justice of the peace court of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija. The justice of the peace court dismissed the complaint, and she appealed to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. That court rendered judgment by default against the petitioners. From there the case moved on motions: the petitioners moved to set aside the judgment by default, the respondent moved for execution, and the respondent court, after long delay, denied the first motion and granted the second. The petitioners then filed a notice of appeal, moved for reconsideration, and filed an amended notice of appeal from the order of denial. The respondent court fixed a supersedeas bond, held that it did not stay the judgment by default, and ordered execution. The petitioners came to the Supreme Court by petition for a writ of certiorari, and the Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of a bond.

Facts

On 11 June 1941, Tomasa Bulos Vda. de Tecson, as administratrix of the estate of the late Pablo Tecson Ocampo, sued the petitioners for forcible entry in the justice of the peace court of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija. The complaint was dismissed. She appealed to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, and on 8 October 1941 that court rendered judgment by default against the petitioners. Their counsel received a copy on 10 October.

On 16 October, the petitioners moved to set aside the judgment by default on the ground of accident, mistake or excusable neglect. On 24 November, the respondent moved for execution. The respondent court acted on neither motion until 13 April 1950, when it denied the motion to set aside and granted the motion for execution. The petitioners received that order on 24 April 1950. On 27 April they filed two motions: one asking whether they had to file a supersedeas bond to stay execution during the appeal they intended to take, and if so to fix its amount; the other praying that no writ of execution issue and that they be given time to file such a bond. On 3 May they filed their notice of appeal. On 4 May the respondent court denied both motions, saying that no appeal could be taken from a judgment by default and that there was no need to fix a supersedeas bond.

On motion for reconsideration, the respondent court on 12 May fixed the sum of 1,000 pesos as supersedeas bond for the appeal from the order of 13 April and not from the judgment by default, held that the bond did not prevent execution of the judgment by default, and directed that the writ issue. The petitioners filed an amended notice of appeal and perfected their appeal, filing both the reglementary appeal bond of 60 pesos and the supersedeas bond of 1,000 pesos. Execution nonetheless issued on 15 May 1950. The Supreme Court then issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon a bond of 1,000 pesos, and denied the respondents' motions to discharge it.

Issues

• Whether or not an appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by default.
• Whether or not the filing of a supersedeas bond, together with the perfection of that appeal, stays the execution of the judgment by default.
• Whether or not the respondent court, in ordering execution notwithstanding the supersedeas bond and the perfected appeal, acted in excess of its jurisdiction.

Applicable Provisions

Section 5 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, as quoted in the decision, provides:

… the court may grant such preliminary injunction as may be necessary for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending the proceeding, upon the filing by the petitioner of a bond to the adverse party conditioned that if the petition is dismissed, he will pay the adverse party all damages and costs that may be awarded to him by reason of the issuance of such injunction or the other proceedings following the petition.

This is the provision the Court uses to show that the remedy of injunction and bond exists precisely to preserve the rights of a party who has been unjustly deprived of his opportunity to plead, pending the proceeding on his motion.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that while there can be no appeal from a judgment by default where the party purposely did not appear because he had no valid defense, there are instances in which a party was unjustly deprived of his opportunity to plead in due time. Rule 38 governs those instances. A motion to set aside may be granted if timely filed, based on fraud, accident, error or mistake, or excusable neglect, and supported by a meritorious defense. If denied, the aggrieved party may appeal from the order denying it and at the same time apply for a writ of preliminary injunction.

On the second issue, the Court held that the appealing party may not only apply for the writ but also move for a stay of execution by filing the bond, and if the motion is denied he may renew it on appeal. That is exactly what the petitioners did. The Court reasoned that if the incidental remedy were not available, and the execution could not be undone, or an irreparable injury had already been caused, the right to move to set aside and to appeal would be useless. The supersedeas bond was clearly and unquestionably for a stay of execution of the judgment by default.

On the third issue, the Court held that the order of 13 April, insofar as it directed execution, and the order of 12 May, insofar as it renewed that order and held that the bond did not stay execution, constitute an excess of the respondent court's jurisdiction.

Doctrine

A judgment by default may be set aside under Rule 38 on grounds of fraud, accident, error or mistake, or excusable neglect, upon a showing of a meritorious defense. The denial of that motion is appealable, and the aggrieved party may apply for a preliminary injunction and move for a stay of execution by filing a supersedeas bond under Section 5 of Rule 38. Once the appeal is perfected and the supersedeas bond is filed, the trial court may no longer order execution of the judgment by default; doing so is an excess of jurisdiction correctable by certiorari.

Disposition

The petition was granted. Those parts of the orders of 13 April and 12 May directing and sustaining the execution of the judgment by default were set aside, vacated and annulled, with costs against the respondent Tomasa Bulos Vda. de Tecson.

Remember This

The line to memorize: the denial of a motion to set aside a judgment by default is appealable, and a supersedeas bond filed with that appeal stays execution. Examiners use this case on the remedy against a judgment by default and on excess of jurisdiction under Rule 65.