ALEJO MADERA, RICARDO DEQUITO, LEONCIO RAMON, OSCAR ALFREDO, AQUILINO FRANCISCO, INOCENCIO SAWILE, INOCENCIO REYES, FRANCISCO MAYNABAY, BONIFACIO FAJARDO, BLAS ALACRE AND MANUEL…

Madera versus Heirs of Salvador Lopez

The Case

This is Madera versus the Heirs of Salvador Lopez, a case about eleven poor, illiterate farmers who sued for damages arising from what they claimed was a malicious prosecution. The respondents are the Lopez heirs, who held a certificate of title over the coconut land the farmers had long occupied and cultivated, and the special counsel who filed a qualified theft charge against them. The farmers asked for damages for malicious prosecution and for the value of the copra taken from their lands. The case matters because the Supreme Court reminds every trial judge that a complaint which is not on its face utterly without merit must be allowed its day in a full trial, and that a public officer who steps beyond the scope of his duty is liable like any private person.

Procedural History

The farmers first filed their complaint for damages in the Court of First Instance of Davao del Norte. The trial judge dismissed the complaint outright, at first on the ground that it was prematurely filed because the criminal case was supposedly still pending. When the farmers moved for reconsideration and pointed out that the Court of Appeals had already dismissed the criminal case, the judge admitted his error but adopted new grounds: that the prosecution was not malicious, and that the action was premature because ownership of the lot was still being litigated in the cadastral review. The farmers appealed. Under Republic Act Number 5440, which abolished appeals by record on appeal from a final order of the Court of First Instance, the appeal was treated as a petition for review, and the Supreme Court directed the petitioners to file their brief, implicitly accepting that the petition was timely filed.

Facts

The petitioners and other farmers claimed to be adverse possessors, in the concept of owners, of about seventy hectares in Mati, Davao Oriental, now known as Lot Number 1285 of the Mati cadastre. In a decision dated February 28, 1959, the justice of the peace court of Mati, sitting as a cadastral court, awarded the lot to the Municipality of Mati on condition that it be used as an agricultural school site within four years, failing which the lot would revert to the heirs of Salvador Lopez. In 1963 the farmers moved to set aside that decision and filed an alternative petition for review of the decree of registration. The lower court denied the petition, but the Supreme Court reversed that denial. Original Certificate of Title Number 2280 was then issued to the Lopez heirs on October 18, 1963.

After the title was issued, the Lopez heirs allegedly harassed the farmers with complaints for qualified theft of coconuts. Two of those criminal cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance upon motion of the prosecutor, on the ground that the liability, if any, was civil in nature, since the accused acted in good faith under a bona fide claim of ownership. Despite those dismissals, the special counsel filed a third information for qualified theft in 1969. The farmers were arrested and jailed, unable to post bail because of their poverty, and were imprisoned for more than two years.

The farmers went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. The Court of Appeals held that a prejudicial question concerning ownership was involved, that the trial judge erred in not granting the motion to quash, and directed him to dismiss the case and release the prisoners. The farmers were released in March 1972. About three months later they filed this complaint for damages for malicious prosecution. The trial court dismissed it, and this appeal followed.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint outright for failure to state a cause of action and for being prematurely filed in view of the pending review of the decree of registration.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in assuming that there was probable cause for prosecuting the petitioners.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in holding that the special counsel is not civilly liable for his acts as a quasi-judicial officer.

Applicable Provisions

Article 2219 of the Civil Code, in its eighth paragraph, provides:

Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (8) Malicious prosecution.

This is the statutory basis for the farmers' action, since it allows recovery of moral damages for malicious prosecution, also called false accusation.

Article 21 of the Civil Code provides:

Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

This article, together with Article 2176 on quasi-delict, may also be invoked to justify the action for damages.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint. On its face the complaint is not totally devoid of merit, and its outright dismissal was arbitrary, unreasonable and high-handed. The affirmative defense of lack of cause of action implies that the respondents hypothetically admitted the allegations of the complaint, so the merits should not have been prejudged. The outcome of the petition for review in the cadastral case would have no decisive effect on the malicious prosecution case. The farmers claimed good faith in gathering coconuts from land they regarded as their own, two prior criminal cases had been dismissed, and the third was quashed by the Court of Appeals. They deserved an opportunity to ventilate their grievances in a full-dress trial.

On the second issue, the Court held that the merits of the complaint for malicious prosecution must be resolved in the light of the circumstances existing when the criminal action was filed and of the antecedent facts, and not by a premature dismissal. To support such an action, the plaintiff must prove the prosecution; that the defendant was himself the prosecutor or instigated its commencement; that it finally terminated in his acquittal; that in bringing it the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and that he was actuated by legal malice, that is, by improper and sinister motives.

On the third issue, the Court held that while the presumption is that a public officer performed his duties regularly, and he has nothing to fear if he acted in good faith, still, as the Court put it:

When a public officer goes beyond the scope of his duty, particularly when acting tortiously, he is not entitled to protection on account of his office but is liable for his acts like any private individual.

The action against the special counsel therefore must also be tried on the merits.

Doctrine

A complaint for malicious prosecution states a cause of action when it alleges the prosecution, that the defendant was the prosecutor or instigated it, that it terminated in acquittal, that it was brought without probable cause, and that it was actuated by legal malice, that is, improper and sinister motives. A trial court may not dismiss such a complaint outright where it is not on its face devoid of merit, because the affirmative defense of lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the allegations of the complaint. A public officer who goes beyond the scope of his duty and acts tortiously is not shielded by his office but is liable like any private individual.

Disposition

The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the trial court's order of dismissal and directed it to conduct further appropriate proceedings, with no costs.

Remember This

Memorize the line that a public officer who goes beyond the scope of his duty, particularly when acting tortiously, is not entitled to protection on account of his office but is liable like any private individual. Examiners use this case on malicious prosecution, on the requisites of that action, and on the liability of public officers who act beyond their authority.