COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION AND CAPTAIN DELFIN MACALINAO, CIS, PC, PETITIONERS, VS. JUAN GARCIA, RESPONDENT.

Garcia versus Commissioner of Immigration

The Case

This is a petition for review brought by the Commissioner of Immigration and Captain Delfin Macalinao of the Philippine Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service against Juan Garcia, who had filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Teban Caoile. The case matters because it settles the finality of decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration, the effect of a mere notation by deputy commissioners, and the power of the Board of Commissioners to reverse a decision of the Board of Special Inquiry on its own motion within one year. It also illustrates how a claim of Philippine citizenship, once shown to rest on falsehood, collapses entirely.

Procedural History

Juan Garcia filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, on the ground that Teban Caoile, a Filipino citizen, was illegally detained. The trial court, through Judge Nicasio Yatco, dismissed the petition, finding that Caoile was legally detained. Garcia appealed to the Court of Appeals. During the appeal, the Court of Appeals allowed Caoile's release on bail of 5,000 pesos. The Commissioner of Immigration challenged that bail resolution before the Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition, but the petition was dismissed. The Court of Appeals later granted the writ of habeas corpus, made Caoile's provisional liberty permanent, and nullified the warrant of exclusion. The Commissioner of Immigration and Captain Macalinao then appealed to the Supreme Court, which resolved the appeal in this decision.

Facts

Teban Caoile, together with his three brothers, arrived at the port of Manila on June 7, 1961, and applied for admission as a Philippine citizen under documentation issued by the Philippine Consulate General at Hongkong. After hearing, the Board of Special Inquiry rendered a decision dated June 23, 1961, allowing his admission on the assumption that he was the son of Antonio Caoile of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, who was allegedly born on July 30, 1913 as the illegitimate child of Maria Caoile and a Chinaman. The Board relied on blood tests conducted in Hongkong, on Antonio Caoile's income tax returns for the years 1953, 1958, 1959 and 1960, on a statutory declaration made in Hongkong by one Chan Wah Hing, and on the testimonies of the applicants and the claimant-father.

On July 7, 1961, the Board of Commissioners of Immigration acted on that decision. Commissioner Emilio L. Galang voted for the exclusion of Teban Caoile and his brothers, while Deputy Commissioners Francisco de la Rosa and Felix Talabis simply wrote the word "noted" and affixed their signatures below it. On July 10, 1961, the Bureau of Immigration issued to Teban Caoile an identification certificate stating that he was admitted as a citizen of the Philippines as per the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry dated June 23, 1961, duly affirmed by the majority of the members of the Board of Commissioners. Thereafter, Caoile registered as a voter, obtained a Philippine passport, paid residence and income taxes, worked in the Avenue Electrical Supply Company, and became a member of the Social Security System.

On January 24, 1962, the Secretary of Justice, acting in the public interest under section 79(C) of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Memorandum Order No. 9, setting aside all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal from, or on review motu proprio of, decisions of the Boards of Special Inquiry, because the Board had not met collectively to discuss and deliberate on cases. Exactly one year from the date of the Board of Special Inquiry's decision, on June 23, 1962, a new Board of Commissioners, acting under that order, reversed motu proprio the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry and ordered the exclusion of Teban Caoile and his three brothers on the ground that they were not properly documented for admission. The Commissioner of Immigration issued a warrant of exclusion. On March 10, 1964, Captain Macalinao arrested Teban Caoile, who was detained at Camp Crame. Juan Garcia then filed the petition for habeas corpus. At the trial, Antonio Caoile categorically affirmed that he does not know Teban Caoile and that he saw him only at the hearing of the case.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in basing its decision on facts not stipulated upon by the parties or not proven in the trial court.
• Whether or not the two Deputy Commissioners of Immigration, in noting down the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry, ratified that decision.
• Whether or not Juan Garcia was denied a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine Antonio Caoile.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in making findings on extraneous issues and in indulging in speculations not supported by the evidence.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal although only legal issues were involved.

Applicable Provisions

Section 27(b) of the Immigration Law provides:

The Board of Commissioners may reverse a decision of the Board of Special Inquiry motu proprio within one year from the promulgation of said decision.

This provision is the source of the authority of the new Board of Commissioners to reverse the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry on its own motion, and it fixes the one-year period within which that power may be exercised.

Section 29(a)(17) of Commonwealth Act No. 613 provides:

An alien who is not properly documented for admission into the Philippines shall be excluded.

This is the ground on which the Board of Commissioners ordered the exclusion of Teban Caoile and his brothers.

Paragraph (3), section 1, Article IV of the Constitution provides:

The following are citizens of the Philippines: Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

This is the constitutional basis on which Teban Caoile claimed Philippine citizenship through his alleged father, Antonio Caoile.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in relying on facts not proven and in indulging in speculation. The Court found that the overriding fact is that, pursuant to the directive of the Secretary of Justice and in strict conformity with the Immigration Law, the Board of Commissioners reversed the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry and ruled that Teban Caoile had not established his Philippine citizenship. That decision also negated the supposed approval by the two Deputy Commissioners.

On the second issue, the Court held that the notation by the two Deputy Commissioners did not ratify the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. The first Board of Commissioners did not meet collectively to discuss and deliberate on the decision, and its action was set aside by Memorandum Order No. 9. The Court ruled that individual action by the members of the Board of Commissioners renders nugatory the purpose of its constitution as a board.

On the third issue, the Court held that Juan Garcia was not denied a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine Antonio Caoile. Garcia had every opportunity during the trial to confront Antonio Caoile and rebut his denial of the filiation of Teban Caoile, but his counsel chose to withdraw his appearance and stage a walkout.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in making findings on extraneous issues and in speculating on the identity of Antonio Caoile. The Court found that the doubt harbored by the Court of Appeals on the identity of Antonio Caoile was anchored on suspicion, and that the sea of suspicion has no shores. The Court also found that the report of Investigator Nacu, relied upon by the Court of Appeals, exhibited grave discrepancies with the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry, so that the report and the decision cancel each other and should be discarded.

On the fifth issue, the Court held that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal, since factual and legal questions were involved, and that this matter was already res judicata. The Court further held that when the facts are undisputed, the question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is a question of law which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to resolve.

The Court concluded that the foundation of Teban Caoile's assertion of Philippine citizenship was his representation that he is the son of Antonio Caoile, and that this foundation collapsed when Antonio Caoile revealed that he could not have been the father of Teban Caoile. The Court quoted the rule that when a party resorts to falsehood or fraud in order to strengthen his evidence, it is presumed that he knows perfectly well that his cause is groundless.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate must retain the following rules. First, the Board of Commissioners of Immigration may reverse a decision of the Board of Special Inquiry on its own motion within one year from the promulgation of that decision, as provided in section 27(b) of the Immigration Law. Second, individual action by the members of the Board of Commissioners, such as a mere notation by deputy commissioners, renders nugatory the purpose of its constitution as a board and does not amount to a valid ratification of a decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. Third, when a party resorts to falsehood or fraud in order to strengthen his evidence, it is presumed that he knows perfectly well that his cause is groundless. Fourth, when the facts are undisputed, the question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is a question of law which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to resolve.

Disposition

The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the decision of the trial court dismissing the petition for habeas corpus, with costs against the respondent.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that individual action by the members of the Board of Commissioners renders nugatory the purpose of its constitution as a board, and that a claim of citizenship built on falsehood collapses entirely. Examiners like to use this case to test the finality of decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry, the effect of a mere notation by deputy commissioners, and the power of the Board of Commissioners to reverse a decision on its own motion within one year.