JOSE SERRANO, PETITIONER, VS. LUIS SERRANO, MARCELINO MONTANTE AND HON. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, RESPONDENTS.

CONCEPCION, J.:


Appeal by certiorari from an order of the Court of Industrial Relations, the
dispositive part of which reads;-

“WHEREFORE, the Examining Division of this court is hereby ordered to compute
the unpaid wages of the petitioners together with their overtime compensation on
the basis of the evidence adduced by the petitioners until the day of their
respective |dismissal and to submit a report thereof to the Court for its
further disposition.”

On July 7, 1962, herein respondents Luis Serrano and Marcelino Montante,
filed with the Court of Industrial Relations, a petition alleging that herein
petitioner Jose Serrano, had engaged their services in the construction of his
apartment house at Ho. 1317 Makata St., Manila; that they had worked in said
construction twelve (12) hours a day, but were not paid either their basic daily
wages or the corresponding overtime compensation, and that thereafter petitioner
had illegally dismissed them, as well as refused, not only to pay said wages and
overtime compensation, but, also, to reinstate them to their former work, and,
accordingly, praying that judgment be rendered sentencing the petitioner to make
said payments and reinstatement.

In his answer, petitioner denied the existence of employer-employee
relationship between him and respondents and assailed the jurisdiction of said
court to hear and decide the case upon the ground that it merely involved money
claims, because the construction of the house in question had already been
completed, and that the complaining employees do not exceed thirty (30) in
number.

After appropriate proceedings, the lower court issued the order complained
of, finding that the allegations in respondents’ petition had been established
by the evidence, and that they were, therefore, entitled to recover wages and
overtime compensation which the Examining Division of the Court was directed to
compute, but not ordering respondents1 reinstatement, the same being impossible
owing to the fact that the construction of the house had been finished in the
meanwhile. On motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner, said order was
affirmed by the court en banc. Hence, this appeal by certiorari.

Petitioner maintains that the order appealed from should be annulled and the
case dismissed because (1) the lower court had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case; and (2) he had been denied due process. Petitioner questions
the jurisdiction of the lower court to entertain this case upon the ground that
the same merely involves money claims, for although respondents seek
reinstatement to their former work, this is no longer feasible the house they
had been hired to construct having been completed already. Petitioner’s
contention is untenable for the court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of
a litigation is determined by the allegations of the complaint and those made in
respondents’ petition in the lower court are conceded fly sufficient to confer
thereto that jurisdiction. Moreover, said court found that respondents Luis
Serrano and Marcelino Montante were dismissed on April 30 and May 30, 1960,
respectively, and the record shows affirmatively that the construction was then
incomplete. In fact the evidence sufficiently indicates that respondents had
seasonably brought their grievances to the attention of the proper labor
officials, although the latter were unable to file the corresponding petition
until July 7, 1960. It being settled that the Court of Industrial Relations has
jurisdiction over claims for overtime compensation when coupled with a prayer
for reinstatement, it is clear that the satisfaction of the unpaid wages may
likewise be ordered incidentally to said jurisdiction (Gomez vs. North Camarines
Lumber Co., Inc., 104 Phil., 294).

The alleged denial of due process is predicated upon the following
circumstances:

When this case was first called for hearing on the merits, petitioner moved
for the dismissal of the case upon the aforementioned ground of lack of
jurisdiction. The resolution of this motion was, however, deferred, and the
parties were directed to introduce their respective evidence. Thereupon
respondents presented their evidence, and petitioner introduced the testimony of
several witnesses. Then the hearing was continued to another date. When it was
resumed on October 27, 1960, petitioner moved for an ocular inspection of the
house aforementioned. The motion was denied upon the ground that the inspection
could not settle the question whether the house had been completed before or
after July 7, 1960. Then, petitioner moved for continuance of the hearing, which
was denied. Required to present such other evidence as he may have, petitioner
declined to do so and then left the courtroom. When the case was next called for
continuation of the hearing, on November 10, 1960, petitioner did not appear.
Respondents moved to submit the case for decision, but the motion was denied,
and the case was set for continuation of the hearing on June 26, 1961. On this
occasion, petitioner reiterated his request for a ruling on his motion to
dismiss. However, petitioner was ordered to bring his evidence and submit the
case the next day. What happened then is set forth in the order appealed from,
from which we quote:

“* * * The following day, June 27, 1961, due to the flood, no hearing was
held. However, on July 3, 1961, counsel for respondent filed an ‘Urgent
Manifestation’ praying for a hearing of the motion to dismiss dated November 2,
1960. The Clerk of Court obliged and set the case for hearing on September 1,
196l at 9:00A.M. The records show that respondent counsel received said notice
of hearing. On August 31,1961, counsel for respondent wrote again the Clerk of
Court reiterating a ruling first on its motion dated November 2, 1960 before
hearing the case anew. It is clear from the records that on September 1, 1961
the date set for hearing, respondent again miserably failed to appear, so
petitioners thru its representative, moved to consider the case deemed
submitted.”

Hence, the trial Judge concluded:

“After a careful review and study of the evidence adduced by the parties,
more particularly the respondent’s, the Court believes that after affording the
respondent sufficient time to adduce its evidence and failing to take advantage
of said opportunity, respondent has waived its right to adduce said additional
evidence. In view of this, the case is deemed submitted for its resolution.”

It is urged by petitioner that the lower court had erred in issuing the order
complained of before he had rested and submitted the case for decision, and that
he was not bound to so submit the case before the court had passed upon his
aforesaid motion to dismiss. It is well settled, however, that a court has ample
discretion to defer its action upon such motion until after the parties have
introduced ail of their evidence and submitted the case for decision on the
merits, and, under the circumstances obtaining in the present case, we are not
prepared to hold that the lower court had abused its discretion in acting as it
did. What is more, we are satisfied that petitioner’s behavior indicated, either
that he had virtually submitted the case for decision, or that he had no
additional evidence to Introduce. In fact, he does not claim that he has any
such evidence, much less intimated the nature thereof.

In short, petitioner has not been denied due process and since the evidence
of record substantially bears out the findings of fact made in the order
complained of, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner Jose
Serrano. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo,
Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and
Makaiintal, JJ., concur.