FISCAL JUAN A. ABING, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE CLOTILDE J. SALAZAR, RESPONDENT.

Abing versus Salazar

The Case

This is an administrative case in which Fiscal Juan A. Abing sought to disqualify Municipal Judge Clotilde J. Salazar of Balangiga, Eastern Samar, from hearing and deciding a criminal case for Qualified Theft, and in effect asked that administrative sanctions be imposed upon her. The complaint rests on four alleged irregularities in the performance of her judicial duties. The case matters to a reviewee because it is the Supreme Court's own statement of the standard of judicial conduct: that a judge's error, when honestly committed and untainted by bad faith or improper motive, does not warrant administrative sanction, though it may merit admonition.

Procedural History

The complainant, then Acting Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Eastern Samar, first raised his objections by letter dated February 2, 1972, addressed to the Secretary of Justice. The respondent submitted her comment on April 24, 1972, and the complainant filed his refutation on November 18, 1972. On January 2, 1973, the Department of Justice advised the complainant that if his letter was intended as an administrative complaint, he should have it verified; he accordingly submitted a verified copy on February 1, 1973. Pursuant to Section 7, Article X of the new Constitution, the case was referred to the Supreme Court by the Undersecretary of Justice on February 22, 1973. The Supreme Court, by Resolution of December 10, 1973, referred the case to the District Judge of the Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar for investigation, report, and recommendation. District Judge Andres P. Arche submitted his report and recommendation on September 23, 1975, and the case then came before the Supreme Court for decision.

Facts

The complainant alleged four irregularities. First, that the respondent administered Oaths of Office to two elective officials without requiring them to affix their signatures to the oaths. Second, that she issued summons in a Forcible Entry case as Acting Municipal Judge of Lawa-an, Eastern Samar, only after the lapse of one year, five months, and twelve days from the filing of the complaint on September 20, 1968. Third, that she conducted the hearing and decided on the merits a case for Acts of Lasciviousness although, because of the penalty, the case was beyond the jurisdiction of her court. Fourth, that she refused to accept a criminal complaint for Slander by Deed against a parish priest on what the complainant called a flimsy pretext, compelling the complainant therein to travel from Balangiga to Borongan at inconvenience and expense.

The investigation established that the failure to sign the oaths was a product of haste and excitement on the occasion; one oath was later corrected, and the other remained unsigned only because the affiant himself refused to sign, and in any event the oath-taking was in an acting capacity and therefore a surplusage. On the delayed summons, the evidence showed that the respondent was detailed to Lawa-an, a municipality not connected to Balangiga by roads and accessible only by rough seas, and that the plaintiffs themselves had requested that the usual legal processes be held in abeyance while they attempted an amicable settlement, the parties being close relatives. On the Acts of Lasciviousness case, the respondent admitted that by honest mistake of judgment she took cognizance of the case, tried it, and convicted the accused, believing it fell within the concurrent jurisdiction of the municipal court and the Court of First Instance.

On the Slander by Deed complaint, the evidence showed that the offended party was advised to have her complaint prepared by the Chief of Police or the Provincial Fiscal; that when she returned with the complaint prepared, the respondent expressed a desire to inhibit, and the complainant refused to give the papers, saying she would file them once the new judge arrived; that she ultimately filed the complaint on July 9, 1968; and that on September 4, 1968, upon motion of her own private prosecutor, the complaint was withdrawn.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent committed the irregularities charged in the four counts of the complaint.
• Whether or not the respondent's erroneous assumption of jurisdiction over a case for Acts of Lasciviousness, admitted to be an honest mistake of judgment, warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions.
• Whether or not the respondent's conduct, taken as a whole, affects her fitness and capacity to discharge her judicial duties.

Applicable Provisions

Section 7, Article X of the new Constitution provides:

The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.

This is the constitutional basis for the Supreme Court's authority to investigate and decide the administrative complaint against the respondent, and it is the provision under which the case was referred to the Court.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court found Charges One, Two, and Four unsubstantiated. The failure to secure signatures on the oaths was excusable, the delay in the summons was attributable in large part to the request of the plaintiffs themselves and to the difficulty of the respondent's detail, and the refusal to accept the slander complaint was not shown to be improper, the complainant having presented no witness to support the charge.

On the second issue, the Court held that the respondent's error in taking cognizance of a case beyond her jurisdictional authority did not warrant administrative sanction, because it was not prompted by any improper motive nor by a desire to commit an injustice, but was simply the result of an honest mistake of judgment.

On the third issue, the Court nevertheless stressed that the error could have been avoided had the respondent exhibited more circumspection in the discharge of her judicial duties. It held that it was her duty not only to be industrious but to exercise prudence and wise discretion, and that the strength and stability of judicial institutions depend on the people's faith and confidence in the ability and impartiality of judges. Judges are therefore enjoined to comport themselves so that parties before them will have no occasion to question their ability, impartiality, and fairness.

Doctrine

An error committed by a judge in the honest exercise of judgment, unaccompanied by bad faith, improper motive, or a desire to commit an injustice, does not warrant the imposition of administrative sanctions. The standard is fitness and good faith, not perfection. Yet the same principle carries a duty: a judge must exercise not only industry but prudence and wise discretion, and must comport himself or herself so that litigants will have no occasion to question his or her ability, impartiality, and fairness. Where the error is admitted but honestly made, the proper response is dismissal of the charges with admonition to exercise greater caution.

Disposition

The charges against Municipal Judge Clotilde J. Salazar were dismissed, with the admonition that she should exercise more caution in the discharge of her judicial duties.

Remember This

Memorize the line: an honest mistake of judgment, without bad faith or improper motive, is not an administrative offense, but it earns an admonition to be more circumspect. Examiners use this case to test the boundary between judicial error and administrative liability, and the duty of judges to preserve public faith in the courts.