A.M. No. 96-5-163-RTC. June 18, 1998

RE: REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 117, PASAY CITY.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions June 18, 1998 EN BANC DAVIDE, JR., J.:
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DAVIDE, JR., J.:


As a result of the judicial audit and physical inventory of
pending cases in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 117, Pasay City,
conducted on 18 and 19 March 1996, it was discovered that, among other
things, although Mr. William Villaruz was the regular Deputy Sheriff of
Branch 117, most of the writs of replevin issued in eighty-seven (87)
civil cases were assigned to Deputy Sheriff Virgilio Villar of Branch
111 and Deputy Sheriff Edilberto Santiago of Branch 113 said court. Upon
inquiry, Teresita S. Pablo, Clerk of Court, Branch 117 informed the
audit team that Deputy Sheriff Villaruz did not accept the numerous
writs of replevin due to time constraints; and Villaruz himself
explained that he had to request service by the other deputy sheriffs
because many of those writs could only be served in the evening.

Conformably with the recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) in its memorandum of 24 April 1996, the court, in
its resolution of 9 July 1996, required Deputy Sheriff Villaruz “to
explain … why he should not be held administratively liable for refusal
to perform his official duty of serving copies of writs of replevin
amounting to insubordination and/or gross inefficiency.”

In his Explanation of 14 August 1996, Villaruz averred that it
was not true that he refused to serve copies of the writ of replevin, in
fact, he spent several days and nights monitoring the whereabouts of
the properties to be seized; that although there were times when due to
asthma attacks, he had to pass on service of the writs to his
co-sheriffs in order not to impair the administration of justice, he
nevertheless continued to perform his official duties of serving
subpoenae and other court processes; and that due to his deteriorating
health and age, he would like to avail of early retirement so as not to
prejudice the best interest of the service.

In its resolution of 12 November 1996, the Court required
Villaruz to submit copies of the sheriff’s returns of service which he
filed with Branch 117 from January 1995 up to the present, and to inform
the Court if he would submit his case for resolution on the basis of
his 14 August 1996 explanation.

In his letter of 2 January 1997, Villaruz complied with the 12
November 1996 resolution and manifested that he was submitting his case
for resolution on the basis of his explanation.

On 17 June 1997, the Court referred the case to the OCA for
re-evaluation, report and recommendation. The OCA then recommended that
Villaruz be required to submit a “properly notarized Medical Certificate
attesting to his asthmatic condition…which prevented him from
performing his duties,” which the Court approved in our resolution of 23
September 1997.

On 24 November 1997, Villaruz submitted medical certificates
dated as follows: (1) 13 May 1996 and 19 November 1997 issued by Dr.
Delfin P. Santos stating that Villaruz was under his care for recurring
bronchial asthma since 1988; (2) 23 September 1997, issued by the Holy
Saviou’s Family Clinic stating that Villaruz was examined on 26 August
and 23 September 1997, for difficulty of breathing and was diagnosed as
suffering from bronchial asthma; (3) 20 August 1996, showing that
Villaruz was treated at Estuita Clinic of Internal Medicine for
moderately severe asthmatic bronchitis; and (4) 27 August 1996, issued
by Dr. Winchito M. Moral stating that Villaruz was treated for asthmatic
bronchitis.

In its Memorandum of 18 February 1998, the OCA informed the Court
that Deputy Sheriff Villaruz had applied for optional retirement
effective 15 July 1997, which request was still pending due to this
case, and that an inquiry from the Leave Section of the Office of the
Administrative Services revealed that for the period of 1 January 1995
to 14 July 1997, he had no application for leave of absence except for
the period of 7-30 April 1997 for vacation leave, and that he did not
file his daily time records from 16 May to 14 July 1997. The OCA then
observed and found:

At the very outset, Deputy Sheriff Villaruz claimed that the other
deputy sheriff[s] performed his duties for him because the defendants
could only be served the writs in the late evening. This assertion
corroborates Branch Clerk of Court Pablo’s disclosure of time
constraints as the reason for his refusal sometimes to enforce writs of
replevin.

Later, he altered his excuse averring instead asthmatic condition.
Explored, this ground opens the question of his work performance, office
attendance and application for early retirement.

The Sheriff’s Returns of Service on record show that in 1995, he
discharged his duties only in the months of May-August and
November-December; in 1996, in the months of February and September
–December; and in 1997, only in the month of February. There is no
showing that he performed his duties the rest of the time. Viewing that
no leaves of absences were filed and no reported unauthorized absences
were incurred on the dates he did not perform his duties, we presume
that he regularly reported to work without rendering actual service.

The medical certificates bear no moment in the light of
respondent’s consistent attendance. In any case, there is nothing in the
medical certificates that suggests that his asthmatic condition
incapacitated him from discharging his duties. Moreover, if his health
was undermining the quality of his work and conversely, his work further
impaired his health, he should have filed an application for disability
retirement and not early retirement. Finally, as observed in this
Office’s Memorandum of August 18, 1997, “the absence of any any [sic]
communication casts some doubts as to the real reason for his request
for succor from other sheriffs, so that the writs under his care can be
implemented.”

We are not persuaded by the documents on record that health reasons
brought about his failure to perform his duties, hence, our conclusion
that he is administratively liable for negligence and insubordination.

The Office of the Court Administrator thus recommend that:

Deputy Sheriff Villaruz be FINED in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND
(P5,000.00) PESOS to be remitted to the Court within THIRTY (30) DAYS
from notice.

The Court agrees with the OCA only insofar as the recommended penalty
is concerned, but cannot subscribe to the view that Villaruz is liable
for “negligence and insubordination.” Plainly, “negligence” is not
involved here. What the OCA may have had in mind was “neglect of duty,”
one of the grounds for disciplinary action under Sec. 46(3), Chapter 7,
Subtitle A, Title I, Book V, Administrative Code of 1987.

Negligence is not synonymous with “neglect of duty.” The
former pertains to the failure to observe such care as a reasonably
prudent and careful person would use under similar circumstances; it is
the doing of some act which a person of ordinary prudence would not have
done under similar circumstances. It is a conduct which falls below the
standard established by law for the protection of others against
unreasonable risk of harm; a departure from the conduct expected of a
reasonably prudent person under like circumstances (BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 930-931, 5th ed., hereafter BLACK’S). At bottom, it is a test
of foreseeability, and in this jurisdiction, may be deemed either a quasi-delict
under Chapter 2, Title XVII, Book IV, Civil Code, or a delict under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, depending on the facts attending
its commission. Likewise, it may be ground for administrative liability
of a government official or employee.

The Court likewise does not perceive “insubordination” as
pertinent to this proceeding. While it is another ground for
disciplinary action against erring civil servants (Sec. 46[25], Chapter
7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V, Administrative Code of 1987), it
properly refers to wilful or intentional disregard to some lawful and
reasonable instructions of the employer (BLACK’S 720). Here, there is no
showing that any of Villuruz’ immediate superiors instructed him to
serve the writs of replevin and that he wilfully or intentionally
refused to do so. What appears clear from the record is that he
requested that the writs be served by other deputy sheriffs due to his
alleged asthmatic condition and that his requests were accommodated. In
fact, the Clerk of Court of Branch 117 even tolerated this practice as
neither has it been shown that he ever called Villaruz’ attention to
this irregularity.

To our mind, what Villaruz must be sanctioned for is either neglect of duty or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, pursuant to Sec. 46(3) and (27), respectively, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V, Administrative Code of 1987.

This Court has time and again stressed that each and every
employee in the judiciary is a vital link in the chain which binds all
those involved in the sacred task of administering justice. And as the
chain can only be as strong as its weakest link, by the very nature of
the duties and responsibilities of those so involved, be they the
seemingly lowliest clerk or the Executive Judge, they must all
faithfully adhere to, hold inviolate and invigorate the principle
solemnly enshrined in Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution, that
public office is a public trust and, as such, all public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and act
with patriotism and justice and lead modest lives. Thus, will this Court
never tolerate or condone any conduct, act or omission on the part of
officers and employees of the judiciary which would violate the norm of
public accountability or diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith
of the people in the justice system (Sy v. Academia, 198 SCRA 705
[1991]; Annang v. Vda. De Blas, 202 SCRA 635 [1991]).

The alleged asthmatic condition of Deputy Sheriff Villaruz
provided him no excuse to be remiss in the performance of his duties,
nor did it exempt him from the exacting demands of the public trust
character of his office. In the first place, what is telling for
Villaruz is that while his ailment had been characterized as “recurrent”
or “moderately severe,” there is at all no showing that his condition
had degenerated to such a stage that would have reduced him to the
demonstrated levels of neglect of duty and inefficiency. The medical
certificates he submitted failed to so indicate the gravity of his
disorder which could have accounted for, but certainly not have
justified, his ineptitude, as most of the dates of treatment mentioned
therein were post-audit dates. Moreover, considering that he submitted
these medical certificates only after he was required to do so, and not
of his own volition, to support his allegations in his explanation,
there is much doubt as to the credibility of the entries therein.
Confirming this doubt is the finding of the OCA that for the periods
material to this case, Villaruz did not apply for sick leave and nothing
in his daily time records suggested that he was absent due to sickness.
If indeed he had frequent bouts of asthma, then he must have absented
himself from work, or if he did not, necessarily he must have simply
rested in the office, much like a non-performing asset, to the prejudice
of public service.

WHEREFORE, for neglect of duty and for conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, Deputy Sheriff WILLIAM
VILLARUZ is hereby FINED in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00)
PESOS payable to this Court within ten (10) days from notice of this
resolution. He is further WARNED that the commission of the same or
similar acts or omissions in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing, and Purisima, JJ., concur.