RE:  FIRST INDORSEMENT DATED JULY 21, 1992 OF HON. FERNANDO DE LEON, CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.  ALICIA A. BAYLON, CITY PROSECUTOR OF DAGUPAN CITY, COMPLAINA…

The present administrative matter was initiated by a sworn
letter-request^[1]
of Alicia A. Baylon, City Prosecutor of Dagupan City, dated June 18, 1992,
charging Judge Deodoro J. Sison, presiding judge of Branch 40, Regional Trial
Court, Dagupan City, with utter disregard of judicial decorum by excessive
display of interest in handling a case assigned to and then pending in his
branch. The said letter was sent to
Chief State Prosecutor Fernando P. de Leon of the Department of Justice who, in
turn, indorsed the same to this Court for appropriate action as requested
therein.

The records of this case show that on October 24, 1991, the
Office of the City Prosecutor in Dagupan City filed an information for double
murder against several accused which was docketed as Criminal Case No. D-10678,
entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Manolo Salcedo, et al.,” and
thereafter raffled to respondent judge.

Subsequently, the accused filed on November 8, 1991 a petition
for reinvestigation which was granted by the trial court in an order dated
November 20, 1991, and the Office of the City Prosecutor was given until
December 23, 1991 to resolve the same. The reinvestigation was finally concluded by the said prosecutor on
March 31, 1992. A petition for review
interposed therefrom by the accused was later dismissed by the Department of
Justice in a resolution dated May 8, 1992.

During the pendency of the reinvestigation, however, the accused
filed a petition for bail on December 21,
1991, a Saturday, and requested that it be set for hearing on December
23, 1991, the immediately following Monday. On this latter date, according to an order handed down by respondent judge
on June 8, 1992^[2] the prosecution filed an opposition
to the petition for bail signed by Third Assistant City Prosecutor Chita
Estrella D.N. Bonifacio and noted by First Assistant City Prosecutor Silverio
Q. Castillo, alleging inter alia, that the information was filed on the
bases of the sworn statements of several eyewitnesses to the incident which
constitutes clear and strong evidence of the guilt of all the accused; that to
grant the petition for bail would preempt the outcome of the reinvestigation which
was then being conducted by the Office of the City Prosecutor at the instance
of the accused, and also necessarily defeat the purpose of said reinvestigation;
and that the accused should at least wait for the outcome of the
reinvestigation, which they themselves sought, before any motion of the same
import could be filed.

Nevertheless, on the very day and time specified by the accused,
December 23, 1991 at 1:30 P.M., a hearing on the petition was purportedly held
by the trial court. Then, reportedly on
the basis of a joint counter-affidavit of the accused, an affidavit of one Oscar Villaga, a certification of entry in
the police blotter, and the position paper submitted by the accused, and
allegedly because there was no objection on the part of the prosecution which
was supposedly represented by Third Assistant Prosecutor Rosita Castro, the
court forthwith granted bail for the provisional liberty of each accused in the
amount of P40,000.00.

A motion for reconsideration of said order of December 23, 1991
was duly filed by the prosecution but the same was denied by respondent judge
on January 10, 1992. In his aforecited
order of June 8, 1992 reiterating his denial of a motion for his inhibition, he
maintained that he had granted bail ostensibly “after due hearing and
after a careful and deliberate consideration of the pertinent affidavits and
counter-affidavit, position papers and arguments advanced by the parties.”
Respondent judge further stated therein that the prosecution did not ask for an
opportunity to show that the evidence of guilt against the accused was strong.

Significantly, the aforestated orders of respondent judge of
December 23, 1991 granting bail, and that dated January 10, 1992 denying
reconsideration thereof, became the subject of a petition for certiorari
filed by the prosecution and were subsequently annulled and set aside by the
Court of Appeals in its judgment handed down in CA-G.R. SP No. 28384 on January
19, 1993.

In the meantime, immediately after the court had issued its order
granting bail, Roberto Untalan, the private complainant in Criminal Case No.
D-10678, filed with the assistance of counsel on March 11, 1992 a motion for
respondent judge to inhibit himself from the case,^[3]
contending that such act of respondent judge “had invited our serious
doubt and less expectation of (an) impartial disposition of this case,”
and “that the instant case had plunged (sic) into (a) network of intrigue
and distrust creating thereby an animosity between us (litigants-complainants)
and the judicial system represented by the Honorable Court and in the last
analysis, our grievance of justice is in grave peril.”

In an order dated March 25, 1991 (sic, should be 1992),
respondent judge denied the motion to inhibit on the ground that during the
hearing on the petition for bail, the prosecution was represented by Assistant
City Prosecutor Rosita Castro who supposedly “interposed no objection to
the granting of bail in the amount of P40,000.00 which she considered
reasonable.” He also argued therein that time was of the essence
considering that all of the accused, except for one Joel Doe, had been under
detention since October 21, 1991 and that the City Prosecutor had not yet
terminated the reinvestigation as of December 23, 1991, hence “without
determining whether the proper charge could be double homicide,” he
granted said bail for the provisional liberty of the accused.^[4]

Private complainant moved for the reconsideration of said order
contending that, aside from the court’s non-observance of the three-day notice
rule before the hearing, Assistant City Prosecutor Rosita Castro who happened
to be present during said hearing in Branch 40 was not duly authorized to
appear for and in behalf of the prosecution in Criminal Case No. D-10678 or to
comment on the proceedings for bail, since she actually was sent by her office
to Branch 42 to move for the postponement of another case therein.^[5]
Attached thereto was an affidavit to that effect by said assistant prosecutor.^[6]

On June 8, 1992, in an order of respondent judge denying the
motion for reconsideration and which has been earlier adverted to, he insisted
that in its opposition to the petition for bail and its motion for
reconsideration of the order granting bail,
the prosecution never asked for an opportunity to show that the evidence of
guilt against the accused was strong; that during the hearing on the petition
for bail, the assistant prosecutor did not raise any objection and instead left
the matter to the sound discretion of the court; that the alleged lack of due
process had been cured by the filing of the motion for reconsideration and the
motion to inhibit; that the motion to inhibit constituted forum shopping; and
that from the narration of facts and events, the prosecution failed to convince
the court that the evidence of guilt of the accused was strong.

Respondent Judge Deodoro J. Sison stands charged with the now
familiar malfeasance of granting bail in a non-bailable offense without benefit
of notice and hearing. Specifically, it
is averred that the prosecution was not given notice of at least three days
before the scheduled hearing on the petition for bail, in violation of the
mandate under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court and, worse, with two
non-working days between the filing and the hearing of the petition. It is likewise contended that during the
controverted hearing on December 23, 1991, the prosecution, which was not even
duly represented, was not given the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt
of the accused was strong.

Required to comment thereon, respondent judge tried to justify
his assailed orders by claiming that he honestly believes that he did not
commit a serious and grave abuse of discretion; that he granted the petition
for bail because the assistant prosecutor present at the hearing did not
interpose any objection thereto; that the prosecution never requested, either
in its opposition to the petition for bail or in its motion for reconsideration
of his adverse order, that it be allowed to show that the evidence of guilt
against the accused was strong but, instead, submitted the incident for
resolution; that the motion for reconsideration of the order granting bail was
denied only after due hearing and after a careful and judicious consideration
of the pertinent affidavits, counter-affidavit, position papers and arguments
submitted by the parties; that the lack of previous notice was cured by the
filing of the motion for reconsideration since, in the application of due
process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not the lack of previous notice
but the denial of the opportunity to be heard; that the claim of Assistant City
Prosecutor Rosita Castro that there was no hearing held on December 23, 1991 is
negated by the testimonies given in A.M. No. RTJ-92-822 by defense counsel
Atty. Constante Rueca, Officer-in-Charge Gloria Beltran, Court Stenographer
Tripina Tigno, and herein respondent; that a judge cannot be held
administratively liable for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith; and
that the filing of the complaint is pure and simple harassment.^[7]

In a resolution^[8] dated
May 4, 1993, this Court referred the administrative matter at bar to the Office
of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation within
sixty (60) days from receipt of the records of this case. However, it was only two (2) years
thereafter, or on February 10, 1995 when, after repeated inquiries, the said
office submitted its report and recommendation with the explanation that it had
to verify whether the issue raised in the instant case is pertinent to another pending administrative case involving
the same parties. It made no
manifestation or submission in the interim.

The Court views with displeasure and chagrin the chronology of
events which, even if true, caused the supervenience of a grossly unreasonable
delay in the resolution of this simple administrative matter, to the inevitable
prejudice and frustration of the offended parties and the prosecution in the
criminal case involved. This is a
situation which this Court has assiduously tried to avoid and obviate, since it
tarnishes the judicial image, fuels suspicions and speculations, and creates an
unfair climate of misperception and distrust. We shall not clutter this decision with the pointless mea culpae of the parties responsible,
but this Court is not beyond expressing its profound regrets for this
distressing episode and shall redouble its efforts to prevent any repetition
thereof.

Nonetheless, prescinding from the regrettably lackadaisical
manner with which this case was handled by the Office of the Court
Administrator, we are constrained to agree with its finding that respondent
judge is indeed guilty as charged, as well as its recommendation for a much
belated administrative sanction to be imposed on him.

Complainant alleges that the prosecution was not given notice of
the petition for bail at least three (3) days prior to the scheduled hearing
thereof. It bears emphasis that the
petition for bail was filed in court and a copy thereof served on the
prosecution on December 21, 1991, a Saturday, and was craftily set for hearing
on December 23, 1991, thereby giving the prosecution only one day, a Sunday at
that, to prepare its opposition thereto. The stratagem employed by the defense which virtually deprived the
prosecution of an opportunity to adequately counter the representations in its
petition is too obvious to be ignored. Yet respondent judge condoned the same and aggravated the situation by
the unusual and precipitate haste with which the petition was granted by respondent
judge.

On top of that, he exacerbated his disregard of settled rules of
procedure by justifying his non-observance of the three-day notice rule under
Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court on the theory that the petition for
bail is an urgent motion and may therefore be heard on shorter notice. Such ratiocination, which espouses and
reveals a distorted notion as to the true nature and conditions of the right to
bail, does violence to the well-established rule of law that bail is not a
matter of right and requires a hearing where the accused is charged with an
offense which is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.^[9]
Given this contingency, respondent judge should have carefully scrutinized the
validity of the petition for bail and the veracity of its allegations, rather
than cavalierly considering it outright as an urgent motion.

There are two main arguments invoked and relied on by respondent
judge to support and justify his grant of bail to the accused, namely, that
time was of the essence, considering that the accused had been detained since
October 21, 1991; and that the prosecution failed to interpose an objection to
the granting of bail and to ask for an opportunity to prove the strength of the
evidence of guilt against the accused.

We reject the first tenuous proposition that time was of the
essence, since the ambient circumstances obtaining prior to the grant of bail
could not but have cautioned respondent judge to be more circumspect in
entertaining and resolving the petition therefor. First, the accused were charged with double murder, each
of which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, hence bail is not
a matter of right. Second, no
bail was recommended in the information which was filed on the bases of the
sworn statements of several eyewitnesses to the incident, thus constituting
clear and strong evidence of the guilt of all the accused.^[10]
Third, at the time of the application for bail, there was still pending a
reinvestigation of the case being conducted by the Office of the City
Prosecutor. It must be noted that the
reinvestigation was at the instance of the accused themselves, hence any
resultant delay caused by the conduct thereof is naturally and logically
attributable to them. And, finally,
the guileful setting of the hearing of the petition for bail on December 23,
1991, when the same was filed only on December 21, 1991 which was a Saturday,
readily casts doubt on the good faith in and the regularity of the procedure
adopted by the defense.

On the basis of the foregoing considerations alone, and even
without the further elaboration correctly advanced by complainant in
representation of her office, we find no cogent reason whatsoever to justify
respondent’s alacrity in ordering the immediate release of the accused despite
their somewhat extended confinement and, much less, could respondent’s
pretensions validly support a grant of bail.

Respondent judge asseverates that he honestly believes that he
did not commit a serious and grave abuse of discretion. He hastens to add the handy and oft-invoked
defense that he cannot be held administratively liable for an erroneous
decision rendered in good faith.

Respondent should not hide behind that axiom so often resorted
to, it may be now be said, to the point of abuse. While the Court does not require perfection and infallibility, it
reasonably expects a faithful and intelligent discharge of duty by those who
are selected to fill the position of administrators of justice. Moreover, the Code of Judicial Conduct
requires judges to act with competence, integrity and independence and should
so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.^[11] It
is true that, generally, a judge cannot be held liable to account or answer
criminally, civilly or administratively, for an erroneous judgment or decision
rendered by him in good faith. However,
good faith may be negated by the circumstances on record,^[12]
as we have hereinbefore demonstrated.

We agree that bail in this case, not being a matter of right,
must be addressed to the sound discretion of respondent judge. But this does not mean, however, a
lubricious and untrammeled exercise of such discretion. We have held that admission to bail as a
matter of discretion presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance with law
and guided by the applicable legal principles, to wit:

“x x x The
prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by
the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such
evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in determining whether the
guilt of the accused is strong. In
other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the
confines of procedural due process, that is, after evaluation of the evidence
submitted by the prosecution. Any order
issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but
of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.

“Accordingly, while the determination of whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, this
discretion, by the nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the
evidence is submitted to the court at such hearing. Whether the motion for bail of an accused who is in custody for a
capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a
regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within
a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the
court may resolve the motion for bail. If the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be
a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail
should be considered void on that ground.”^[13]

Quintessentially, and as a matter of law, the discretion of the
court, in cases involving capital offenses may be exercised only after there
has been a hearing called to ascertain the weight of the evidence against the
accused. Peremptorily, the discretion
lies, not in determining whether or not there will be a hearing, but in
appreciating and evaluating the weight of the evidence of guilt against the
accused. It follows that any order
issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but
of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.^[14]

This brings us to the second and main contention of respondent
judge. He would want to impress upon
this Court that it was incumbent upon the prosecution to seek permission from
the trial court to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong, and that when it failed to do so in any of its pleadings filed with the
court, respondent judge was left with no other recourse but to grant the
application for bail. He likewise
asserts that the prosecution failed to interpose an objection during the
hearing on the petition for bail. Such
arguments are deplorably specious and lamentably absurd.

The rule is explicit that when an accused is charged with a serious
offense punishable with reclusion perpetua to death, such as murder,
bail may be granted only after a motion for that purpose has been filed by the
accused and a hearing thereon conducted by a judge to determine whether or not
the prosecution’s evidence of guilt is strong. Whether the motion for bail of an accused who is in custody for a
capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a
regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within
a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may wish to introduce on the
probable guilt of the accused, before the court resolves the motion for bail.^[15]

It is accordingly settled that an order granting or refusing bail
must contain a summary of the evidence offered by the prosecution. On the basis thereof, the judge should then
formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong
enough as to indicate the guilt of the accused.^[16] In
fact, such a summary with his evaluation of the evidence may be considered as
an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense.

The importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a few
cases wherein this Court has ruled that even if the prosecution refuses to
adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it
is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching and
clarificatory questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of
guilt, or the lack of it, against the accused.

Thus, in the aforecited case of Borinaga vs. Tamin, etc.,^[17]
it was there held that even where the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in
opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask the
prosecution such questions as would ascertain the strength of the People’s
evidence or judge the adequacy vel non of the amount of bail. This was reiterated in the recent case of Aguirre,
et al. vs. Belmonte, etc.^[18]
where we said that the error committed by the therein respondent judge in
granting bail cannot be corrected by the mere failure of the prosecution to
file a motion for cancellation thereof or a clarification of his order.

In Libarios vs. Dabalos,^[19] we
emphasized that irrespective of respondent judge’s opinion that the evidence of
guilt against the accused is not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence
demands that a hearing be conducted before bail can be fixed for the temporary
release of the accused, if bail is at all justified.

Where the prosecutor does not oppose the application for bail and
refuses to satisfy his burden of proof, but the court has reasons to believe
that the prosecutor’s attitude is not justified, as when he is evidently
committing a gross error or a dereliction of duty, it has been ruled in the
early case of Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, et al.^[20]
that, in the paramount interest of justice, the court must inquire from the
prosecutor as to the nature of his evidence to determine whether or not it is
strong, it being possible for the prosecutor to have erred in considering it
weak and, therefore, in recommending bail.

Finally, in the most recent case of Tucay vs. Domagas^[21]
it was categorically stressed that although the provincial prosecutor had
interposed no objection to the grant of bail to the accused, the respondent
judge therein should nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing
and diligently ascertained from the prosecution whether the latter was not
really contesting the bail application. Additionally, it must be borne in mind that a hearing is also necessary
for the court to take into consideration the guidelines set forth in Section 6,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount of bail. Only after respondent judge has satisfied
himself that these requirements have been met can he then proceed to rule on
whether or not to grant bail.

The obstinate persistence of respondent judge in posturing that
he did conduct a hearing on December 23, 1991 is belied by the fact that the
order granting bail, the contents of which could merely be deduced after a
careful perusal of the records of the case and the other orders issued by him
in view of the parties’ failure to present the same, leaves much to be
desired. For one, it does not contain
the requisite summary of the evidence presented by the parties and necessary to
support the grant of bail. What appears
from the records is that the petition for bail was granted on the basis merely
of the joint counter-affidavit of the accused, and possibly of a witness, and
the position paper of the accused. The
prosecution was not even given the chance to cross-examine the accused on their
counter-affidavit. Mere affidavits or
recitals of their contents are not sufficient since they are mere hearsay
evidence, hence they cannot legally form the basis of an order granting bail.^[22]

As a final note, we take judicial cognizance of the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28384, promulgated on January 19, 1993,
which annulled and set aside the orders dated December 23, 1991 and January 10,
1992 issued by herein respondent judge. The disquisitions therein of said appellate court serve to further
strengthen the merits of our findings and the necessity for the present
administrative disciplinary proceeding.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Deodoro J. Sison is hereby
found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion. He is hereby ORDERED to pay a FINE of
P20,000.00 with a STERN WARNING that the commission of the same or similar
offense in the future will definitely be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be attached to
the personal records of respondent Judge Deodoro J. Sison.

Considering that the offense involved in this administrative
matter was committed way back on December 23, 1991, this judgment is
immediately final and executory.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., concur but vote for
a reduced fine of P10, 000.00.

^[1]
Rollo, 4.

^[2]
Ibid., 19-29.

^[3]
Ibid., 12.

^[4]Rollo,
14.

^[5]
Ibid., 16.

^[6]
Ibid., 18.

^[7]
Rollo, 58.

^[8]
Ibid., 65.

^[9]
Section 4, Rule 114, Rules of Court, as amended.

^[10]
Order of June 8, 1992, 6; Rollo, 19.

^[11]
Lardizabal vs. Reyes, A.M. No. MTJ-94-897, December 5, 1994.

^[12]
Libarios vs. Dabalos, A.M. No. RTJ-89-286, July 11, 1991, 199 SCRA 48.

^[13]
Borinaga vs. Tamin, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-93-936, September 10, 1993, 226
SCRA 206.

^[14]
People vs. Nano, etc., et al., G.R. No. 94639, January 13, 1992, 205
SCRA 155.

^[15]
Lardizabal vs. Reyes, supra, Fn.
11.

^[16]
Aguirre, et al. vs. Belmonte, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-93-1052, October 27, 1994; Carpio, et al. vs.
Maglalang, etc., et al., G.R. No.
78162, April 19, 1991, 196 SCRA 41.

^[17]
Supra, Fn. 12.

^[18]
Supra, Fn. 15.

^[19]
Supra, Fn. 11.

^[20]
76
Phil. 756 (1946).

^[21]
A.M. No. RTJ-95-1286, March 2, 1995.

^[22]
Ocampo vs. Bernabe, et al., 77 Phil. 55 (1946).