RE: COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2521 (IN THE MATTER OF PETI­TIONING THE SUPREME COURT TO INITIATE DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST THE HON. JOSE T. PINON, RTC, BRANCH V, BONGAO, TAWI-­TAW…

Comelec Resolution No. 2521 seeks to impose administrative disciplinary
action against respondent Judge for issuing an allegedly illegal order and for
gross ignorance of the law.

The antecedent facts as culled from the records are as follows:

Akmad J. Sana, Harkin Que, Hadji Otong Ayub and Samuel Bani filed
a petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), docketed as COMELEC Case
No. UND 92- 245^[1]
for their official proclamation as vice-mayor and councilors of Bongao,
Tawi-Tawi as a result of the May 1992 elections, alleging, among others, that
despite their victory in said elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Bongao failed to proclaim them as the duly elected vice-mayor and councilors.

On July 6, 1992, Harkin Que filed a petition for mandamus
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch V, Bongao, Tawi-Tawi, presided by
respondent Judge, docketed as CV Case No. 18-5, to compel the Municipal Board
of Canvassers of Bongao to declare Harkin Que as a duly elected councilor of
Bongao claiming that he placed number eight (8) among the winning candidates
for councilors. It appears that the
Board of Canvassers had previously proclaimed the first five (5) winning
candidates for councilor.^[2]

On July 22, 1992, the other candidates for councilors, namely,
Idlana Mangona and Erong Udjid filed a motion to dismiss the mandamus
case on the ground that the issue raised therein involved a pre-proclamation
controversy over which the COMELEC had already taken cognizance.^[3]

On September 22, 1992, respondent Judge issued an order directing
the Municipal Board of Canvassers to convene within five (5) days from the
promulgation of said order and to proclaim Harkin S. Que as the number eight
duly elected councilor of Bongao. Said
Order also directed all the respondents to jointly and severally pay Harkin S.
Que moral, nominal, and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees, in the
total amount of P145,000.00.^[4]

On September 28, 1992, a petition was filed with the COMELEC by
Amilajed Idjirani, Saipada Sangkula, Manuel Magbanua and Bantela Abubakar,
docketed as SPA 92-353, alleging that there was a failure of elections in
Precinct Nos. 44 and 43-A in Bongao affecting the positions of Vice-Mayor and
the number six (6) to eight (8) slots for the positions of councilors.^[5]
The First Division of the COMELEC in its Resolution in UND 92-245 promulgated
on September 25, 1992, advised the parties – the petitioners and
intervenors/oppositors – to seek redress with the COMELEC En Banc.^[6]
The COMELEC then ordered the setting of the hearing of the cases on October 15,
1992.^[7]

On October 14, 1992, Harkin S. Que filed an Opposition in SPA
92-353 alleging that there was no report of any untoward incident that would
warrant a declaration of failure of election in Precinct Nos. 44 and 43-A.^[8]

Meanwhile, a motion for contempt was filed against the Board of Canvassers
of Bongao in the Mandamus case for its failure to proclaim Harkin S. Que
as a duly elected councilor. Atty.
Wynne Asdala of the COMELEC who was assigned to represent the Board of
Canvassers of Bongao, moved for the reconsideration of the contempt order. However, the motion for reconsideration was
denied in the order of respondent Judge dated October 27, 1992.^[9]
In the same order, the members of the Board of Canvassers were declared in
contempt of court for allegedly defying his order dated September 22,
1992. Simultaneously, respondent judge
issued a warrant of arrest against the members of the Board and directed their
commitment to the municipal jail until they shall have proclaimed Harkin S. Que
as number eight (8) councilor and paid the amount of P145,000.00 in damages.^[10]
In view of their arrest, the members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers were
prevented from boarding the plane for Manila to attend the hearing of the
COMELEC in SPA 92-410 and SPA 92-353.^[11]

On the same day, October 29, 1992, respondent Judge issued
another order which reads as follows:

“An order was issued this morning adjudging Idlana Mangona,
Abdulnasser Hadjiula and Ujid Erong, for contempt of court and the court
ordered for their arrest until they comply with the Order of the Court, dated
September 22, 1992.

Idlana Mangona, Abdulnasser Hadjiula were arrested soon thereafter
and at 8:45 A.M., they submitted a duplicate original copy of the proclamation
paper en banc of Harkin S. Que as the no. 8 councilor for Bongao, Tawi-Tawi.

That despite of their proclamation made of Harkin S. Que, the
respondents in this case were ordered to pay to the petitioner Harkin S. Que,
the sum of P145,000.00 by way of damages.

In a receipt signed by Harkin S. Que furnished to this court dated
October 29, 1992, acknowledging the receipt of the sum of P145,000.00 from
Fauzia M. Hadjiula, the wife of Municipal Treasurer Abdulnasser Hadjiula in
payment for the damages cited in Special Civil Action No. 18-5 for Mandamus.

WHEREFORE, the Court, finding that respondents, Idlana Mangona and
Abdulnasser Hadjiula having complied with the Order of the Court dated
September 22, 1992, thereby Orders the release of said Idlana Mangona and
Abdulnasser Hadjiula from custody and the Order of the Court citing them in
contempt of court is hereby ordered LIFTED.”^[12]

In the aftermath of the above-described events, the COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 2521. In said
resolution, the COMELEC expressed its view that respondent Judge acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion:

“a) In denying the motion for reconsideration
filed by the Commission on Elections and ordering the incarceration of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers, as in fact they were detained and continued to
be detained, had they not prepared and submitted under duress a duplicate
original copy for the proclamation of Mr. Harkin Que as the No. 8 councilor for
Bongao, Tawi­-Tawi and paid the exorbitant amount of One Hundred Forty Five
Thousand Pesos (P145,000.00) by way of damages on the basis of an illegal court
order;

b) For taking cognizance of a pre-proclamation
controversy case which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission
of Elections under Sec. 3, par. c, Art. IX, Constitution;

c) For violation of Section 281, par. (f),
Article XXII, quoted as fol­lows:

Sec. 261 Prohibited Acts – The following shall be guilty of an
election offense:

x x x                x x x                  x
x x.

(f). Coercion of election officials and employees
– Any person who, directly or indirectly, threatens, intimidates, terrorizes or
coerces any election official or employee in the performance of his election
functions or duties.”^[13]

In his comment on COMELEC Resolution No. 92-2521 as required by
this Court, respondent Judge avers that the case at bar is not a pre-proclamation
controversy because a proclamation of winning candidates for the 1991 municipal
elections in Bongao, Tawi-Tawi was in fact made by the members of the Board of
Canvassers on May 24, 1992.^[14]
On the aforementioned date, the mayor and five municipal councilors were
proclaimed by the Board leaving out the vice-mayor and the candidates obtaining
the 6th to 8th highest number of votes. He likewise contends that because a proclamation was made by the Municipal
Board of Canvassers, it was the ministerial duty of the Board to proclaim all
the winning candidates after the canvass of votes had been completed.^[15]

We disagree.

Respondent Judge does not dispute the fact that the proclamation
made by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongao, Tawi-Tawi on the 24th of
May 1992 did not include those candidates obtaining the 6th to 8th highest
number of votes, among whom were petitioners in Comelec Case RTC UND
92-245. In other words, only a partial
proclamation as authorized by Section 247 of the Omnibus Election Code^[16]
was made on that day. Under the
aforecited section, the Commission may, motu propio or upon filing of a
verified petition and after due notice and hearing, order the proclamation of
other winning candidates whose election will not be affected by the outcome of
the controversy. Clearly, candidate
Harkin Que, who filed a case for contempt docketed as Special Civil Action No.
18-5 for mandamus, was never proclaimed by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers and there was no ministerial duty on the part of the Board to
proclaim him prior to a resolution of the petitions made by various parties in
the Municipal Elections before the Commission on Elections.

Under the circumstances above described, and in consonance with
the above-stated legal provision, it is patently evident that the controversy
brought before the respondent Judge was a pre-proclamation controversy outside
of the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.

“Sec. 241. Definition. – A pre-proclamation
controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings
of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any
registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board
or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234,
235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of the election returns.”

Matters included in the sections cited in the definition of
pre-proclamation controversies encompass delay, loss, or destruction of
election returns;^[17]
material defects in election returns;^[18]
tampering or falsification of election returns;^[19]
and the presence or absence of discrepancies in election returns.^[20]
Since it had been alleged that possible discrepancies in election returns in
Precinct No. 45 of said municipality might affect the results of the election,
the members of the Board of Canvassers were well within the authority vested
upon them by Section 241 of B.P. 881. Controversies of the nature involved in the instant case are within the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections. This constitutional grant of power to the
COMELEC is so fundamental that it would be difficult for this Court to situate
respondent judge’s actions within the sphere of an ordinary error of judgment.^[21]
Judges are expected to be knowledgeable of those jurisdictional areas mapped
out and reserved by the Constitution exclusively upon certain quasi-judicial
bodies, particularly the constitutional commissions. These jurisdictional boundaries are laid principally for the
purpose of avoiding controversies such as the one involved in this case. Specifically, in the case of
pre-proclamation controversies, the Commission on Elections, under the Omnibus
Election Code, is mandated by law to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all
such controversies.^[22]

This case would, therefore, have been avoided if the respondent
Judge had made it a point to acquaint himself with applicable Constitutional
provisions involving the Commission on Election’s power and functions and the
provisions of the Omnibus Election code on pre-proclamation controversies. In Zaldivar vs. Estenzo^[23]
this Court emphatically ruled that since the Commission on Elections is vested
by the Constitution with the exclusive charge of the enforcement of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections, assumption of jurisdiction by the
Regional Trial Court over a case involving enforcement of the Election Code
“is at war with the plain constitutional command, the implementing statutory
provisions and the hospitable scope afforded such grant of authority so clear
and so unmistakable in recent decisions.”^[24]
In the light of the present Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code which
have in fact broadened the powers and functions of the COMELEC, we cannot see
how respondent judge could have issued any of the assailed orders in Special
Civil Action No. 18-5 under the color of any of our existing laws. His interference with the Board’s
proceedings in SPA Nos. 92- 410 and 92-353, the issuance of a warrant of arrest
to prevent said Board from boarding their plane in order to attend en banc
proceedings of the COMELEC in the aforecited cases, and his order compelling
the Board to proclaim candidate Harkin S. Que were clearly made without or in
excess of jurisdiction.

The question now arises as to whether or not respondent Judge
should be held administratively liable for issuing the order assailed by the
Commission on Elections.

Since malice or deliberate intent has not been alleged in the
case at bar, in order to hold respondent Judge liable for rendering a
manifestly unjust judgment or order through inexcusable negligence or
ignorance, it must be clearly shown that although he has acted without malice,
he failed to observe, in the performance of his duty, the diligence, prudence
and care which the law requires from a public official.^[25]

As a public official charged with the responsibility of
acquainting himself, at the very least, with the fundamental outlines of the
law applicable to cases brought before him, his ignorance of the Constitutional
provisions relating to the powers and functions of the COMELEC and the relevant
portions of the Omnibus Election Code, is inexcusable particularly because he
practically interfered with and prevented the exercise of the duties vested
exclusively with the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Such gross ignorance constitutes serious misconduct for which
this Court may impose the most stringent penalties.

It does not serve the interests of our judicial system for judges
to be woefully lacking in the type of legal knowledge generally presumed by
practitioners of the law to be fundamental. Not only is a judge expected to be proficient in the law, it is expected
of a judge, as it is expected of any member of the bench, that he continuously
keeps himself abreast of legal and jurisprudential developments, primarily
because the learning process in law neither ends at the portals of law school
or ceases upon admission to the bar. What exacerbates the respondent Judge’s errors in the case at bench is
the nagging suspicion that he acted the way he did – flagrantly violating
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code – not out of ignorance but out of an
attempt to thwart the sanctity of the ballot. Assuming he did not, the absence of provable intent does not,
nonetheless, free him from the charge of gross ignorance of the law which
requires us to impose upon him an appropriate penalty. If judges wantonly arrogate unto themselves
the authority allocated to other officials, there can be no consequence but
confusion in the administration of justice and, in many instances, oppressive
disregard of the basic requirements of due process.^[26]
In the instant case, not only did respondent Judge prevent the members of the
Municipal Board from attending the COMELEC en banc meeting in Manila but he
went as far as incarcerating said officials in order to force them to proclaim
the petitioner in SPA No. 18-5. The
fact that said petitioner was subsequently proclaimed by the Commission on
Elections does not validate any of the acts or orders made in flagrant
violation of existing election laws.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court
Resolved to hold respondent Judge administratively liable for gross ignorance
of the law and arbitrariness and impose on him a fine of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P35,000.00), with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 5

^[2]
Id., at pp. 15-17.

^[3]
Id., at pp. 18-19.

^[4]
Id., at p. 24.

^[5]
Id., at p. 5.

^[6]
Id., at p. 6.

^[7]
Ibid.

^[8]
Ibid.

^[9]
Ibid.

^[10]
Id., at p. 8.

^[11]
Id., pp. 7-8.

^[12]
Id., p. 8.

^[13]
Id., at pp. 8-9.

^[14]
Id., at pp. 14-15.

^[15]
Id., at p. 23.

^[16]
Omnibus Election Code, Art. XX, Sec. 247 (hereinafter cited as Election Code).

^[17]
Election Code, Art. XIX, Sec. 233.

^[18]
Sec. 234.

^[19]
Sec. 235.

^[20]
Sec. 236.

^[21]
Const., Art. IX B, Sec. 2, states:

“The Commission on Elections
shall exercise the following powers and functions:

“xxx       xxx.

“2.
Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contest relative to
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and
city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contest involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction. x x x.

“3. Decide, except those involving the right to
vote, all questions affecting elections, including determination of the number
and location of polling places, appointment of elective officials and
inspectors, and registration of votes.”

^[22]
Election Code, Sec. 243.

^[23]
23 SCRA 533 (1968).

^[24]
Ibid.

^[25]
Groizard, 4 El Codigo Penal Español, 1912 ed., cited in In re Climaco, 55 SCRA
107, 119 (1974); AGPALO, LEGAL ETHICS, 470 (1989).

^[26]
Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52, 59 (1970).