JUAN OYAO, COMPLAINANT, VS. PRISCO PABATAO, MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF MOLAVE, ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, RESPONDENT.

Respondent Municipal Judge Prisco N. Pabatao, of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, is charged
with misconduct, dishonesty and ignorance of the law.

Complainant’s charges stemmed from respondent’s Order of
dismissal dated April 23, 1974
in Criminal Case No. 2360 (for theft of two steel bars) wherein complainant
Juan Oyao is the offended party.  It appears that at the instance of Juan Oyao, the Chief of Police of Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur filed a
complaint for theft against Hospicio Geraldizo and Judith Geraldizo on
March 20, 1974.  On April 23, 1974, after a “careful and
serious consideration” of complainant’s affidavit and those of his
witnesses, respondent Judge “dismissed the case for lack of probable
cause”, and remanded the records of the case “to the Clerk of Court
of First Instance, Pagadian, City, for the information and review of the * * *
Provincial Fiscal.” In the
aforementioned Order, the respondent stated that on the basis of the
preliminary examination conducted by him, no witness testified that they saw
the two accused steal the two steel bars in question and that the reason why
the complainant charged them was that
he “assumed that it was Hospicio Geraldizo and Judith Geraldizo
who stole the two steel bars”, and while the two steel bars were found in
the house of the accused Hospicio Geraldizo.  Hospicio Geraldizo and Judith Geraldizo
were both engaged in the buying and selling of scrap iron.  Contrary to the reasoning of respondent, it is not necessary that the accused has
been seen by a witness in the act of stealing the property, to create a
presumption of guilt from possession of stolen property.  It is enough to show that the property has
been stolen, and the stolen property is found in the possession of the accused,
who cannot satisfactorily explain his possession.  Thus, it is a well-established doctrine that
if the defendant cannot give a satisfactory explanation as to his possession of
stolen property, a prima
facie case exists
against him for theft.  For it has been
said that men who come honestly into the possession of property have no difficulty
in explaining the method by which they came to such possession.^[1]
This rule is embodied in Section 5[j] of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of
Court, on disputable presumptions, to wit:
“that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent
wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things
which a person possesses, or exercises
acts of ownership over, are owned by him.”

It appears, however, that respondent Judge did not accord much
credence to the claim that the two steel bars, which were found in the
possession of the accused, were the very same steel bars which were allegedly
stolen from Juan Oyao “sometime in the latter part of February, 1974″
(Annex “C-2”).  Given this
doubt, how could he be charged with grave misconduct in his conclusion that
there is no reasonable ground to believe that the accused committed the offense
in question?  The question of whether
probable cause exists or not must depend upon the judgment of the judge or
magistrate issuing the warrant.  To
sustain a finding of probable cause means that sufficient facts have been
presented to the judge issuing the warrant to convince him, not that the
particular person has committed the crime, but that there is probable cause for believing that the person whose arrest is sought
committed the crime charged.  There is no
fixed rule that can be established which will govern the
discretion of the judge in this matter.  It all depends on the attendant
facts.  Our attention has not been
invited to any fact in the records of the case from which We could adequately
conclude that respondent has acted arbitrarily.

In any event, this dismissal of the case does not preclude the refiling of the case should the Provincial Fiscal, to whom
the records were referred for review, be of a different view.  Thus, Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Court does not provide for appeal if the municipal judge dismisses the complaint after
conducting the investigation previous to arrest, because such dismissal does
not bar the filing of another complaint for the same offense, and there is no
accused to be released by the dismissal.^[2]

Hence, even assuming that the dismissal of the case is erroneous,
this would be merely an error of judgment and not serious misconduct. The term
“serious misconduct” is a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by the magistrate.  It implies
a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment.  For serious misconduct to exist, there must
be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt
or inspired by intention to violate the law, or were a persistent disregard of
well-known legal rules.^[3]
We have previously ruled that negligence and ignorance on the part of a judge
are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by
a reasonable interpretation.  This is not
so in the case at bar.

WHEREFORE, the respondent is EXONERATED of the charges.

Fernando, (Chairman), Barredo, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and Santos,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
U.S. v. Soriano, 9 Phil. 98; 441 & 445 (3 cases); U. S. v. Paguia, et
al., 10 Phil. 90; U. S.
v. Jamero, 10
Phil. 137; U.S. v. Soriano & Villalobos, 12 Phil. 512; U. S. v. Espia, 16 Phil. 506; U. S. v. Divino, 18 Phil. 425; U. S. v. Tapan & De Leon, 20
Phil. 211; U.S. v. Javier, et al., 37 Phil. 449; U. S. v. Mohamad Ungal, 37 Phil. 835; People v. Tanchoco, 76
Phil. 463; People v. Magbanua, 77 Phil. 79.

^[2]
People
v. Ocampo, 63 Phil. 121; Temporora v. Yatco, et al., 79 Phil. 225.

^[3]
In Re:  Horilleno, 43 Phil. 212.