SALVADOR LACSON, JR., COMPLAINANT, VS. RAMON POSADAS, MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF TALISAY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, RESPONDENT.

Lacson versus Posadas

The Case

This is an administrative complaint filed by Salvador Lacson, Jr. against Municipal Judge Ramon Posadas of Talisay, Negros Occidental, charging the judge with ignorance of the law, partiality, and violation of the Election Code of 1971. The case matters because it fixes the standard of judicial conduct in election inclusion proceedings: a judge who grants inclusion petitions without the safeguards the election law requires, even in good faith, falls short of the care the law demands, because the right of suffrage is a public trust and not a mere private convenience.

Procedural History

The verified complaint was referred to the Executive Judge for investigation, report, and recommendation. After investigation, the Executive Judge found the charges of ignorance of the law and partiality to be without factual basis. He nevertheless found that the respondent judge had failed to comply with the requirements of Section 136 of the Election Code of 1971. The matter then came before the Supreme Court as an administrative case against a municipal judge, and the Court resolved it on the report and recommendation of the investigating judge.

Facts

In connection with the elections of 1971, numerous petitions for inclusion in the permanent list of voters were filed before the respondent judge. The petitioners claimed that they had applied for registration on October 9, 1971 but were refused registration for lack of registration forms. The petitions did not attach the certificate of the chairman or any member of the board of inspectors of the precinct concerned attesting to that refusal.

The respondent judge reset the petitions for hearing on very short notice. Petitions filed on October 14 were set for October 18, and petitions filed in the afternoon of October 19 were set for hearing the very next morning, October 20. The boards of inspectors were not notified of these reset dates. The respondent judge believed that notice to the election registration board alone was sufficient, and that the certificate of the board of inspectors was unnecessary because he relied on the testimony of the petitioners themselves.

When the election registration board or the members of the board of inspectors were not present at the hearings, the respondent judge considered them in default and summarily granted the petitions. Practically all the inclusion cases resulted in orders of inclusion. On appeal, however, most of the petitions were dismissed, either for failure of the petitioners to appear or, in some cases, because the chairman of a precinct testified that his precinct even had a surplus of seventeen application forms. The investigating judge found that the respondent acted without improper motive and in good faith.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge failed to comply with the requirements of Section 136 of the Election Code of 1971 in acting on the petitions for inclusion.
• Whether or not the respondent judge's good faith and lack of malice excuse his non-compliance with the election law.
• Whether or not the respondent judge may still be held liable given the general amnesty granted under Presidential Decree No. 433.

Applicable Provisions

Section 136 of the Election Code of 1971 provides:

Any person who has been refused registration or whose name has been stricken out from the permanent list of voters may at any time except sixty (60) days before a regular election or twenty-five (25) days before a special election, apply to the proper court for an order directing the election registration board or the board of inspectors as the case may be, to include or reinstate his name in the permanent list of voters, attaching to his application for inclusion the certification of the Election registration board or the board of inspectors regarding his case and proof of service of a copy of his application and of the notice of hearing thereof upon a member of the said board.

This provision supplies the very safeguards the respondent judge disregarded: the required certification and the required notice of hearing upon a member of the board.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the respondent judge failed to comply with Section 136. The petitions did not attach the required certification of the board of inspectors, and the boards were not notified of the reset hearing dates. The Court stressed that inclusion and exclusion cases, though summary in nature, still require safeguards against indiscriminate inclusion. The procedure adopted by the respondent judge provided no safeguard whatsoever, since he treated the absence of the boards as default and summarily granted the petitions.

On the second issue, the Court held that good faith is of no avail. Speaking of the statutory purpose, the Court reasoned that the respondent's good faith or lack of malice does not excuse him, considering that in crimes which are mala prohibita, meaning acts prohibited by law regardless of intent, the act alone, irrespective of its motives, constitutes the offense. The Court anchored this on the nature of suffrage, quoting an earlier decision:

The people in clothing a citizen with the elective franchise for the purpose of securing a consistent and perpetual administration of the government they ordain, charge him with the performance of a duty in the nature of a public trust, and in that respect constitute him a representative of the whole people.

On the third issue, the Court noted that Presidential Decree No. 433 granted general amnesty for violations of election laws in connection with the elections of 1965, 1967, 1969, 1971, and the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention. The respondent was therefore relieved of any criminal liability. Nevertheless, in the public interest, the Court held that he should be admonished.

Doctrine

A judge acting on petitions for inclusion in the permanent list of voters must observe the requirements of the election law, including the attachment of the required certification and proof of notice of hearing upon a member of the board. The summary nature of inclusion proceedings does not excuse the omission of these safeguards, which exist to prevent indiscriminate inclusion. Good faith does not exonerate a judge from administrative responsibility for violating a mandatory election law requirement, because the act alone, irrespective of motive, constitutes the offense. The right of suffrage is a public trust, and its protection is a matter of public interest.

Disposition

The respondent judge was admonished to exercise greater care in observing existing laws in the discharge of his judicial duty, and warned that any subsequent misconduct would be dealt with more severely.

Remember This

Remember the line that good faith is no defense where the act alone constitutes the offense, and that suffrage is a public trust. Examiners use this case on the administrative liability of judges in election inclusion proceedings and on the limits of good faith as an excuse.