RODOLFO R. PAULINO AND CORINA I. PAULINO, COMPLAINANTS, VS. JUDGE DONATO M. GUEVARA, RESPONDENT.

Administrative complaint in Adm. Matter No. 584-CJ against Judge Donato M. Guevara of the City Court of Manila charg­ing
said respondent with knowingly rendering an unjust decision, bias and ignorance
of the law and another administrative complaint in Adm. Matter No. 851-CJ charging the same respondent with
grave abuse of discretion.

In the first case, complainants Rodolfo R. Paulino
and Corina I. Paulino
alleged that the judgment of acquittal rendered by respondent in Criminal Case
No. I-143658 in his court, entitled People of the Philippines
vs. Benjamin Oliva was marked by bias and ignorance
of the law and was unjust and, furthermore, it was rendered by said respondent
well knowing that it was unjust.  They
claim that respondent’s findings of
facts are not supported by the evidence and that his conclusions
of law conflict with established jurisprudence. 
They assert that respondent did not carefully analyze the evidence and
that he “completely disregarded the convincing evidence of the prosecution
and what was discussed in said Decision was only the evidence of the
defense.” Respondent was required to comment on the foregoing charges,
which he did on January 7, 1974.  And
after careful evaluation of said comment together with its annexes in the light
of the allegations of the complaint and the contents of the annexes thereto,
the Court deems it unnecessary to hold any further proceedings, since on the
basis thereof the matter on hand may already be properly disposed of.

It appears that
purportedly by virtue of an agreement dated March 11, 1967, herein complainants, the spouses Rodolfo R.
Paulino and Corina I. Paulino, sold to Benjamin Oliva
the accused in the above-mentioned
criminal case, and his wife, a 1965 Ford Cortina
being operated as a taxi.  The said
agreement was as follows:

“AGREEMENT

“KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

“THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into on this 11th day of
March, 1967, by and between CORINA I. PAULINO, Filipino, of legal age, married,
with residence at 17-C, A-1 Project 6, Quezon City,
hereinafter referred to as the First Party and Atty. and Mrs. Benjamin Oliva, husband and wife, Filipinos, and with residence at
7567 Sycamore St., Green Village, Parañaque, Rizal, hereinafter referred to as the Second Party;

“1.  WHEREAS the First
Party is the owner of a 1965 (Ford Cortina bearing
Plate No. 2599, 1967, Manila, Motor
No. 113E-411679 and Chassis No. NE-76-Em-10129.

“2.  WHEREAS the First
Party is the lessee of a one (1) unit line to operate said taxi from Lourdes Ridad, owner and operator of Rivar
Taxi.

“3.  WHEREAS the term of
said lease from Rivar Taxi is 3-1/2 years starting October 18, 1965.

“4.  WHEREAS said Taxi
No. 2599 is presently mortgaged to the Francisco Commercial Corporation with a
balance of P368.00 monthly starting March
28, 1967 to October 28, 1967, or a period of 8 months, with interest
therein at the rate of 1% on the unpaid balance.

“5.  WHEREAS the First Party desires to
sell said taxi, together with her lease, to the line to the Second Party.

WITNESSETH

“NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the sum of Eight
Thousand Two Hundred Ninety Eight Pesos (P8,298.00),
the First Party hereby sells and conveys unto the Second Party Taxi No. 2599,
together with the right to operate the line for the unexpired portion of the
3-1/2 years lease from Rivar Taxi, entered into on
October 10, 1965, subject to the following terms and conditions:

“1.  The sum of Two
Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) Checks No. 602947 and . . . . dated
March 31, 1967 and April 15, 1967 respectively, are
hereby acknowledged by the First Party as partial payment.

“2.  The sum of Three
Thousand Three Hundred and Fifty Pesos to be paid as follows:

a) P1,000.00 on or before April 30, 1967

b) P1,000.00 on or before May 31, 1967

c) P1,350.00 on or before June 30, 1967

“3.  To secure the payment of this above mentioned
amounts, the Second Party hereby issues the following postdated checks:

“4.  The balance of P368 monthly for 8 months with
interest on the unpaid as provided for in the contract by the First Party with
Francisco Commercial Cor­poration, will be assumed by the Second Party who will issue, the corresponding
checks to the First Party starting March 31, 1967 until October 31, 1967 at a
rate of P368.00 is issued under Check No. 604745 dated March 31, 1967
corresponding to the March, 1967 payment and thereafter checks will be issued
on the 15th of every month until the balance is fully paid together with the
interest therein:

“5.  The Second Party
assumes all expenses and liability arising from suits in the operation of the
taxi and if for any reason the First Party shall be made liable by third
parties in connection with the operation of said taxi, the second party binds
himself to assume all liabilities therein.

“6.  The First Party
warrants the legality, terms and conditions with her contract with Rivar Taxi and binds herself to defend and protect the
rights of the Second Party, her transferee
in said contract.

“IN WITNESS WHEREOF we have set our signatures on this 11th
day of March, 1967, at Manila, Philippines.

(Sgd.) CORINA I. PAULINO

First Party

(Sgd.) BENJAMIN OLIVA

(Sgd.) GABRIELA M. OLIVA

Second
Party.”

(Pages 136-137, Record.)

In a complaint filed on November
16, 1967 with the City Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 166002 of
said court, herein complainants sought
the collection from the Olivas of an alleged balance
of P6,340.00
of the amount stipulated in the above contract. 
The Olivas lost that case as well as the
appeal thereof to the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 75918, wherein the
judgment of the inferior court was
affirmed on April 6, 1971.  An
attempt to appeal from this latter decision was frustrated, as neither the
Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court was persuaded to grant relief to the Olivas against the action of the Court of First Instance of
Manila declaring its judgment final and executory.  Thus, the civil case between complainants and
the Olivas came to an end on April
25, 1972 when the
second motion for reconsideration of the Olivas was
denied by the Supreme Court.

In the meanwhile, under
date of October 21, 1971, there was filed against Benjamin Q. Oliva in the City Court of Manila, in the branch presided
by herein respondent judge, an informa­tion as
follows:

“INFORMATION

The undersigned accuses Benjamin Q. Oliva
of the crime of perjury, committed as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of March, 1968, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously subscribe and swear to an affidavit before a notary public,
duly appointed, qualified and acting, as such, and a competent person
authorized to administer oath, in which the said accused affirmed and swore,
among other things, that one Corina Paulino is not in fact a lessee to any unit of the Rivar Taxi, neither is she the registered owner of the said
motor vehicle subject of a sale, and that Rodolfo R. Paulino
and said Corina Paulino
employed deceit and fraudulent acts in selling a motor vehicle and subleasing a
franchise over which they have no proprietary nor leasehold right, which facts
as falsely sworn to by him are material matters and, required by law for the
purpose of supporting his, estafa charge against the
spouses Rodolfo R. Paulino and Corina
Paulino.

Contrary to law.

(SGD.)
MARIANO CASTAÑEDA, JR.

Assistant Fiscal

“I hereby certify that a preliminary investigation in this
case has been conducted by me in accordance with law wherein the accused was
given a chance to appear in person or by counsel; that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the offense charged has been committed; that the accused
is probably guilty thereof; and that the filing of this information is with the
prior authority and approval of the City Fiscal.

Manila, October 21, 1971.

(SGD) MARIANO
CASTAÑEDA, JR.

Assistant Fiscal

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 21st day of October 1971, in
the City of Manila, Philippines.

(SGD) ILLEGIBLE

Assistant Fiscal

WITNESSES:

1.  Rodolfo
R. Paulino, 17-C A-1, Proj.
6, Q. City (to bring documentary evidence)

2. 
Corina Paulino,    -do?

And
others.

BAIL RECOMMENDED:  P1,000.00” (Page 48, Record.)

The affidavit referred to in the above information reads thus:

“A
F F I D A V I T

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)

 CITY OF MANILA                        ) S.S.

I, BENJAMIN Q. OLIVA, of legal age, married and residing at 7567
Sycamore St., Marcelo Green Village, South Superhighway, Parañaque,
Rizal, after having been duly sworn to under oath
depose and state:

1.    That I am the same attorney who is the
complainant in I.S. Case No. 68 – 8135 for Estafa
against Rodolfo &
Corina Paulino;

“2.   That the said Rodolfo & Corina Paulino, representing
themselves to be the owners of a motor vehicle (Ford Cortina,
1965 model with Plate No. TX-2599- 67′ Mla., Motor
No. 113E-411679) and the lessees of one (1) unit line to operate the said
vehicle as a taxi from the owner and operator of the Rivar
Taxi, sold the said motor vehicle together with their alleged leasehold right
over one (1) unit of the franchise of
said taxi company in favor of the complainant and his wife, per written
agreement a copy of which is hereto attached as ANNEX ‘A’ and made part hereof;

3.    That per terms of the said agreement, the
respondents particularly Corina Paulino
warranted the legality, terms and conditions of the sale and the assign­ment of
the lease to the complainant and bound herself to defend and protect the rights
of the complainant to the vehicle sold and to the lease assigned under the said
agreement;

4.    That in consideration of the sale and
assignment above-mentioned, the complainant paid respondent Rodolfo Paulino on different occasions the total amount of
P1,868.00 as advance payments as evidenced by three (3) separate checks, copies
of which are attached hereto as ANNEXES ‘B’, ‘C’ & ‘D’, which checks were
all encashed by respondent Rodolfo Paulino;

5.    That as a condition precedent to further
pay­ments, respondents promised and agreed to deliver to the complainant the
following items:  (a).  the cor­responding deed of sale of the
motor vehicle in favor of the complainant; (b). 
the certificate of registration of the said motor vehicle; (c).  the contract of lease that the respondents
have with the Rivar Taxi; and (d).  the franchise owner’s consent to the
assignment of the lease;

6.    That despite of their said promise,
respondents failed to deliver the said deeds and documents and until now have
not delivered the same; and that instead of complying with the same,
respondents threatened the complainant with suit for the collection of the full
price and as a matter of fact, they made good their threat by filing an action
in court against the complainant and his wife;

7.   That because of the unreasonable and
unfounded refusal of the respondents to deliver the said deeds and documents, the
complainant instituted an action with the CFI of Pasay
City for the annulment of the aforesaid agreement and for damages against the
respondents; a copy of the said complaint is attached as ANNEX ‘E’ and made
part hereof;

8.    That the respondents herein, Rodolfo & Corina Paulino are patently
guilty of deceit & fraud in executing the aforesaid agreement with the
complainant to the damage and prejudice of the latter, because as subsequently
discovered by the complainant, respondent Corina Paulino is not in fact a lessee to any unit of the Rivar Taxi; neither is she the registered owner of the said
motor vehicle subject of the sale.  A
copy of the certificate of the Public Service Commission attesting to the non­existence
of the alleged lease and the photostatic copy of
certificate of registration with the Land Transportation Commission are
attached as ANNEXES ‘F’ & ‘G’ and made part hereof;

9.    That the deceit, fraud and
misrepresentation of the respondents had been further confirmed and
corroborated when representatives of the owner and operator of the Rivar Taxi impounded the said vehicle by detaching its
plate number and detached and con­fiscated all the stickers and accessories of
the same by virtue of the order and authority of the owner and operator of the
said taxi company;

10.  That the complainant subsequently informed
respondent, Rodolfo Paulino, of what happened to the
taxi which he sold to the former but Rodolfo Paulino
simply stated that he has ‘no more business with the matter because he had
already delivered the vehicle’ to the complainant;

11.  That the deceitful and fraudulent acts of the
respondents in selling a motor vehicle and sub- leasing a franchise over which
they have no prop­rietary nor leasehold right, and at the same time collecting
payment thereof constitute the crime of ESTAFA punishable under the Penal Code;
and

“12. That
affiant further sayeth not.  Manila, March 29, 1968.

(Sgd.) BENJAMIN Q. OLIVA

(Affiant)”

(Pages 182-183, Record.)

The foregoing affidavit came about as the basis of a estafa charge filed by Oliva against the Paulinos, which
to the former’ disappointment, was dismissed by the Office of the City Fiscal
of Manila.  And so, the Paulinos went after Oliva
claiming that his above-quoted affidavit was perjured in the portions detailed
in the above information.  This case of
perjury, as already stated, fell in the
sala of respondent judge who after due trial
acquitted Oliva. 
It is this acquittal that complainants, the Paulinos,
charge was knowingly unjust and was the result of bias and ignorance of the law
of respondent.

In his decision in
question, respondent rationalized thus:

“Is it true that Corina Paulino is not in fact a lessee to the Rivar
Taxi?  The answer to this is the
certification made by the Public Service Commission that no lease was ever recorded over a taxi of that line in favor of
Corina Paulino, (Exhibits
‘2’, ‘2-B’, ‘3’ & ‘3-A’).  Is the
statement that neither is she the registered owner of said motor vehicle subject
of a sale also true?  The answer to this
is the certificate of the Land Transportation Commission dated July 22, 1969 to
the effect that the car in question (referring to the car subject of sale mentioned in Exhibits ‘A’ and ‘1’) is still registered
in the name of Lourdes Ridad.  Is it also true that Corina
Paulino and Rodolfo R. Paulino
employed deceit and fraudulent acts in selling a motor vehicle and subleasing a
franchise over which they have no proprietary nor leasehold rights?  It being proven that the vehicle sold,
together with the leasehold rights are still in the name of Lourdes Ridad and
that the alleged special power of attorney in favor of Rodolfo Paulino is not duly registered with the Public Service
Commission, hence, no legal power of
attorney had ever been executed and, therefore, no legal
leasehold right have been assigned (Exhibits ‘3’ and ‘3-A’).  Besides, this special power of attorney
executed by Lourdes Ridad on October 19, 1965 in
favor of Rodolfo Paulino is only to manage and operate
the five (5) units of Rivar Taxi (Exhibits ‘7’ and
‘7-A’), and does not include the power to lease or sell.

“Under Article 183 of
the Revised Penal Code, false testimony in other cases and perjury in so­lemn
affirmation states that perjury is committed even by affidavit if the
accused:  (a) states a falsehood (b) on a
material matter (c) required by law (d) under oath (e) before a competent
officer.

“Is there a falsehood in the affidavit in question marked
Exhibit ‘N’?  The answer is none because
the claim is supported by legal documents. 
It is therefore clear that the five requisites are not complied with and, therefore, there can
be no perjury.” (Page 87, Record.)

On the other hand, the thrust of the charge of complainants is
that while it is true that the official documents relied upon by respondent
would not show on their faces the ownership of Mrs. Paulino
of the Ford Cortina car sold to Oliva
nor the lease in her favor of the certificate of public convenience to operate
the said car as a taxi, enough authentic documents and testimonies were
presented at the trial before respondent which should have persuaded him to
find that, as the taxi in dispute was being operated under a “kabit” arrangement with Rivar
Taxi or Mrs. Lourdes V. Ridad, its owner, in truth
and in fact, Mrs. Paulino was the owner of said taxi
and had the authority to operate the same, notwith­standing the absence of any
showing to such effects in the corresponding
official documents.

Incidentally, it may be stated that the Court takes judicial
notice of the fact that under the commonly known “kabit
system”, it is not possible for the true owner of a car which is operated
as a taxi under a certificate of public convenience issued to another person,
for a stipulated remuneration, to maintain the registration of the car in his
name — it must be registered in the name of the holder of the certificate –,
and, moreover, the common practice is
that the lease of the right to operate is not recorded in the Public Service
Commission (now Board of Transportation), for the simple reason that, strictly
speaking, the ”kabit” arrangement is illegal.

Bearing this observation in mind, it is indeed possible for a
person to actually own a car and operate it as a taxi without the public
records attesting to such ownership and corresponding authority to
operate.  The parties to a “kabit” arrangement have to protect their respective
interests thru other counter-documents between themselves.  And from what appears in the various
documents and papers attached to the complaint herein, the comment of
respondent and the reply thereto of complainants, this is the important
consideration that respondent is claimed to have overlooked.  In his decision, respondent allowed himself
to be guided strictly by the public records.

To be sure, We are satisfied, having in view, particularly, Annex
2 of complainants’ reply, the “Formal Offer of Evidence” and also
Annex 23, the “Memorandum of the Prosecution”, that complainants did
present enough evidence at the trial of the perjury case in question from which
a finding of the “kabit” character of the
taxi in question could have been made and, consequently, respondent could have
discerned what were the true facts behind the public records in which the
ownership of the car in question and the authority to operate it as a taxi on
the part of Mrs. Paulino did not appear.  From this consideration, it does not
necessarily follow, however, that respondent may be faulted as having knowingly
rendered an unjust decision, much less that he was
actuated by actual bias or ignorance of the law.  The following portions of respondent’s
comment reveal, to Our mind, the considerations that
respondent took into account in acting the way he did:

“x x x The Paulinos
claim that such were the facts surrounding
this taxi because the same was operated under the ‘kabit‘
system where an owner of a motor vehicle who wants to operate a taxi but has no
line registers the motor vehicle in the name of the franchise holder to go
around legal requirements and prohibitions concerning the operation of public
utility vehicles.  At the time this was
made, there was already a mis­representation of fact which is that the
franchise holder is the owner of the vehicle when in fact, he is not.  The party deceived by this misrepresentation
or who pretends to be deceived is the government, the Public Service Commission
and the Land Trans­portation Commission in particular and the public in
general.  It is this initial
misrepresentation that spawned all these suits involving the parties and which
eventually caught this court in the crossfire. 
The Paulinos and Lourdes Ridad
are the original parties to this misrepresentation.  Oliva is not privy
to this because his relationship is with the Paulinos
and not with Lourdes Ridad, the owner and operator of
the Rivar Taxi. 
While government records show that the motor vehicle and leasehold
rights to the franchise show that they pertain to Lourdes Ridad,
the Paulinos allege, the real fact is that they are
the beneficial owners of the vehicle and leaseholders of a unit of the
franchise thereto and this fact is known to Oliva.  This is precisely the meat of the matter
which is addressed to the discretion of the court as borne out by the
evidence.  To the mind of the court the
prosecution has not established beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time the
accused made the alleged perjurious statements, he
was aware of their untruth and that Oliva knows this
fact.  The fact that he made inquiries
from the Public Service Commission and the Land Transportation Commission
regarding the registra­tion of the lease in the name of the Paulinos
shows that during those times that he made these state­ments, he had doubts
anent this matter, which doubts were confirmed when he discovered that the Paulinos are not in fact recorded lessees of any unit of
the Rivar Taxi. 
These doubts were further confirmed when the registered lessee Lourdes
V. Ridad withdrew Oliva’s
taxi from operation under the franchise of the Rivar
Taxi, because if this unit of the franchise was really leased to Paulino, then Ridad would not
have the authority to withdraw said taxi from Operation
under her franchise.” (Pages 81-82, Record.)

In the light of this explanation of respondent, and considering
that a judge is not to be assumed to be entirely immune to error, it is Our considered opinion that what is involved here is more an
error of judgment than a case of actual partiality or deliberate malice.  Even if it were conceded that the weight of
the evidence presented by the prosecution were as complainants maintain it is,
respondent claims, he was not convinced
beyond reasonable doubt that Olivas knew of the
falsity of his alleged perjured statements, and We do not Ourselves find
in the record indubitable proof that he did. 
It results, therefore, that the complaint herein has to be
dismissed.  Incidentally, We note that there have been so many charges and
countercharges between the Olivas and the Paulinos that, perhaps, it would be best for them to leave
things as they are insofar as the present one is concerned.

Anent Administrative Matter No. 851-CJ, all that need be said is
that the charge therein should have been taken up by the court together with
the complaint in Administrative
Case No. 1222, by the same complainant against the same respondent, since they
both involve exactly the same facts. 
Indeed, the only difference between the two cases is that Adm. Case No.
1222 was a disbarment proceeding against respondent as a lawyer, whereas now he
is being charged as a judge.

Now, in Adm. Case No. 1222, We rendered
on February 27, 1976 a resolution exonerating respondent.  We see nothing new in the present charge
which would justify a different conclusion, even from the point of view of an
administrative proceeding against a judge. 
We, therefore, adopt the findings and rulings We
made in Our former decision.

WHEREFORE, the two respective complaints in these two
cases are hereby dismissed.

Fernando, (Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion,
Jr., and Martin, JJ.,
concur.

Aquino, J., took no part.