AMANTE E. SANGLAY, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ANTONIO QUIRINO, RESPONDENT.

The respondent, Antonio Quirino, was
counsel for complainant Amante E. Sanglay’s
aged mother who was sued for recovery of a sum of money in civil case No.
82-241 entitled Jovita Malan
Deposito v. Flora Estrella
Sanglay in the Court of First Instance, Branch
XIII, Manila.  The plaintiff alleged that
she had made advance/partial payments initially in the amount of P36,032.20 and later an additional P5,000.00 for the purchase
of the defendant’s property, which had been mortgaged to the Cavite Development Bank and was on the verge of being
foreclosed.  Defendant Flora Sanglay admitted to respondent Quirino
that she had received the said amounts but needed time to find a better
buyer.  Acting by virtue of a special
power-of?attorney given him by Flora Sanglay,
respondent Antonio Quirino entered into a compromise
agreement with counsel for the plaintiff which was approved by the trial judge
and made the basis of the decision dated August 22, 1980.

Subsequently, a petition for relief from the compromise judgment
was filed on behalf of Flora Sanglay.  This was denied for lack of merit, whereupon,
notice of appeal was made, but pending perfection of the appeal, execution of
judgment was issued.

Flora E. Sanglay filed with the Court
of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition to annul the order
of the trial judge.  Finding that the
assailed order was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a
lack of jurisdiction, the appellate court denied due course for lack of merit
and dismissed the petition outright.

The complainant in a letter addressed to the Chief Justice asked
for an inquiry and thorough review of the case alleging that the respondent Quirino

. . . abused the POWER OF ATTORNEY
entrusted to him.  The forged DEED OF
SALE document which he earlier intended to present as a vital
evidence against plaintiff in court, was never presented anymore and the
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT entered by him without the knowledge and consent of our
mother was totally against our mother. 
And Atty. Quirino, knowing that the receipt in the amount of P5,000.00 was forged, coupled with high interest therein,
should not have agreed into such kind of agreement.

For your kind information your honor, Atty. Quirino
did not return to us anymore all our papers in his possession including the
original of the forged DEED OF SALE document, for reason that he did not sign
any receipt of acceptance from us. . . . 
(Letter dated April 25, 1983, Rollo. p. 2)

The Court by resolution dated June 27, 1983 gave respondent ten (10) days to answer the
complaint.  In his answer the respondent
explained the acts complained of and stated inter alia
that Flora Sanglay had admitted receiving the sums of
money sought to be recovered from her including the P5,000.00
where her signature in the receipt is alleged by the complainant to be a
forgery.  After the complainant filed his
reply, the Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation.

The Solicitor General first set the case for hearing on October 10, 1983 where both
complainant and respondent appeared.  But
the latter requested time to get the services of a lawyer and the case was
reset for November 28, 1983.  On this date the respondent came but the
complainant was not present because he was allegedly ill.  The case was once more set for hearing on March 26, 1984.  In spite of the fact that complainant’s
counsel was notified by registered mail, neither he nor the complainant
appeared.  Respondent upon request
presented his evidence ex-parte after which he was
given thirty (30) days to submit a memorandum. 
Complainant given the same period to submit his memorandum alleged that
he did not know of the March 26, 1984
hearing and filed a letter with documents attached consisting of thirty-two
(32) pages which he submitted as evidence, including the order of Judge Ricardo
D. Galano, dated October 3, 1981. 
On the basis of the review made of the antecedent facts of the
transactions entered into by Flora Sanglay over her
house and lot on 2 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila,
and the intervention of the respondent Antonio Quirino
as her counsel and attorney-in-fact the Solicitor General arrived at the
following findings and recommendation:

Respondent Atty. Quirino has not
committed any act of misconduct calling for disciplinary action in entering
into a compromise agreement in behalf of the mother of herein complainant Amante E. Sanglay, because
respondent was duly authorized in a Special Power of Attorney (pp. 10-11,
Rec.).  The Honorable Court of Appeals
ruled that said compromise agreement cannot be challenged as having been
entered into without previous consent of complainant’s mother because there was
the Special Power of Attorney.  Hence:

Nor could she validly assail the validity of the Compromise
Agreement on the pretense that the same was executed by her counsel, Atty. Antonio Quirino,
without previously consulting her or without her knowledge and consent.  For the record shows that she had executed a
special power of attorney in favor of Atty. Quirino
authorizing the latter to appear for her in connection with Civil Case No.
129823 and, among others, “to offer and enter into any amicable settlement
and to sign the same” and “to offer and enter into any compromise and
to sign the compromise agreement”.  xx xx.” Respondent Judge,
therefore, correctly denied the petition for
relief as there was no showing that
petitioner had entered into the Compromise
Agreement by fraud, mistake, force or
violence (p. 35; underscoring supplied).

Complainant himself supplied evidence
showing that respondent Atty. Antonio Quirino is
innocent of the charge that he had been unfaithful to his trust.  Complainant submitted the order of Judge
Ricardo D. Galano dated October 3, 1981 holding,
among others, that the Compromise
Agreement entered into by respondent Atty. Antonio Quirino
was duly authorized by a Special Power of Attorney, and it was fair and just
(p. 29, Investigation).  Thus:

In a situation like this, what could Atty. Antonio Quirino do?  What he
actually did was to enter into a Compromise Agreement under the best terms and
conditions possible for his
client.  He was fully authorized to do
this under the Special Power of Attorney which the defendant (complainant’s
mother) executed in his favor.

A careful scruity (sic) of the Compromise
Agreement reveals that the terms and conditions are not unreasonable or
unconscionable.  The Compromise Agreement
improves the tight situation of the defendant,
for whereas before she was under immediate obligation to sell the property in
question, inasmuch as the mortgage with the Cavite
Development Bank has already been discharged and the owner’s duplicate of the
title already released.  Under the
Compromise Agreement all that the defendant was required to do was to return all the amount which she received from the plaintiff, plus
interest.  Relative to the payment of
interest, the defendant herself had so agreed to pay in her letter to plaintiff
dated January 25, 1980.  Under the Compromise
Agreement, the defendant is not even compelled to pay a down payment of the
obligation upon the signing of the agreement. 
She is given a period of six (6) months within which to pay the
obligation.  She is not compelled to sell
the property for as long as she can pay the obligation within the said period.

The foregoing terms and conditions are fair and just.  They are consistent with the antecedent
facts.  The Court can find no basis for
any charge that defendant’s counsel of record has not been faithful to his trust.  (p. 29,
Investigation)

On July 18, 1985
the Solicitor General submitted to the Court the Report and Recommendation
together with the whole record of the case. 
On August 7, 1985,
this Court gave the parties herein twenty (20) days from notice to file their
memoranda after which the case would be deemed submitted for decision.  The complainant in a letter dated August 27, 1985 in effect adopted the
documents submitted on April 9, 1984
as has memorandum.  The respondent did
not submit any memorandum.

This Court after careful consideration of the investigation
conducted by the Solicitor General and taking into account the evidence on
record and recommendation thereon, find that there is in need no basis for the
charge that respondent Antonio Quirino was unfaithful
to his trust.

WHEREFORE, the Court
Resolved to DISMISS the complaint for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Padilla, and Bidin, JJ., concur.