ALEJANDRO BALATBAT, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE JESUS DE VEGA, RESPONDENT.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF COURT ADMINISTRATOR

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an administrative complaint filed by complainant
Alejandro Balatbat against respondent Judge Jesus de Vega of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, Branch I, Malolos, Bulacan, for “knowingly rendering
an unjust decision and for ignorance of the law”.

This complaint is an aftermath of respondent’s decision of July
28, 1980^[1]
in Civil Case No. 5494-M against the herein complainant, plaintiff in the said
case.

Briefly stated, Civil Case No. 5494-M is for collection of a sum
of money based on a written contract entitled “Deed of Transfer of
Leasehold Rights”, Exhibit “A” (submitted in this complaint as
Annex “A”, Record, pp. 14-17), filed by the herein complainant
against Atty. Gonzalo David.  The case
was tried in Branch II, but before rendition of judgment, Branch II became vacant and the same was re-raffled to
Branch I presided by the herein respondent who decided the same in favor of the
defendant.

On the pemise that the transaction involved in Civil Case No.
5494-M is governed by a written contract, “Deed of Transfer of Leasehold
Right”, Exhibit “A”, the genuineness, due execution and validity
of which was not attacked by the defendant in his filed answer, complainant
claims that respon­dent knowingly violated –

(1)  Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court when
he declared that there was fraud in securing Atty. David’s consent in the
execution of Exhibit “A”;

(2)  Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court when
he declared the nullity of Exhibit “A” without Atty. David pleading
the nullity or sought the reformation of the same;

(3)  Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court when
he considered parol evidence against the provision of a written contract;

(4)  Article 1159 of the Civil Code when he ordered
the withholding of payment on a ground not provided for in Exhibit
“A”; and

(5)  Article 1398 of the Civil Code when he, after
declaring Exhibit “A” null and void, did not order the restoration to
each other the things which have been the subject matter of Exhibit
“A”.

Further, complainant claims that
respondent did not have the authority to apply Articles 1547 and 1654 of the
Civil Code since the transaction involved in Civil Case No. 5494-M is neither a
sale nor a lease.  It is a “Deed of
Transfer of Leasehold Rights”; that respon­dent cannot apply fairness,
equity and justice when the situation is covered by contract and by law; and
that respondent, in ordering complainant to pay Atty. David attorney’s fees in
the sum of P15,000.00 without stating the reason for doing so, violated Section
9, Article X of the Constitution.

Respondent’s comment to the instant complaint, appearing in a 2nd
Indorsement dated December 12, 1980, may be briefly stated as follows:  That complainant, having been frustrated to
influence him through the use of influential persons to intervene for his
behalf, he now comes with this complaint; that complainant apparently deduced
and based his complaint on the alleged erroneous appreciation of the evidence
and misapplication of the law committed by him in render­ing the questioned
decision, and as such, complainant’s remedy is clearly to take an appeal and
not to institute the instant administrative
complaint.  Accordingly, it would appear
that the instant complaint was filed out of spite and as a means to harass him;
that up to this time, he is not conscious of any error committed by him in
rendering the said decision, and, he, therefore, categorically and vehemently
denies the instant charge against him; that even assuming that he did not
commit errors in the said decision, it is well settled that a judicial officer,
when required to exercise his judgment or discretion, is not liable for any
error he commits, provided he acts in good faith; and that the disputed
decision itself offers the best proof of showing the truth or falsity of the
instant charge against him.

Complainant, in his “Reply to Comment” dated February
16, 1981, asserts that the complaint, among
others, is for gross ignorance of the law, and gross ignorance of the law
is another term for incompetence; and that the grounds for the charge were
specifically explained, but respondent in his comment did not answer the
charge.  He merely claims that up to this
time, he is not conscious of any error committed by him in rendering the
questioned decision; that in a complaint for gross ignorance of the law or
incompetence, good faith can never be a defense.  For a judge, even if he acts in good faith,
who is not equipped with the fundamentals of the law has no place in the judiciary.  He should
be dismissed from the service. 
Respondent, in Civil Case No. 5494-M, either acted in an incompetent
manner or in spite of his knowledge of the law, chose to violate the same to
favor Atty. David.  Accordingly, either
way, he should be dis­charged from the service.

The weakness of the instant complaint is apparent.

1.  Complainant’s remedy, as
aptly pointed out by respondent, is to take an appeal from the questioned
decision and not to institute an administrative complaint.  This Court, in the case of Barrosa vs. Arche,^[2]
citing the case of Dizon vs. de
Borja,^[3]
ruled that if a litigant disagrees with a judge’s rulings in the case, his
remedy lies not in filing before this Court an administrative complaint but to
point out the errors on appeal from the decision in the same forum, for to hold
a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he
renders, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and
would make his position untenable.

2.  Contrary to complainant’s
claim, a mere reading of defendant’s “Answer With Counterclaim”^[4]
shows that respondent did have a basis in reaching his conclusion.  Paragraph 22 of the same reads:

“22.  That on account of the misrepre­sentation made
by plaintiff against defendant in the execution of the deed of transfer of
leasehold rights (Annex “A”), x x x.”

3.  The assailed decision is
well presented.  Analyzed and discussed
are the respective theories of the parties. 
It contains the established facts and the provisions of law relied upon
by respondent in reaching his conclusions, and his conclusions are not without
logic or reason.  In order that a judge
may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown
beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not
supported by the evidence, and the same was made with conscious and deliberate
intent to do an injustice.^[5]
To hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or
decision he renders, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of
harassment and would make his position unbearable.^[6]
And where the facts of record are sufficient to provide a basis for determining
whether or not the respondent is
to be held administratively liable, a formal investigation is no longer neces­sary.^[7]

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully
recommended that the instant case filed against Judge Jesus R. de Vega of the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch II at Malolos be dismissed for lack
of merit.

May 27, 1981.

Relova, J., concur.

^[1]
Record, Annex “F”, pp. 97-105.

^[2]
Adm. Case No. 216-CFI, September 30, 1975, 67 SCRA 161.

^[3]
Adm. Case No. 163-J, January 28, 1971, 37 SCRA 46.

^[4]
Record, Annex “B”, page 21, par. 22.

^[5]
In re:  Climaco, Administrative Case No. 134-J,
January 21, 1974, 55 SCRA 107; and Pabalan vs. Guevarra, Administrative
Matter No. 333-CJ, November 24, 1976, 74 SCRA 53.

^[6]
Sec. of Justice v. Marcos, Administrative Case No. 207-J, April 25,
1977, 76 SCRA 301; and Villa v. Llamas, Administrative Matter No.
326-CJ, July 31, 1978, 84 SCRA 277.

^[7]
Cresencio Garcia v. Alberto Asilo, Adm. Matter No. P-1769, Feb. 28,
1979, First Division, Fernandez, J.