RICARDO ESCARDA, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE JACINTO MANALO OF CORON, PALAWAN, RESPONDENT.

Escarda versus Manalo

The Case

This is an administrative complaint for improper conduct filed by Ricardo Escarda against Municipal Judge Jacinto Manalo of Coron, Palawan. The charge arose because the judge refused to refer a complaint for slight physical injuries to the Lupon Tagapayapa, the barangay conciliation body created under the Katarungan Pambarangay Decree. The case matters because the Supreme Court uses it to fix the precise moment when the barangay settlement system becomes mandatory for the courts — a question every judge, and every bar candidate, must be able to answer.

Procedural History

The matter reached the Supreme Court as an original administrative complaint against a municipal judge, not as an appeal from any lower court. There were no proceedings in the trial court or the Court of Appeals to review. The complaint was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator, and Court Administrator Lorenzo Relova submitted a memorandum recommending that the respondent need not have referred the case to the barangay captain or the Lupon. The Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, resolved the complaint in a resolution issued in November 1980.

Facts

A complaint for slight physical injuries, identified in the record as Criminal Case Number 2041, was filed with the Municipal Judge of Coron, Palawan. The complainant, Ricardo Escarda, asked that the case be referred to the Lupon Tagapayapa for barangay conciliation. Judge Manalo declined to make the referral, and instead took cognizance of the case himself.

Escarda then filed an administrative complaint charging the judge with improper conduct for disregarding the Katarungan Pambarangay Decree. The theory was that the Decree required minor disputes to pass through barangay settlement before the courts could act.

The key fact, established in the Court Administrator's memorandum, was that Criminal Case Number 2041 was filed before any certification that the barangays in the judge's jurisdiction had organized their Lupons. The judge therefore acted at a time when the conciliation machinery had not yet been certified as in place.

Issues

• Whether or not a municipal judge may be held administratively liable for refusing to refer a complaint for slight physical injuries to the Lupon Tagapayapa.
• Whether or not the Katarungan Pambarangay Decree required referral to the Lupon at the time the complaint was filed with the judge.

Applicable Provisions

Circular Number 22 of the Supreme Court, as quoted in the decision, provides:

Effective upon your receipt of the certification by the Minister of Local Government and Community Development that all the barangays within your respective jurisdictions have organized their Lupons provided for in Presidential Decree No. 158, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, in implementation of the barangay system of settlement of disputes, you are hereby directed to desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions or proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons.

This circular fixes the trigger date: the duty to desist from receiving covered cases begins only upon receipt of the certification that the Lupons have been organized.

Letter of Implementation Number 105 of President Marcos, as quoted in the decision, provides:

For this purpose, all City and Municipal Development Officers of the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development are hereby ordered to certify the fact of organization of the Lupong Tagapayapa in their respective barangays within five (5) days from the publication of this order, and to send such certification to the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court, as well as to the fiscals and judges concerned.

This provision identifies the certification as the operative notice to judges, confirming that the barangay system takes effect for the courts only when that certification is sent and received.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the complaint for improper judicial conduct was without merit. A judge cannot be faulted for performing what the law then required of him.

On the second issue, the Court held that prior to the certification of the organization of the Lupon Tagapayapa, a municipal judge must comply with the Rules of Court applicable to any complaint or judicial proceeding properly cognizable by him. The Court stated the rule directly:

Prior to such certification of the organization of the Lupon Tagapayapa then, a municipal judge must comply with the Rules of Court applicable to any complaint or judicial proceeding properly cognizable by him.

Since there was no question that the physical injuries case fell within the jurisdiction of the respondent judge, he acted in accordance with law. The Court adopted the reasoning of the Court Administrator: the criminal case was filed before any such certification, so the respondent need not refer the case to the barangay captain or the Lupon.

Doctrine

The barangay conciliation requirement under the Katarungan Pambarangay Decree does not bind the courts until the certification of organization of the Lupons has been issued and received. Before that certification, a municipal judge must receive and act on cases properly cognizable by him under the Rules of Court. A judge who does so commits no improper conduct and cannot be administratively sanctioned. The rule is tied to Circular Number 22, which makes the duty to desist effective only upon receipt of the certification, and to Letter of Implementation Number 105, which directs that the certification be sent to the judges concerned.

Disposition

The administrative complaint was dismissed for lack of merit, and a copy of the resolution was ordered spread on the record of Judge Jacinto Manalo.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: before the certification of organization of the Lupons, the judge must act under the Rules of Court, and his refusal to refer is lawful. Examiners use this case to test the effectivity date of the Katarungan Pambarangay system and the administrative liability of judges who follow the law as it then stood.