EDNA BAGUYO, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. OSCAR LEVISTE, DISTRICT JUDGE, CFI, BRANCH II, ROXAS CITY.

In a sworn complaint dated July 5, 1979,^[1] Edna
Baguyo, with the consent of her mother Rosario C. Baguyo, charged District
Judge Oscar Leviste of the CFI of Capiz, Branch II, Roxas City, with
“grave abuse of authority” and “violation of Section 5 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948”, allegedly commit­ted as follows:

(1)     That Criminal Case No. 768, entitled
“People of the Philippines vs. Fernando Azarraga” for rape, with the
complainant herein as victim, was filed on August 15, 1977 before the CFI of
Capiz, Branch II, Roxas City;

(2)     That after the prosecution rested its case,
the accused Fernando Azarraga waived his right to testify, thus his counsel was
constrained to submit the case for decision and the court ordered the case
submitted for decision on September 26, 1978;

(3)     That respondent rendered a decision on
March 20, 1979,^[2]
convicting the accused and sentencing him to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY;

(4)     That on March 30, 1979, before said
decision became final, respondent Judge issued another Order (Amendment to
Decision of March 20, 1979)^[3]
finding the accused Fernando Azarraga not guilty of the charge of rape for
failure of the prosecution to prove the offense beyond reasonable doubt,
without any Motion for Recon­sideration being filed by the accused;

(5)     That due to the haste in the preparation of
the amendment of the decision, respondent incorrectly indicated Criminal Case
No. 5567 instead of “768” and furnished a copy thereof to the Pro­vincial
Fiscal instead of the City Fiscal of Roxas City;

(6)     That the criminal case was submitted for
decision on September 26, 1978, and yet it was only decided on March 20, 1979,
or 174 days after it was submitted for decision, in violation of Section 5 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. 296).

On September 6, 1979,^[4]
respondent Judge, as required by this Court, submitted his comment with the
following explanation:

That the records of Criminal Case No. 768, together with all
exhibits, minutes, and transcripts, were submitted by interpreter Sabiniano
Mendoza, who prepared the minutes, to respondent Judge only on January 19,
1979, so he could not prepare the decision within the 90 days counted from the
order declaring the case submitted for decision on September 26, 1978; that
even the stenographer assigned to type respondent’s Certification
(Certification of Service) failed to include said case for failure of the
Deputy Clerk of Court to inform her of said case; that the respondent Judge
amended his decision of March 20, 1979, before it became final and executory,
and complainant is presumed to know that it is within the power of the court to
amend its decision to conform to the evidence before it becomes final and
executory, even without notice to the parties; that whatever clerical mistakes
might have been committed in placing the wrong case number on the
“Amendment to the Decision” cannot be considered as the fault of the
respondent Judge, but attributable to the clerk concerned; that the amendment
to the decision made by respondent Judge is in accordance with law and the
evidence, otherwise both the fiscal and the private prosecutor would have
brought it up to the Supreme Court on certiorari, which neither did.

After a careful study of the record of this case, we find that
the decision rendered in Criminal Case No. 768, declaring the accused therein
guilty of the crime of rape was based on respondent Judge’s evaluation of the
evidence therein presented, supported by the well-established principle and
recognized jurisprudence that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the
positive testimony of the prosecution. 
However, on March 30, 1979, before the said decision became final and
executory, respondent Judge issued an amendment to the findings and dispositive
part of the decision in question for the following reasons, namely, (1) the
Court failed to consider in its judgment of conviction that the accused is,
notwithstanding the waiver of his right to testify, entitled to the presumption
of innocence and to the benefit of the doubt; (2) the Court should have relied on
the strength of the evidence for the prosecution rather than on the silence of
the accused; (3) the Court entertained reasonable doubt that the accused is
guilty of rape, because the use of force or lack of consent was not proven; (4)
the Court entertained that doubt because the prosecution evidence did not
establish any indication of injury on the vagina and the body of the supposed
victim, and the evidence of the prosecution proved the fact that it was the
mother of the supposed victim who wanted to prosecute the case, and not the
alleged victim who was only forced by the mother to complain to the police; (5)
the Court found that after the alleged rape, the victim put on her blouse which
had no indication of damage, thus negating her theory that force and violence
was utilized in taking off the blouse and in raping her; and (6) the offense
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Section 7, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court provides:

“Section 7. 
Modification of judgment.  – A
judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside by the court rendering it
before the judgment has become final or appeal has been perfected.  A judg­ment in a criminal case becomes final
after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence
has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has
expressly waived in writing his right to appeal.”

As it is within the prerogative of a judge to correct his own
decision before it becomes final and executory, so as to make it conform to the
evidence presented and the applicable laws, herein respondent did not commit
any grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of his prerogative in this
case.  He sufficiently explained the
reasons why he amended motu proprio his own decision upon his
realization that the available evidence and the pertinent jurisprudence on the
matter showed the error in his judgment of conviction.  The reasons given by respondent that
compelled him to amend his decision are convincingly correct.  Backed up by the good faith of respondent
judge which has not been put in issue, the presumption of regularity in the
perform­ance of his official duties must be conceded to him.  The Amendment to the Decision of March 30,
1979, in itself, contains an order that the Provincial Fiscal, counsel, complainant
and the accused should be notified of the amendment, and if the parties did not
receive the notification as ordered, the respondent Judge can no longer be
faulted with such omission.

Finally, the explanation of the respondent Judge regarding the
short delay in the disposition of the criminal case maybe considered
satisfactory under the circumstances obtain­ing in this case.  Anyway, after the judgment of convic­tion,
and previous to it, complainant never complained of the delay in the disposition
of the case.  It was only after
respondent Judge altered the judgment of conviction that complainant, perhaps
feeling aggrieved, raised the question of delay in its disposition.

Be that as it may, We find that there is no need for a formal
investigation in this case as the issues raised in the complaint were
satisfactorily explained by respondent in his comment and this complaint may
already be resolved by mere recourse to the record.

The respondent Judge delayed the decision in said criminal case
for about 174 days — almost six (6) months -­- from the date the said case was
submitted for decision on September 26, 1978, and almost three months from the
expiration of the first ninety (90) days, for which he deserves admonition.

WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT DISTRICT JUDGE OSCAR LEVISTE IS
HEREBY ADMONISHED WITH THE WARNING THAT A REPETITION OF SUCH IRREGULARITY WILL
BE DEALT WITH MORE SEVERELY.  LET A COPY
OF THIS RESOLUTION BE ENTERED IN HIS RECORD.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Fernandez, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

^[1]
pp. 1-5, Rollo.

^[2]
pp. 6-21, Rollo.

^[3]
pp. 22-23, Rollo.

^[4]
pp. 27-29, Rollo.