RE: EMPLOYEES INCURRING HABITUAL TARDINESS IN THE 1ST SEMESTER OF 2007: MS. MARIVIC C. AZURIN, ATTY. WINSTON R. BANIEL, MS. MARIA VICTORIA S. BUZON, MR. CRISANTO C. CARILLO, JR.…

Re: Employees Incurring Habitual Tardiness in the First Semester of 2007

The Case

This is an administrative matter taken up by the Supreme Court over its own personnel. Sixteen employees of the Judiciary were reported for habitual tardiness during the first semester of 2007, and the Court, sitting en banc, had to decide whether they should be disciplined and, if so, with what penalty. The case matters for two reasons. First, it fixes the working definition of habitual tardiness under the Civil Service rules. Second, it lays down the graduated penalties for the first, second, and third offenses, and shows how the Court weighs humanitarian considerations against the strict standard of conduct demanded of everyone in the administration of justice.

Procedural History

The matter began within the Supreme Court itself, not in a trial court. The Leave Division referred to the Complaints and Investigation Division of the Office of Administrative Services the list of employees who had been tardy ten times or more in a month during the first semester of 2007. The Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, Atty. Candelaria, required each employee to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken. After receiving the explanations, she submitted a Memorandum dated 16 November 2007 recommending penalties. The Court then required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the matter for resolution on the pleadings. Only five employees filed their manifestations; the rest were deemed to have waived. The administrative matter was then deemed submitted for decision, and the Court resolved it en banc.

Facts

During the first semester of 2007, that is from January to June, sixteen employees of the Supreme Court incurred tardiness ten times or more in a month. They fell into two groups. The first group had prior penalties for habitual tardiness: Ms. Olipas, Ms. Azurin, Atty. Baniel, Mr. Chua, and Mr. Sanchez. The second group was charged for the first time: Ms. Buzon, Mr. Carrillo, Mr. De Guzman, Mr. Duero, Mr. Gombio, Mr. Iglesias, Atty. Lacandula-Rodriguez, Mr. Napolitano, Ms. Palafox, Ms. Pendon, and Mr. Yacat.

Each was asked to explain. The explanations were uniformly human: single parenthood, illness, hypertension, menopause, a sick spouse, children to care for, a wife leaving for abroad, road repairs and traffic, overtime work, and unfamiliarity with government attendance rules. Ms. Azurin did not submit any explanation at all despite notice and a tracer, and so was deemed to have waived her right to comment.

Atty. Candelaria recommended a fifteen-day suspension for Ms. Olipas as a third offender, severe reprimand for the four second offenders, and a stern warning for the eleven first offenders. The Court agreed with her findings but modified the penalties.

Issues

• Whether or not the employees concerned are guilty of habitual tardiness as defined under Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular Number 4, Series of 1991.
• Whether or not the justifications offered, such as domestic problems, health conditions, and traffic, excuse them from administrative liability.
• Whether or not the penalties recommended by the Chief Administrative Officer are the correct penalties under the Civil Service rules.

Applicable Provisions

Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular Number 4, Series of 1991 defines habitual tardiness:

A public employee shall be considered habitually tardy if he incurs tardiness, regardless of the number of minutes, ten (10) times a month for at least two (2) months in a semester or at least two (2) consecutive months during the year.

This definition is the test of guilt, and every employee in this case met it.

Section 52, paragraph C, subparagraph 4, Rule VI of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular Number 19, Series of 1999 provides the penalties:

First Offense - Reprimand. Second Offense - Suspension for 1-30 days. Third Offense - Dismissal from the service.

This graduated scale governs the penalty for each employee according to the number of prior offenses.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that there was no question the employees were habitually tardy as defined in the Circular, for which they must be penalized for an administrative offense that seriously compromises efficiency and hampers public service. The Court stressed that officials and employees of the Judiciary must be role models in the faithful observance of the constitutional canon that public office is a public trust, and that punctuality is a virtue while absenteeism and tardiness are impermissible.

On the second issue, the Court held that none of the justifications merited consideration. Moral obligations, performance of household chores, traffic problems, health conditions, and domestic and financial concerns are not sufficient reasons to excuse habitual tardiness or to exempt the guilty employee from the penalty, although these may be considered to mitigate liability.

On the third issue, the Court applied the graduated scale. Ms. Olipas, a third offender who should have been dismissed, was instead suspended for fifteen days without pay for humanitarian reasons and her long years of service, with a final warning. The second offenders were suspended for five days without pay. For the first offenders, the Court refused to approve the recommendation of a mere warning, because the proper penalty for a first offense is reprimand.

Doctrine

Habitual tardiness is committed when an employee incurs tardiness, regardless of the number of minutes, ten times a month for at least two months in a semester or at least two consecutive months during the year. The penalties are graduated: reprimand for the first offense, suspension of one to thirty days for the second, and dismissal for the third. Domestic problems, health conditions, and traffic do not excuse the offense, though they may mitigate the penalty. Every employee of the Judiciary must strictly observe official time, because public office is a public trust.

Disposition

The Court found the employees administratively liable for habitual tardiness: Ms. Olipas was suspended for fifteen days without pay, the second offenders for five days without pay, and the eleven first offenders were reprimanded, all with warnings that a repetition would be dealt with more severely.

Remember This

Memorize the definition: ten times a month for at least two months in a semester, or two consecutive months in a year, regardless of minutes. Examiners use this case to test the graduated penalties for habitual tardiness and the rule that personal and domestic hardships mitigate but never excuse the offense.