RE: EMPLOYEES INCURRING HABITUAL TARDINESS IN THE FIRST SEMESTER OF 2005

Re: Employees Incurring Habitual Tardiness in the First Semester of 2005

The Case

This is an administrative matter that arose within the Supreme Court itself. The Office of Administrative Services, through its chief, reported eleven employees of the Court who had incurred habitual tardiness during the first semester of 2005, and each was required to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be taken. The case matters because it is the Court's own statement of how strictly it enforces punctuality among court personnel, and because it shows how the Court calibrates penalties, extending compassion to first offenders while refusing to warn forever an employee who has already been warned repeatedly.

Procedural History

There was no trial court and no Court of Appeals, for this is an original administrative proceeding within the Supreme Court. The Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief of the Office of Administrative Services submitted a memorandum recommending penalties against the eleven employees. Each employee was individually sent a memorandum citing his or her tardiness and requiring a written explanation, and each submitted a comment. After evaluating the comments, the Office of Administrative Services rendered its findings and recommendations, treating one employee's explanation as meritorious and recommending dismissal of the charge against him. The matter was then resolved by the Supreme Court en banc, which agreed with the findings but modified the recommended penalties.

Facts

Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular Number 23, series of 1998, defines habitual tardiness: an employee is habitually tardy if he incurs tardiness, regardless of the number of minutes, ten times a month for at least two months in a semester, or at least two consecutive months during the year. Applying that standard, the Office of Administrative Services found that eleven employees had crossed the threshold in the first semester of 2005.

Three of them were repeat offenders. Nora Ang incurred tardiness ten times in February and eleven times in April, and this was her fifth incursion; she had been reprimanded in 2000, suspended for ten days in 2001, suspended for three months with a final warning in 2002, and suspended for six months with a final warning in 2001. She pleaded her kidney and gall bladder stones, the lingering effects of a vehicular accident, and weak bones, and asked to be allowed to retire early. Rolandino Due incurred tardiness twelve times in April and ten times in June, having been reprimanded in 2000, and explained that he was helping his sister move house. Rudin Vengua incurred tardiness ten times in February and twelve times in June, having been sternly warned in 2001, and blamed heavy traffic.

The rest were first offenders. Their explanations ranged from insomnia due to hyperthyroidism and anemia, to caring for an elderly aunt, to attending a wife who suffered profuse bleeding and underwent an operation, to heavy traffic and the absence of a househelper, to forgotten half-day leave applications, to hypertension and headaches. One employee, Atty. Ephyro Luis Amatong, explained that on the dates in question he was on official business conducting research at the University of the Philippines Law Library, a fact attested to by his supervising Justice, and he resigned from the Court shortly after. The Office of Administrative Services found his explanation meritorious, recommended a reprimand for one employee whose tardiness fell in the same period as an earlier absenteeism penalty, and recommended suspension for Ang and severe reprimands for the second offenders.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent employees are administratively liable for habitual tardiness.
• Whether or not the explanations offered, such as illness, family obligations, household responsibilities, and traffic, excuse habitual tardiness.
• Whether or not the penalties recommended by the Office of Administrative Services should be adopted, particularly the recommended six-month suspension of Nora Ang instead of dismissal.

Applicable Provisions

Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular Number 23, series of 1998, defines the offense:

Any employee shall be habitually tardy if he incurs tardiness, regardless of the number of minutes, ten (10) times a month for at least two (2) months in a semester or at least two (2) consecutive months during the year.

This is the definition that fixes who among the eleven employees is chargeable with the offense.

Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular Number 19, series of 1999, classifies the offense and its penalties:

First offense – Reprimand
Second offense – Suspension for 1 to 30 days
Third offense – Dismissal

This is the scale the Court applies, subject to the mitigating factors it has recognized in administrative cases.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that there is no question the respondents violated the rule on tardiness. Only Atty. Amatong's explanation was accepted, because he was on official business on the dates in question, and the charge against him was dismissed for lack of merit.

On the second issue, the Court held that the explanations offered were not satisfactory. It ruled that moral obligations, performance of household chores, traffic problems, health conditions, and domestic and financial concerns are not sufficient reasons to excuse habitual tardiness. The Court grounded this on the constitutional principle that a public office is a public trust, and on the duty of court officials and employees to strictly observe official time so as to inspire public respect for the justice system.

On the third issue, the Court agreed with the findings but not with all the recommended penalties. It noted that under the Civil Service rules habitual tardiness is a light offense penalized by reprimand on the first offense, suspension of one to thirty days on the second, and dismissal on the third, but that in several administrative cases it had refrained from imposing the actual penalties in the presence of mitigating factors such as length of service, acknowledgment of infractions, remorse, and family circumstances. Applying that scale, the Court severely reprimanded the second offenders, severely reprimanded one employee in view of his previous incursion of habitual absenteeism, and reprimanded the first offenders.

As to Ang, the Court refused to extend another warning. It reasoned that public interest in an efficient and honest judiciary dictates that notice of future harsher penalties should not be followed by another forewarning of the same kind, ad infinitum, but by discipline through appropriate penalties. Having been given final warnings on her third and fourth incursions, her fifth offense warranted dismissal.

Doctrine

Habitual tardiness is committed when an employee incurs tardiness, regardless of the number of minutes, ten times a month for at least two months in a semester or at least two consecutive months during the year. Moral obligations, household chores, traffic, health conditions, and domestic and financial concerns do not excuse habitual tardiness, because a public office is a public trust and court personnel must strictly observe official time. Under the Civil Service scale, habitual tardiness is a light offense penalized by reprimand on the first offense, suspension of one to thirty days on the second, and dismissal on the third, but the Court may temper the penalty where mitigating factors such as length of service, acknowledgment of the infraction, remorse, and family circumstances appear. A final warning is not a penalty to be repeated indefinitely; when an employee offends again after final warnings, dismissal follows.

Disposition

The Court dismissed Nora Ang from the service for her fifth offense, with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government, severely reprimanded the second offenders and one employee with a prior absenteeism record, reprimanded the first offenders, warned all of them against repetition, and dismissed the charge against Atty. Amatong for lack of merit.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: a final warning cannot be followed by another final warning ad infinitum, but by the penalty of dismissal. Examiners use this case to test the definition of habitual tardiness, the rule that personal and health excuses do not justify it, and the Court's calibrated penalties from reprimand to dismissal.