SANTIAGO JIMENEZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. DIMALANES BUISSAN, DISTRICT JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, ZAM­BOANGA DEL NORTE, BRANCH III, DIPOLOG CITY, RESPONDENT.

Jimenez versus Buissan

The Case

This is an administrative case. Santiago Jimenez filed a sworn complaint against Judge Dimalanes Buissan, the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte, Branch III, sitting in Dipolog City. The complaint charges the judge with partiality, gross ignorance of the law, and knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order. The grievance is concrete: after an appeal had already been perfected, the judge still entertained an ex parte motion filed by a person who was a complete stranger to the case, allowed that stranger to intervene, and issued orders touching the very property under litigation. The case matters because it fixes two boundaries every judge and every litigator must respect — the trial court's loss of jurisdiction upon a perfected appeal, and the closed door against bringing a new party into a case for the first time on appeal.

Procedural History

The story begins in the City Court of Dipolog City, Branch II, in an ejectment case brought by Pacifico Cimafranca against Lucia Torregiani. Judgment went for Cimafranca, and the defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte, Branch III, presided over by the respondent judge. That court reversed and dismissed the complaint, holding that the plaintiff had failed to allege and prove prior physical possession. The plaintiff elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court and remanded the case for proper disposition on the merits, viewing it as one for unlawful detainer rather than forcible entry. On remand, the respondent judge rendered another decision dismissing the complaint. The plaintiff appealed once more to the Court of Appeals. It was on the very day that this second appeal was perfected that the respondent judge acted on the stranger's ex parte motion. After the judge denied the plaintiff's motion to set aside those orders, Santiago Jimenez came directly to the Supreme Court by this sworn administrative complaint.

Facts

Santiago Jimenez is the predecessor in interest of Pacifico Cimafranca, the plaintiff in the ejectment case against Lucia Torregiani over a house and lot. The city court ruled for Cimafranca, ordering Torregiani to vacate the property, to pay a monthly rental of 200 pesos from August 1972 until she fully vacated, to pay 500 pesos in attorney's fees, and to pay the costs.

On appeal, the respondent judge reversed and dismissed the complaint for failure to allege and prove prior physical possession. The Court of Appeals reversed him and remanded the case, treating it as one for unlawful detainer. On remand, the respondent judge again dismissed the complaint, and Cimafranca appealed to the Court of Appeals on March 4, 1977.

On that same day, with the appeal already perfected, the respondent judge granted an ex parte motion filed by one Oreste Torregiani, a stranger to both the city court case and the Court of First Instance case, allowing him to employ a lawyer to prosecute his motion and to be allowed to collect rentals on the property under litigation. Despite opposition, the judge, by order dated March 17, 1977, allowed Oreste Torregiani to employ counsel, and on May 11, 1977, authorized him to collect rentals from the occupants of the building. The plaintiff's motion to set aside these orders was denied, and so this complaint was filed.

Issues

• Whether or not a court may still issue orders related to a case after an appeal therein has already been perfected.
• Whether or not a person who is not a party to the litigation, whether in the lower court or in the appellate court, may be allowed to intervene in the case and seek affirmative relief.

Applicable Provisions

Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which the Court cites as the measure of the trial court's residual authority after a perfected appeal, provides:

When an appeal has been perfected, the trial court loses its jurisdiction over the case, except to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, to approve compromises offered by the parties prior to the transmittal of the record on appeal to the appellate court, and to permit the prosecution of pauper's appeals.

This provision bears directly on the case because the respondent judge's orders allowing a stranger to intervene and to collect rentals were issued after the appeal was perfected and were not orders for the protection or preservation of the parties' rights.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that upon the perfection of the appeal, the trial court presided over by the respondent was divested of jurisdiction over the matters litigated by the appeal, retaining only the narrow authority to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve matters litigated in the appeal. The order allowing a stranger, Oreste Torregiani, to be impleaded as a party through an ex parte motion, and the later order authorizing him to collect rentals from the occupants of the property under litigation, were not orders for the protection or preservation of the rights of the parties. The respondent judge therefore erred when he acted on the ex parte motion of a stranger at a time when he no longer had jurisdiction of the case by reason of the perfected appeal.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the judge's explanation that he allowed Oreste Torregiani to litigate because he was, after all, the husband of the defendant. In an appeal from an inferior court to the Court of First Instance, that court cannot, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, bring in a new party for the first time on appeal. The Court noted that the Court of First Instance case was the same city court case elevated on appeal, and that Oreste Torregiani was not a party in the original case in the inferior court.

Doctrine

Two rules must be retained. First, upon the perfection of an appeal, the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case, except to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, to approve compromises offered by the parties prior to the transmittal of the record on appeal, and to permit the prosecution of pauper's appeals. Orders that do not fall within these exceptions are void for want of jurisdiction. Second, a court exercising appellate jurisdiction over a case coming from an inferior court cannot bring in a new party for the first time on appeal; a stranger to the original case cannot be allowed to intervene and seek affirmative relief, and the fact that the stranger is related to a party does not cure the defect.

Disposition

The Court admonished the respondent judge to be more careful and circumspect in his actuations as a judge.

Remember This

Memorize this line: upon a perfected appeal, the trial court loses jurisdiction except for orders protecting and preserving the parties' rights that do not involve matters litigated by the appeal. Examiners use this case to test the jurisdictional cutoff after a perfected appeal and the prohibition against impleading a new party for the first time on appeal.