ARTEMIO ESPAYOS, COMPLAINANT, VS. ADELARDO G. LEE, AS MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF MAGALLANES, SORSOGON, RESPONDENT.

The facts and circumstances concerning the charges of misbehavior
and partiality against respondent municipal judge* in
connection with his disposition of Criminal Case No. 2044, People vs. Prodencio Pareja, a case of less
serious physical injuries, are set forth in detail in the following report of
the investigator, Judge Rustico de los Reyes of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon:

“In a verified letter-complaint, dated March 7, 1977,
complainant Artemio Espayos
charged Honorable Adelardo Lee, then municipal judge
of Magallanes, Sorsogon for
(1) conduct unbecoming a judge and (2) partiality in the administration of
justice, alleging that on January 17, 1977 one Prodencio
Pareja threw a piece of stone at the said complainant
hitting him at the right side of his nose and as a consequence thereof the
station commander of the Magallanes police department
filed with the Municipal Court of Magallanes, a
criminal complaint for less serious physical injuries, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 2044; that the complainant brought the complaint to the respondent
judge’s house, where he has an office as a municipal judge, for his signature;
that he informed the judge that his injury is more serious than it appears and
demonstrating to him by smoking and blowing out the smoke through his nose with
the result that smoke came only through his right nose indicating that his left
nose was closed.

“Complainant further alleged that he hired Atty. Edgar Mella who told him that he will amend the complaint to
serious physical injuries; that Prodencio Pareja, the accused offered him P200.00 to settle the case
amicably but he refused; then on January 27, 1977, without the herein
complainant’s knowing it, the accused Prodencio Pareja was arraigned, appearing in court by himself,
without a lawyer and, as if somebody had instructed him beforehand what to do,
he pleaded guilty to the complaint for slight physical injuries; that the
station commander who was present in court did not object to Pareja’s pleading guilty, then Judge Lee immediately
sentenced him to 15 days imprisonment.

“Allegedly thereafter, complainant Espayos‘
lawyer filed a petition to allow Espayos to prove
damages but the court denied it in an order issued on February 7, 1977; that
before the order of denial was issued, Judge Lee called Espayos
while he was walking on the street and told him in the Bicol
dialect, ‘Since you are here also, you cannot get anything from those persons
because they are insolvent.  So I will
give you P80.00′; that complainant Espayos refused,
and then Judge Lee said to him, also in Bicol:  ‘Then one hundred’, which complainant
likewise refused.

“The letter-complaint also alleged that the respondent judge
made his house as the office of the municipal judge and goes to the municipal
building only when he tries cases and when he performs a marriage ceremony, so
that the public does not know what happens in his house while in the performance
of his judicial functions.

“Required by the Acting Assistant Judicial Consultant of the
Supreme Court to comment on the complaint of Artemio Espayos, Judge Adelardo Lee filed
a letter answer dated May 5, 1977, alleging and explaining the background of
Criminal Case No. 2044 in that minutes before the arraignment on January 27,
1977 of the accused Prodencio Pareja
in Criminal Case No. 2044, said accused intimated to the respondent judge that
he could not financially afford the expenses of a litigation and that he would
be willing to enter a plea of guilty although he was innocent of the crime
charged provided that the penalty would not exceed 15 days imprisonment; that
respondent judge emphasized to the accused that his plea should be with the
conformity of the police station commander who may object or offer no objection
and the respondent judge explained to accused Pareja
that if he was really intending to plead guilty he should answer that he is
willing to plead guilty to a lesser offense when the complaint is read to him.

“Respondent judge further alleged that when the accused was
arraigned, he manifested that he was entering a plea of guilty for a lesser
offense of slight physical injuries; respondent judge then asked the police
station commander if he objects or conforms, to which said station commander manifested
that he had no objection, after which the respondent rendered a decision
imposing upon the accused an imprisonment of 15 days and to pay the costs; that
on the same day when the decision was rendered on January 17, 1977, the accused
signified his desire to serve immediately his sentence, thus making the
decision final.

“Then on January 28,
1977 Artemio Espayos,
the herein complainant and the complainant in the criminal case filed with the
respondent judge a motion to allow him to prove damages but which the judge
denied.

“As to the specific charge that the accused Pareja was arraigned without Espayos‘
knowledge and that upon arraignment he pleaded guilty as though he had received
prior instruction, respondent Judge Lee explained in his letter-answer that the
station commander was notified and participated in the arraignment and all that
respondent judge did was to enlighten the accused concerning his desire to
enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense than that charged in the
complaint.

“On the charge that the said judge should have suspended the
promulgation of the sentence and the complainant notified so as to give him a
chance to prove damages, the respondent explained that he did not know that
complainant’s lawyer had a plan to amend the complaint and in fact no lawyer
appeared for the accused; that upon plea of guilty by the accused, respondent
had no alternative but to pronounce and promulgate sentence because the accused
was under detention and, at any rate, as stated in his order of February 7,
1977, the complainant still had the right to file a separate civil action for
damages.

“On the alleged offer to the complainant by the respondent
judge to pay the former P80.00 and then increased to P100.00 to settle the case
but which were refused, the respondent judge vehemently denied it.

“As to the complainant’s embarrassment and sufferings for
which only 15 days was meted to his assailant, the respondent claims that that
was the proper penalty imposable under the law.

“And finally as to his alleged holding office in his house,
respondent admits that ‘whenever he has no cases to try or official matters to
transact, he stays at his library at his house (only some 140 meters from the
court) especially when he studies his pending cases and/or prepares decisions’
for the following reasons:  (a) the
municipal court is devoid of any book while he has his library in his house and
which is very near the more complete library of his brother; (b) the clerk of
court could stay in the office and could easily call the respondent when
needed; and (c) he needed secrecy and concentration in making decisions, which
conditions are not obtaining in the municipal court because people just get in
and out and his clerk busily pounding on the typewriter which disturb him.

“Ordered on January
30, 1978 by the Supreme Court to file a reply to the foregoing
comment of Judge Adelardo Lee, complainant filed his
reply dated March 19, 1978.  He alleged that the sudden and unexpected
setting of the arraignment from the date of filing of the complaint was not the
usual practice of Judge Lee, as illustrated in eight specific cases.  Complainant Espayos
admitted that he had asked accused Pareja P500 for
the dismissal of the case but Pareja was willing to
give only P200 after which he went to the direction of the house of Judge Lee;
he admitted also that he could file a separate civil suit to recover damages
but he would incur additional expenses. 
He alleged further that when Judge Lee offered him P80.00 and then P100,
the complainant had already filed his petition to prove damages; that Judge Lee
used to have a handicraft factory in his house which he manages and after the
business became defunct, he plays mahjong in the afternoons during working days
and he thus stays in his house not to prepare decisions.”

Complainant Espayos did not appear at
the investigation of the case in spite of repeated notices.  He filed a motion withdrawing his
complaint.  He stated therein that he had
lost interest in the case due to the circuitization
of the municipal courts (respondent was transferred to Bacon, Sorsogon).  The
investigator recommended the dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute (nolle prosequi).

A municipal judge may be disciplined if he is not performing his
duties properly, or if complaints are made which, if true, would indicate that
he is unfit for the office (Sec. 97, Judiciary Law).

Complainant’s desistance is not an obstacle to the taking of
disciplinary action against the respondent because the latter’s answer to the
charges reveals that he had not performed his duties properly.  Respondent admitted that before the
arraignment, he explained to Prodencio Pareja, the accused in Criminal Case No. 2044, that after
the complaint was read to him, he should answer that he was willing to plead
guilty to a lesser offense.  Pareja followed respondent’s advice.  The respondent convicted him of the lesser
offense and imposed upon him the penalty of fifteen days of arresto
menor. 
The information was not amended.

It was improper and unethical to suggest to Pareja
what he should do at the arraignment. 
That impropriety generated the suspicion that the respondent was in
collusion with the accused.  It is the
sort of misbehavior which would be resented by the offended party and would
make him surmise that the sentence meted to the accused was fixed or is what is
known in the vernacular as lutong macao.  “A judge’s official conduct should be
free from impropriety and the appearance of impropriety” (Par. 4, Canons
of Judicial Ethics, adopted in Administrative Order No. 162 of the Secretary of
Justice, dated August 1, 1946, 42 O. G. 1803).

The respondent erred in not allowing the offended party, now
complainant Artemio Espayos,
to prove the civil liability of the accused (Veloso
vs. Carmona, Administrative Matter No. 502-MJ, June
30, 1977, 77 SCRA 450).  Respondent’s
theory is that the offended party “can always file a separate civil action
for damages” even though he did not reserve his right to institute a
separate civil action.  That theory is
wrong.  It shows unawareness of the rule
that “when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil
action or reserves his right to institute it separately” (Sec. 1, Rule
111, Rules of Court).

As to respondent’s admission that he allegedly stayed in the
library of his residence, whenever he had no official business to transact in
his office, we find that practice to be another instance of his improper
discharge of his duties as a municipal judge. 
He is legally obligated to observe office hours so that the parties
having official business with him would know where to find him (Jakosalem vs. Cordovez,
Administrative Matter No. 13-MJ, July 18, 1974, 58 SCRA 11).  That means that he should stay in his office
and not in his residence.  He cannot
certify that he rendered full-time service if during office hours, he remains
in his house (Suan vs. Resuello,
Administrative Matter No. 610-MJ, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 301).

As well-stated by Justice Muñoz Palma,
“reasons of public policy, the preservation of the good image of the
judiciary, and avoidance of all appearances of impropriety, require that a
judge should hold office at the regular place of business of the court and not
at his residence.  A judge holding office
in his house makes himself open to suspicion and possible criticism that his
official actuations cannot bear public scrutiny, more particularly of his
co-officials in the local government” (Siasico
vs. Sales, Administrative Matter No. 687-MJ, May 31, 1976, 71 SCRA 139, 146).

For having committed the above-mentioned irregularities, showing
that he had not performed his duties properly, respondent judge is severely
censured.  He is warned that a more
drastic penalty will be imposed on him in case he commits similar
irregularities.  A copy of this decision
should be attached to his personal record.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, Acting C.J., Barredo, Concepcion, Jr., and
Santos, JJ., concur.

Antonio, J., in the result.

Abad Santos, J., did not take part.

* Respondent judge, who is now
sixty-two years old and was admitted to the bar in 1945, took his oath of
office on January 20, 1975.