A.M. No. 1426-CFI. February 28, 1977
ANITA LACTAO LIM AND REMEDIOS BERNABE, COMPLAINANTS, VS. HON. SERAFIN SALVADOR, DISTRICT JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, BRANCH XIV, CALOOCAN CITY, RESPONDENT.
FERNANDO, J.:
The serious charge of “a deliberate miscarriage of
justice” was lodged against respondent Judge Serafin Salvador in a letter
complaint dated September 30, 1976
by Anita Lactao Lim and Remedios Bernabe of Maysilao, Santolan, Malabon,
Rizal. It was addressed to the President
of the Integrated Bar, Attorney Liliano B. Neri, who in turn, referred it to
this Court. The letter reads in
full: “We have the honor to report
to you for your kind consideration and appropriate action, a deliberate
miscarriage of justice, committed by Judge Serafin Salvador of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City,
Branch No. XIV, Said judge rendered a ‘decision’ on November 28, 1969, in LRC CASE NO. C-136
(Application for Registration of Title, Teodoro Padua, Applicant, without any
hearing although the ‘decision’ expressly says that after several
postponements, the hearing was held on August
8, 1969 and evidence was presented.
The records of the said case however reveal very clearly that no such
hearing was held nor evidence presented.
The ‘decision’ therefore is plain falsification * * *. We are filing this letter-complaint with your
office as we are some of the several co-owners who were unduly deprived thru
this falsified decision, of our just and legal participation over the land,
subject matter of registration. We swear
under oath below to show the truth of our accusation.”[1]
Respondent Judge was required to comment within ten days from
receipt in an indorsement of Acting Judicial Consultant; Justice Ricardo C. Puno,
dated October 19, 1976. He did so.
It is worded thus: “The
records of LRC Case No. C-136 show that the within Petition for Land
Registration was filed on January 24,
1968 and was initially heard on January 16, 1969 after due publication. In view of the absence of any oppositor and
on motion of counsel for the applicant the latter was allowed to present his
evidence ex parte before the Clerk of Court who was
commissioned to receive the same.
Presentation of evidence was completed on March 8, 1969. While
the Court was preparing the decision it was noticed there was no declaration of
general default issued so the Court decided to reset the hearing of the case
anew on May 2, 1969, May 29, 1969 and July 25, 1969 until the final setting on August 8, 1969 when an order of
general default was issued by the Court.
The Court having already received and assessed the evidence submitted
before the Commissioner promulgated its decision on November 28, 1969 and on November 19, 1971 the Court ordered the issuance
of the decree.”[2]
After a study of the matter and a review of the records of the
case, the Acting Judicial Consultant submitted a memorandum to the Chief
Justice on November 17, 1976. His recommendation was for the dismissal of
the charges, there being no evidence in support thereof and the explanation of
respondent Judge being deemed satisfactory.
He invoked the ruling in Pawaki v. Malik[3]
to the effect that if evidence is lacking to substantiate the complaint, a
respondent Judge cannot be held liable.
This Court is in agreement with the conclusion reached. To justify a charge for misconduct, it is
required, to quote from an opinion of the then Justice, now Chief Justice,
Castro that there be a showing of “a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by the public officer.”[4]
No such fault could be imputed to respondent Judge. The records of the case bear out the veracity
of his explanation. There was compliance
with the procedure set forth by law. It
must be made clear then that the offense imputed to respondent Judge lacks any
factual basis. There could not have been
therefore “a deliberate miscarriage of justice.” If reference is made
to the report of the Acting Judicial Consultant, it is merely to demonstrate
that this Court in deference to the constitutional right to petition does not
ignore complaints against members of the judiciary, even if on the face thereof
the lack of merit is quite discernible.[5]
That is why the matter was referred to him for preliminary study. He did, as was proper, recommend the
dismissal; in his memorandum, he cited the Pawaki and Benedicto cases. Hence mention was made of them. What must be stressed is that in doing so, no
implication is to be made as to any lapse by respondent Judge from the correct
norm of adjudication. He acted in
accordance with the high standard demanded by judicial ethics.
WHEREFORE, the administrative charge against respondent
Judge Serafin Salvador of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan
City, Branch XIV, is
dismissed. Let a copy of this resolution
be spread on his record.
Antonio and Concepcion,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Barredo and Aquino, JJ., concurs
in a separate opinion.
[1]
Letter Complaint dated September 30,
1976.
[2]
Comment dated November 2, 1976.
[3]
Adm. Matter No. 6-MJ, November 28,
1975, 68 SCRA 130.
[4]
Buenaventura v. Benedicto,
Adm. Case No. 137-J, March 27, 1971,
38 SCRA 71, 76. This doctrine goes back
to In re Horrilleno, 43 Phil. 212 (1922), per Malcolm, J.
[5]
Cf. Tobias v. Ericta, Adm. Case No. 242-J, July 29, 1972, 46 SCRA 83.
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CONCURRING OPINION
AQUINO, J.:
I concur. The complaint
against respondent Judge does not indicate the interest of complainants Anita
Lactao Lim and Remedios Bernabe of Maysilo, Santolan, Malabon, Rizal in the lot
with an area of 3,480 square meters, located at Barrio Santolan, Malabon, Rizal, which was involved in LRC Case No. C-136, LRC Record
No. N-34335, Application for Registration of Title, Teodoro Padua, applicant.
The decision of respondent Judge, which Anita Lactao Lim and
Remedios Bernabe branded as “falsified” and a miscarriage of justice, shows that they did not
file any opposition to the application for registration.
The decision was rendered on November 28, 1969.
The complaint against respondent Judge is dated September 30, 1976. There is no prima facie showing
that serious misconduct or inefficiency can be imputed to respondent Judge in
connection with his decision in that land registration case. Hence, I concur in the dismissal of the
charge.
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CONCURRING OPINION
BARREDO, J.:
I concur, and I join Mr. Justice Aquino’s observation that there
is no prima facie showing of any misconduct on the part of respondent
judge to have even warranted any investigation of the serious charge filed by
complainants.
The reference in the main opinion to the rulings that for an
administrative complaint to succeed, it must be proven that the conduct of
respondent judge was corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law and
that there must be a showing of “a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, etc.”, which are undoubtedly good law, may,
however, give the erroneous impression in this case that respondent herein is
being exonerated only because of insufficiency of evidence or failure of
proof. I would not be doing full justice
to respondent should I leave that possible implication uncorrected.
This is not a case where complainants’ grave charge of
“deliberate miscarriage of justice” levelled against respondent was
investigated. What happened here is that
after respondent filed his comment, it appeared incontrovertibly therefrom that
the charge against him is entirely baseless and that it must have been concocted
in complete disregard of the actual facts. The claim of complainants that respondent’s
decision is a falsification because there was allegedly no hearing held nor
evidence presented in support of the application for registration of land
referred to is completely belied by the record which shows that in view of the
absence of any oppositor, an ex-parte presentation of evidence actually took
place before the clerk of court and that said proceeding terminated in fact on
March 8, 1969. It is to be emphasized,
therefore, that the complainants did not only fail to substantiate their charge
with sufficient evidence, they had absolutely no ground to complaint at
all. I am stressing this point
emphatically because I believe it is not fair to respondent to place him in the
same position as an accused in a criminal case who has escaped conviction and
penalty, not precisely because he is factually innocent but only because the
prosecution has failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In this case of respondent judge, We are exonerating him because the charge against him had no
basis at all and could not have been proven in any event. That should keep the record of respondent
unblemished altogether.