CORONACION P. BIABAN, COMPLAINANT, VS. EXECUTIVE JUDGE AMELIA K. DEL ROSARIO, CFI OF AKLAN, BRANCH II, AT KALIBO, RESPONDENT.

Biaban versus Del Rosario

The Case

This is an administrative complaint filed directly with the Supreme Court against a judge of the Court of First Instance, charging bias in the adjudication of a criminal appeal. Coronacion Biaban complains that Judge Amelia K. del Rosario of the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Branch Two, sitting at Kalibo, showed partiality when she acquitted, on appeal, the persons whom the complainant had accused of malicious mischief. The case matters because it fixes the standard for administrative liability of judges on the ground of bias: a charge of partiality cannot rest on the mere fact that the judge ruled against a litigant, but must be grounded on evidence that the judge was swayed by improper motive. It is a compact lesson on the presumption of regularity that shields judicial acts.

Procedural History

The criminal case for malicious mischief began in the Municipal Court of New Washington, Aklan. After trial, the municipal court dismissed the case against one accused, Bibiana Bautista, on the ground that she was exempt from criminal liability as the sister of the complainant, while it convicted the remaining accused and sentenced them to twenty days of imprisonment and to indemnify the complainant in the sum of fifty pesos. The accused appealed to the Court of First Instance of Aklan, where the respondent judge presided. On appeal, the respondent judge acquitted all the accused. From that acquittal, the complainant filed this administrative complaint against the judge directly with the Supreme Court, which referred the matter to its Judicial Consultant for evaluation.

Facts

The complainant, Coronacion Biaban, instituted a criminal case for malicious mischief against Bibiana Bautista, her husband Longinos Bautista, and their four sons, Ely, Godofredo, Eduardo and Reynaldo. The charge arose from the cutting down of a star apple tree and damage to vegetable plants.

After trial in the municipal court, the case against Bibiana Bautista was dismissed because she was exempt from criminal liability, being the sister of the complainant. The other accused were convicted and sentenced to twenty days of imprisonment and to pay an indemnity of fifty pesos.

On appeal, the respondent judge acquitted all the accused. The evidence established that the cutting of the star apple tree and the damage to the vegetable plants were apparently caused by Bibiana Bautista's transfer of the house of her son, Godofredo, to the portion of the land that belonged to her. The respondent judge found that no malice attended her action. The complainant then accused the judge of bias in deciding the appeal.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge acted with bias or partiality in acquitting all the accused on appeal.
• Whether or not the respondent judge may be held administratively liable on the basis of the complainant's charge of bias.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote any statutory provision. Its reasoning rests on the definition of the crime of malicious mischief, which requires that the damage be caused with malice, that is, out of hate, revenge or other evil motive. The Court states the governing rule in these words:

Indeed, if there is no malice in causing the damage to the property, there is no crime of malicious mischief, and the obligation to repair the damage is only civil.

This rule bears on the case because it supplies the legal basis for the acquittal: absent malice, no crime was committed, and the respondent judge's ruling was a legitimate application of the law rather than an act of favoritism.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court found no bias or partiality. The respondent judge acquitted the accused because the evidence showed that the damage was caused by the transfer of Godofredo's house to Bibiana's own portion of the land, and that no malice attended her action. Since malice is an essential element of malicious mischief, the acquittal was legally correct, and a correct ruling cannot be evidence of partiality.

On the second issue, the Court held that the complaint must fail. As the Judicial Consultant found, and as the Court adopted, there is no showing from the record that the respondent judge acted with bias or partiality in the adjudication of the criminal case. The charge of bias was therefore unsupported by evidence and could not sustain administrative liability.

Doctrine

A judge may be held administratively liable for bias or partiality only upon clear and convincing evidence that the judge was swayed by improper motive. The mere fact that a judge ruled in favor of one party, or acquitted an accused, does not by itself prove bias. Where the ruling is supported by the evidence and the law, as where the element of malice is absent in a prosecution for malicious mischief, the ruling is an exercise of judicial duty and not an act of partiality. In malicious mischief, malice is an essential element; if the damage is caused without malice, there is no crime, and only a civil obligation to repair the damage arises. These rules tie directly to the Court's statement that without malice there is no crime of malicious mischief and the obligation to repair the damage is only civil.

Disposition

The Court dismissed the administrative complaint against the respondent judge for lack of evidence of bias or partiality.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a charge of bias against a judge must rest on evidence of improper motive, not on the mere fact that the judge ruled against the complainant. Examiners use this case to test the presumption of regularity in judicial acts and the element of malice in malicious mischief.