CUSTODIO ESCABILLAS, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. LUIS D. MARTINEZ, MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF HAGONOY, DAVAO DEL SUR, RESPONDENT.

In a sworn letter complaint dated October 5, 1972, addressed to
the President of the Philippines and to the Secretary of Justice, Custodio Escabillas charged
respond­ent municipal judge, Luis D. Martinez, of Hagonoy,
Davao del Sur with gross
misconduct in office and gross ignorance of the law, by extending the terms of
a lease contract in defiance of the verdict of this Court; and unreasonable
delay and palpable incompetence for deliberate failure to decide Civil Case No.
261 within 90 days after the same was submitted for decision, in violation of
Section 5, R.A. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 in relation
to Section 70 of the Rules of Court.

Complainant, Custodio Escabillas, purchased two parcels of land, lots A and B,
from spouses Pedro N. de los Reyes and Beatriz Torrecampo on January
7, 1970.  Corresponding
Transfer Certificates of Title regarding said two lots were issued by the
Register of Deeds of Davao del Sur
in the name of the complainant, Custodio Esca­billas.  Lot
A is covered by TCT No. T-3539 with an annotation at its back of the lease
contract entered into by its former owners, Pedro N. de los
Reyes and Beatriz Torrecampo with the Bangayans in 1963.

Previous to the said sale, lots A and B were the subject matter
of Civil Case No. 4939 where the Court of First Instance of Davao
del Sur thru the late Judge Manases
Reyes upheld in its decision dated May 15, 1969, the right of spouses Reyes and
Torrecampo to repurchase the said lots from the Bangayans with a directive that the unexpired period of the
lease contract between the contending parties regarding lot A should be
respected.  Consequent to this directive
of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, Pedro de los Reyes and
Beatriz Torrecampo together with complainant, Custodio Escabillas, filed on
April 30, 1970, a motion for the clarification of the judgment of May 15, 1969
regarding the expiry date of the lease contract and for a directive to cancel
the lease of lot A.  On the same date, Custodio Escabillas filed a
petition for cancellation of encumbrance appearing in
TCT No. T-3539 which was docketed as Miscellaneous Case No.
67 in the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur. 
Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of Davao
del Sur issued its Order of May 20, 1970, entitled “IN RE:  PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF ENCUMBRANCE
APPEARING ON TCT NO. T-3539 – CUSTODIO ESCABILLAS, Applicant”, where it
explicitly stated that the lease contract in favor of defendants Bangayans, as found in the decision in Civil Case No. 4939,
expired on April 15, 1970; and thereupon, authorized the Register of Deeds of Davao del Sur, upon payment of
necessary fees, to cancel the annotation regarding the lease in favor of Lino Bangayan from TCT No. T-3539.  In the same order, complainant was directed
to file an action for illegal detainer against the Bangayans.

The Order of May 20,
1970, was appealed to the Supreme Court by way of review on certiorari
and pending resolution of the same by this Court, complainant herein filed on August 13, 1971, an action for
unlawful detainer against the Bangayans
in the Municipal Court of Hagonoy, Davao del Sur.  The unlawful detainer
case was dismissed by respondent judge for being premature.

Meanwhile on August 3,
1971, the Supreme Court denied the petition for review on certiorari
filed by the Bangayans and a subsequent amended
petition was likewise denied by this
Tribunal on October 5, 1971
for “lack of merit”. 
Consequently, complainant Custodio Escabillas filed Civil Case No. 261 for unlawful detainer involving the same property against the Bangayans before the sala of the
respondent judge.  The case underwent
trial and its last hearing was terminated on March 3, 1972.  On August 31, 1972, the respondent judge
rendered his deci­sion by ordering the Bangayans to
surrender lot A to the complainant after the former shall have collected from
the latter the amount of P9,000.00; to pay P1,000.00
as attorney’s fees and P200.00 as representation expenses.

The said decision of the
respondent judge became the subject matter of the present administrative action
filed by Custodio Escabillas.

Complainant claims that the respondent judge acted with gross
misconduct in office and gross ignorance of law when he extended the terms of
an expired lease contract, in defiance of the order of this Court.

We have succinctly evaluated the record of this case and find
that there is no truth to complainant’s assertion that the respondent judge
extended the terms of an expired lease contract.  The evidence discloses that the respondent
did not in any manner alter or modify the terms of the said contract which had
been held to have expired on April 15,
1970 by the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur.  As a matter of
fact, the respondent judge, in his decision in Civil Case No. 261, vehemently
refused to interfere with the terms of the lease contract on the ground that he
had no authority to intervene in an issue which had already become final.  Thus he said:

“The most important question to be resolved by this Court is
whether the lease contract expired on April
15, 1970.  While defendants
claim that the lease contract will expire on December 11, 1975 since the period
from 1964 when he purchased the land up to 1969 when it was repurchased should
not be included in the lease contract during the said period as he was
occupying the land as an owner and not as a lessee, this Court cannot find
justification to such contention on account of the finality of the Order of the
Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur (Branch V), the dis­positive
portion of which reads thus –

‘Wherefore, the court holds that lease in favor of the defendants,
as found in Civil Case No. 4939, expired on April 15, 1970, and hereby authorized
the Register of Deeds of Davao del Sur, upon payment of the necessary fees, to cancel the
annotation regarding the lease in favor of Lino Bangayan from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3539.’

“The aforesaid order having become final, same became the law
on the case.  This Court is therefore
devoid of any authority to alter or amend much less reverse said Order having
been affirmed by the Honorable Supreme Court.”

The charge of gross misconduct in office and ignorance of law
filed against the respondent judge is therefore clearly without merit.

On the charge of
unreasonable delay and palpable incompetence for deliberate failure to dispose
of Civil Case No. 261 within the 90 day period, the record
shows that the said case was submitted for decision on March 3, 1972 and it was
finally decided by the respondent on August 31, 1972 or more than five months
after the same was submitted for decision. 
It then appears that the respondent judge violated the ninety day
period provided for by Section 5, R.A. No. 296 within which to decide a case
submitted before him for decision.

Respondent judge attributes the delay in disposing of said Civil
Case No. 261 to its voluminous records which he claims needed a proper and
prudent evaluation in resolving the issues posed therein.  This is no defense.  We cannot ignore nor countenance such
inaction of the respondent for more than five months.  For surely, this would defeat the very
purpose and spirit of Section 5, R.A. No. 296, which is for a speedy
administration of justice.  A judge
should be prompt in the performance of his judicial duties for delay in the
administration of justice is a common complaint.  Thus, in an earlier case this Court said:

“Much of the popular criticism of the courts, which must be
frankly admitted is all too often justified, is based on the laws’ delay.  Congested condition of the courts docket is
deplorable and intolerable.  It can have
no other result than the loss of evidence, the abandonment of cases, and denial
and frequent defeat of justice.  It lowers
the standard of the courts, and brings them into disrepute.” (In re Impeachment of Flordeliza, 44
Phil. 608).

It is, therefore, for a good reason that judges are enjoined to
strictly comply with the reglementary period of 90
days in disposing of a case submitted for decision.

WHEREFORE, finding the charge of gross
misconduct in office and ignorance of law to be without merit, we hereby
dismiss the same.  Respondent
Judge, however, having been found to have violated the provisions of Section 5,
R.A 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, is hereby REPRIMANDED and enjoined to strictly
comply with the provisions of said Act. 
Let a copy of this
resolution be spread in his record.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, (Chairman), Antonio, Aquino,
and Santos,
JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., in the result.