LUDOVICO AJENO, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. SANCHO Y. INSERTO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOILO, CITY OF ILOILO, RESPONDENT.
Listen, read along, or open presentation mode.
Ajeno versus Inserto
The Case
This is an administrative case. Ludovico Ajeno filed a verified complaint against Judge Sancho Y. Inserto of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo City, charging him with ignorance of the law. The charge arose from a criminal judgment in which the judge imposed subsidiary imprisonment upon Ajeno for non-payment of a two hundred peso indemnity to the offended party. The complainant invoked Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act Number 5465, and the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be imprisoned for debt. The case matters because it draws the line between an honest error of judgment, which does not warrant administrative liability, and ignorance of the law, which merits at least an admonition. It also clarifies that the constitutional prohibition covers only contractual debts, not obligations arising from crime.
Procedural History
The case began as a criminal case before the respondent judge, who convicted the complainant of less serious physical injuries and sentenced him to four months of arresto mayor, to indemnify Solomon Banagua, Junior in the sum of two hundred pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The complainant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which corrected the error. The complainant then filed a verified complaint with the Supreme Court, praying for the removal of the respondent judge from office for incompetence. The respondent judge filed his comment, admitting the error and disclaiming bad faith. The Supreme Court resolved the matter as an administrative complaint against a judge.
Facts
Ludovico Ajeno of Barotac, Nuevo, Iloilo was charged with frustrated murder before the respondent judge. After trial, the judge convicted him of the lesser offense of less serious physical injuries, in accordance with the evidence presented. The judgment sentenced him to four months of arresto mayor, to indemnify Solomon Banagua, Junior in the sum of two hundred pesos for alleged medical expenses, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The complainant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which corrected the error. He then filed a verified complaint dated October 25, 1975, charging the judge with ignorance of the law. He claimed that the indemnity is a civil liability, and that ordering his imprisonment for its non-payment violates the constitutional provision that no person shall be imprisoned for debt.
In his comment, the respondent judge admitted his error in imposing subsidiary imprisonment of forty days in case of insolvency. He explained that he realized his oversight when the case was appealed, that it was never his intention to oppress anyone, and that he had relied on the doctrine that the constitutional prohibition covers only debts arising from contract and not damages arising from crime, citing the case of People versus Cara. He noted that he had convicted the complainant of a lesser offense than that charged, and that no motion for reconsideration had called his attention to the error. He had served the government for thirty six years, and this was his first violation of the norm of judicial conduct.
Issues
- Whether or not the respondent judge may be administratively held liable for his error in imposing subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of the two hundred peso indemnity.
- Whether or not the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of the indemnity violated the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt.
Applicable Provisions
Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act Number 5465, provides:
Article 39. Subsidiary Penalty. — If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each 8 pesos, subject to the following rules: 1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision correccional or arresto and a fine, he shall remain under confinement until his fine referred in the preceding paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-third of the term of the sentence, and in no case shall it continue for more than one year, and no fraction or part of a day shall be counted against the prisoner as amended by R.A. 5465.
This provision bears on the case because, as amended, it authorizes subsidiary imprisonment only for non-payment of a fine, not for non-payment of an indemnity.
Section 13 of Article Four of the 1973 Constitution provides:
Section 13. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
This provision bears on the case because the complainant invoked it, and the Court had to define the kind of debt it protects.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the respondent judge cannot be administratively held liable for ignorance of the law. For serious misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt, inspired by an intention to violate the law, or in persistent disregard of well known legal rules. None of these was shown. The evidence instead showed an honest error of judgment, not inspired by any ill motive, and the first violation by the respondent during his thirty six years in the service. The Court stressed, however, that judges must be conversant with the law, including its latest amendments, and that a judge nearing retirement should not relax in his study of the law. Service in the judiciary means continuous study and research on the law from beginning to end. In this respect, the respondent failed.
On the second issue, the Court held that there was no violation of the constitutional prohibition. The debt contemplated by the Constitution refers only to a contractual obligation, or an obligation to pay money arising from a contract, and not to an obligation arising from a crime. The obligation of the complainant to pay the two hundred pesos arose from a crime, not from a contract, and is therefore beyond the scope of the prohibition. The respondent judge was correct in relying on the doctrine of People versus Cara, but he failed to realize that subsidiary imprisonment can no longer be imposed for non-payment of an indemnity, not because it would be imprisonment for debt, but because of the amendment introduced by Republic Act Number 5465, which limits subsidiary imprisonment to non-payment of a fine. His error was his failure to observe the amendatory law.
Doctrine
A judge may be held administratively liable for ignorance of the law only upon reliable evidence that the judicial acts complained of were ill motivated, corrupt, inspired by an intention to violate the law, or in persistent disregard of well known legal rules. An occasional mistake or error of judgment does not warrant discipline. But judges owe it to the dignity of the court, the legal profession, and the public to know the very law they apply, and to keep abreast of its amendments and the latest decisions.
Under Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act Number 5465, subsidiary imprisonment may be imposed only for non-payment of a fine, not for non-payment of a civil indemnity.
The constitutional guarantee that no person shall be imprisoned for debt protects only debts arising from contract, not obligations arising from crime.
Disposition
The complaint for removal was dismissed, and the respondent judge was admonished to be more cautious in the application of the law, with a warning that a repetition would be severely dealt with.
Remember This
Memorize this line: subsidiary imprisonment now lies only for non-payment of a fine, and the constitutional ban on imprisonment for debt covers contractual debts alone, not obligations arising from crime. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between an honest error of judgment and ignorance of the law in administrative cases against judges, and to test the scope of the constitutional guarantee against imprisonment for debt.