ROLANDO BARTOLOME, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. JUAN DE BORJA, DISTRICT JUDGE, BRANCH XX, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, MANILA, RESPONDENT.

Bartolome versus De Borja

The Case

This is an administrative case in which Rolando Bartolome, a labor regulation officer of the Department of Labor, and Francisco Grego, an accused in a pending libel case, separately charged Judge Juan de Borja of the Court of First Instance of Manila with serious misconduct, oppression, gross ignorance of the law, and inefficiency. The Supreme Court decided the case in May 1976. It matters because it fixes the high evidentiary standard for removing a judge from office and because it teaches that a judge who errs in the exercise of discretion, or who reacts with vigor to obstruction of justice, is not thereby administratively liable.

Procedural History

The complaints were filed directly with the Supreme Court as administrative matters. The then Judicial Consultant, retired Justice Manuel Barcelona of the Court of Appeals, required the respondent Judge to answer each complaint, and he did so with citations of authority. In the meantime, Grego had gone to the Court of Appeals on certiorari to nullify the warrant of arrest issued against him, and that petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated in October 1975. The administrative charges then came before the Supreme Court for resolution.

Facts

In the first complaint, Bartolome alleged that the respondent Judge, in a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by Adelina Velasco and her father, who had been found guilty of violating the Minimum Wage Law, allowed the replay in court of a taped telephone conversation between Velasco and Bartolome. The recording had been made at Velasco's instance without Bartolome's knowledge, and it revealed information derogatory to him. Bartolome charged that the replay violated the Anti-Wire Tapping Act and the libel provisions of the Revised Penal Code, and that it showed oppression, gross ignorance of the law, and grave misconduct.

In the second complaint, Grego alleged that the respondent Judge acted oppressively, whimsically, and despotically in the pending libel case against him. The record shows that Grego repeatedly sought postponements and failed to appear at scheduled hearings, prompting orders of arrest, and that he even sought the inhibition of the Judge. Grego also complained that the Judge used intemperate language when his patience was tried.

The respondent Judge answered in a dispassionate tone, explaining that he allowed the tape replay because no objection was raised on the ground of the Anti-Wire Tapping Act, and that his orders in the libel case merely enforced procedural regularity.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent Judge is guilty of serious misconduct for allowing the replay of the taped telephone conversation and for his orders in the libel case.
• Whether or not the respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law or inefficiency in his rulings.
• Whether or not the respondent Judge's display of annoyance and strong language warrants administrative sanction.

Applicable Provisions

Section 67 of the Judiciary Act provides:

No District Judge shall be separated or removed from office by the President of the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall exist, in the judgment of the Supreme Court, involving serious misconduct or inefficiency, for the removal of said judge from office after the proper proceedings.

This fixes the grounds for removal and thus the threshold the complaints had to meet.

Section 1 of the Anti-Wire Tapping Act, as relied upon by the respondent Judge, provides:

That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offense mentioned in Section 3 hereof shall not be covered by this prohibition.

This proviso was the basis for holding that the tape replay did not amount to ignorance of the law.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the charge of serious misconduct was without support. Allowing the replay of a recording that cast reflection on the complainant was not oppression, and the orders denying postponements and issuing warrants of arrest conformed to the norm expected of a judge, as the Court of Appeals itself held.

On the second issue, the Court held that inefficiency could not be imputed to the respondent Judge. His reliance on the explicit wording of Presidential Decree No. 21 and on this Court's decisions showed deliberation rather than ignorance. Even assuming his interpretation was erroneous, the Court declared:

No one, called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice, can be infallible in his judgment.

On the third issue, the Court held that while a judge should be calm and dispassionate, it is not realistic to expect him to personify equanimity at all times, and strong language to characterize attempts to obstruct justice is not objectionable.

Doctrine

Administrative proceedings against judges are highly penal in character and the charges must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Removal requires a showing of serious misconduct or inefficiency under Section 67 of the Judiciary Act. A judge may not be disciplined for mere error of judgment in the exercise of discretion, for no one called upon to interpret the law can be infallible. A judge's occasional display of annoyance, or use of vigorous language against litigants who obstruct justice, does not constitute serious misconduct.

Disposition

The complaints of Rolando Bartolome and Francisco Grego were dismissed for lack of merit, and the respondent Judge was vindicated.

Remember This

Memorize the line that no one called upon to interpret the law in the administration of justice can be infallible in his judgment. Examiners use this case to test the grounds for removing a judge and the rule that a mere error of judgment is not serious misconduct.