OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, VS. EXECUTIVE JUDGE OWEN B. AMOR, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, DAET, CAMARINES NORTE, RESPONDENT.

Office of the Court Administrator versus Amor

The Case

This is an administrative case brought by the Office of the Court Administrator against Executive Judge Owen B. Amor of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte. He was charged with grave abuse of authority, grave misconduct, gross insubordination, and acts inimical to judicial service. The case matters because it shows how the Supreme Court polices its own ranks, how silence in the face of administrative charges may be taken as an implied admission, and why a judge cannot escape liability by resigning while the case is pending.

Procedural History

The matter began with a memorandum submitted by Acting Presiding Judge Manuel Contreras of the Municipal Trial Court of Paracale, Camarines Norte, to the Office of the Court Administrator. The Court treated that memorandum as an administrative complaint and required the respondent to comment, but he never did. The Court then ordered him to show cause why he should not be disciplined or held in contempt, and again to submit his comment. He ignored both directives. The Court later referred the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report, and recommendation. In the meantime, the respondent filed a certificate of candidacy for the 2002 Barangay Elections, which caused his automatic resignation from the service effective June 7, 2002. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter, that his retirement benefits be forfeited, and that he be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office. The case reached the Supreme Court as an administrative matter, and the Court resolved it in October 2014.

Facts

Judge Contreras reported a series of incidents. On October 1, 1999, the respondent impounded the tricycle of a certain Gervin Ojeda at the Hall of Justice after the latter bumped the respondent's vehicle and could not pay the damages demanded. The impounding was entered in the guard's logbook, and a security guard issued a certification of it. When Judge Contreras pointed out that the certification bore the wrong date, the guard took it to the respondent's chambers and afterwards refused to return it, and the respondent berated the guards for issuing it.

Later that October, the respondent berated Acting Presiding Judge Rosita Lalwani of the Municipal Trial Court of Mercedes, Camarines Norte, when she called to seek reconsideration of her detail to another station. He called her lazy and abusive, and instructed her to go slow in the trial of a case under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 because the accused was his friend. On October 27, 1999, under the pretext of a judicial visit, he personally intervened with Judge Contreras on behalf of a lawyer previously charged with indirect contempt, telling the judge that the lawyer gave him gold and sneering that the judge was not exploiting the situation. When Judge Contreras rejected the overture, the respondent publicly announced in open court that the judge was abusive for persecuting the lawyer.

Lawyers, prosecutors, and litigants also complained of the respondent's habitual absenteeism, especially on Mondays and Fridays, delaying the disposition of cases. As Executive Judge, he ordered the Clerk of Court to submit all petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure to him for scrutiny, causing delay, and to demand grease money from newspaper publishers under pain of blacklisting, although the Clerk never obeyed. Despite several opportunities and a generous amount of time, the respondent never filed a comment, and he later automatically resigned upon filing his certificate of candidacy.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent should be held administratively liable for grave abuse of authority, grave misconduct, gross insubordination, and acts inimical to judicial service.
• Whether or not the respondent's failure to file a comment despite repeated opportunities amounts to a waiver and an implied admission of the allegations against him.
• Whether or not his automatic resignation from the service divested the Court of jurisdiction to determine his administrative liability.

Applicable Provisions

Section 52 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides:

Section 52. Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office and bar from taking civil service examinations.

This provision supplies the disabilities that attach to the penalty of dismissal, which the Court imposed in substance even though the respondent had already left the service.

Ruling

The Court concurred with the findings and recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator and held the respondent administratively liable on all charges. It defined grave abuse of authority as a misdemeanor committed by a public officer who, under color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon a person bodily harm, imprisonment, or other injury, an act characterized by cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority. It defined misconduct as a transgression of an established and definite rule of action, particularly unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer, and held that to warrant dismissal the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling, implying wrongful intention rather than a mere error of judgment, and directly connected with the performance of official duties. What separates grave from simple misconduct is the presence of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rules.

On the second issue, the Court held that the respondent's failure to comment despite all the opportunities afforded him constituted a waiver of his right to defend himself. It reasoned that, in the natural order of things, a man would resist an unfounded claim against him, and that it is contrary to human nature to remain silent in the face of false accusations. His silence was therefore an implied admission of the veracity of the allegations. On this basis the Court upheld the findings that he abused his authority in impounding the tricycle and pressuring the guards, was discourteous to a fellow judge, used his office to intervene for a lawyer in exchange for gold, was habitually absent, and caused delays in foreclosure proceedings while ordering the demand for grease money. It likewise found him guilty of gross misconduct and insubordination for deliberately and continuously refusing to comply with the Court's directives.

On the third issue, the Court held that the respondent's automatic resignation did not divest it of jurisdiction. It stressed that resignation should not be used either as an escape or an easy way out to evade administrative liability or sanction. Because he had already been deemed automatically resigned, the Court could not impose dismissal itself, but it imposed the administrative disabilities that dismissal carries under Section 52.

Doctrine

A public officer's failure to comment on administrative charges despite repeated opportunities is a waiver of the right to defend and may be construed as an implied admission of the allegations. Grave misconduct requires corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rules, and must be directly connected with the performance of official duties. Resignation, including automatic resignation upon filing a certificate of candidacy, does not divest the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to determine administrative liability, and resignation may not be used to evade sanction. Where the respondent has already left the service, the Court imposes the administrative disabilities inherent in the penalty of dismissal under Section 52 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service: cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office, and bar from taking civil service examinations.

Disposition

The Court found the respondent guilty of grave abuse of authority, grave misconduct, acts inimical to judicial service, and insubordination, and would have dismissed him had he not been deemed automatically resigned; it cancelled his civil service eligibility, forfeited his retirement and other benefits except accrued leave credits already claimed, and perpetually disqualified him from re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality, including government-owned or controlled corporations and government financial institutions.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: resignation is never an escape from administrative liability, and the disabilities of dismissal survive it. Examiners use this case to test implied admission from silence, the distinction between grave and simple misconduct, and the effect of automatic resignation on the Court's disciplinary jurisdiction.