ATTY. FRED HENRY V. MARALLAG AND NORMA F. FERI, COMPLAINANTS, VS. JUDGE LORETO CLORIBEL-PURUGGANAN, RTC, BRANCH 3, TUGUEGARAO, CAGAYAN, RESPONDENT.

Marallag versus Cloribel-Purugganan

The Case

This is an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Fred Henry Marallag, the private prosecutor in a murder case, and his client Norma Feri, the widow of the victim, against Judge Loreto Cloribel-Purugganan of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, Branch 3. The complainants charge the judge with gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law, oppression, and grave abuse of discretion for granting bail to the murder accused without conducting a proper hearing on the petition for bail. The case matters because it is the Supreme Court's clean statement of the rule that in capital offenses, bail is discretionary, and that discretion can be exercised only after a hearing where the prosecution is given the chance to show that the evidence of guilt is strong. It also reminds us that the duty to conduct that hearing belongs to the judge, and it cannot be discharged by the prosecution's default.

Procedural History

An information for murder was filed against Segismundo Duarte before the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, Branch 3, presided over by the respondent judge. Duarte filed a petition for bail. The prosecution moved that the trial be conducted in reverse order, with the defense presenting evidence first. The respondent judge granted the motion, then reconsidered, and in an order dated February 26, 1997, directed the prosecution to present its evidence on the petition for bail. On June 18, 1997, the judge granted in part the prosecution's motion for reconsideration and acknowledged that a hearing on the petition for bail must first be conducted. On July 14, 1997, the complainants filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition questioning the February 26 order, but the appellate court dismissed the petition on July 24, 1997, because the prosecution had failed to report the matter to the Office of the Solicitor General. On August 12, 1997, the prosecution again moved for postponement, and when it refused to present its witness, the respondent judge considered the petition for bail submitted for resolution. On August 14, 1997, the judge granted bail. The complainants then filed this administrative complaint directly with the Supreme Court, and the Office of the Court Administrator submitted its memorandum recommending that the respondent judge be held liable for gross ignorance of the law and fined 5,000 pesos.

Facts

On December 3, 1996, an information for murder was filed against Segismundo Duarte for the killing of Ferdinand Feri. Duarte filed a petition for bail. At the hearing on January 28, 1997, the private prosecutor, Atty. Marallag, manifested that Duarte first had to be arraigned so that the court could acquire jurisdiction over him. Duarte was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The prosecution informed the court that during the preliminary investigation before the Municipal Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Duarte had admitted killing Ferdinand Feri but claimed self-defense. The prosecution then orally moved that the trial be conducted in reverse order, with the defense presenting its evidence first.

The respondent judge ordered Duarte to clarify in writing whether he admitted the killing, and set oral argument on the reverse-order issue for the next day. On January 29, 1997, after hearing both parties, the judge granted the motion for reverse-order trial. The defense moved for reconsideration, and the court required position papers. On February 26, 1997, the judge ruled that the prosecution should first present evidence on the petition for bail, and reset the hearing for March 11 and 12, 1997. The prosecution moved for reconsideration, and on June 18, 1997, the judge granted the motion in part, acknowledging that a hearing on the petition for bail must first be conducted.

On July 14, 1997, the complainants filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed it on July 24, 1997, because the prosecution had not reported the matter to the Office of the Solicitor General. At the hearing on August 12, 1997, the prosecution again moved for postponement, arguing that it had not yet received a copy of the appellate court's resolution. The judge ordered the prosecution to proceed, but only complainant Feri was present, and the prosecution refused to present her because she was not an eyewitness. The judge then considered the petition for bail submitted for resolution. On August 14, 1997, the judge granted bail, concluding that the evidence against Duarte was not strong because the prosecution had failed to present its witnesses despite four settings. The order quoted the rule on bail and stated that the court found no witnesses to prove the guilt of the accused or to show that the evidence of guilt was strong.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge committed gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion in granting bail to the accused without conducting a hearing on the petition for bail and without including in her order a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution.
• Whether or not the respondent judge should be held administratively liable and fined for the error.
• Whether or not the charges made by the respondent judge against complainant Atty. Marallag for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility should be referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as quoted in the assailed order, provides:

Section 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. - All persons in custody, shall, before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right; except those charged with a capital offense, or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.

This provision fixes the dividing line between bail as a matter of right and bail as a matter of discretion, and it is the provision the respondent judge applied when she granted bail.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, cited by the Court, defines and penalizes murder. The Court used it to establish that the offense charged against Duarte was a capital offense, which placed the petition for bail within the discretionary exception.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the complaint is meritorious. The rule is that all persons in custody shall, before conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right. However, when the accused is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, and the evidence of guilt is strong, the grant of bail becomes a matter of discretion. Where the admission to bail is discretionary, it is mandatory for the trial court to conduct a hearing to afford both the prosecution and the defense a reasonable opportunity to present evidence, the prosecution to establish that the evidence of guilt is strong, and the defense to establish that it is not. Since Duarte was charged with murder, a capital offense, a hearing was necessary before bail could be granted. The records showed that although several dates were set, the parties never adduced evidence on the strength of the evidence of guilt, because the hearings were taken up by other issues, such as the necessity of arraignment and the propriety of reverse-order trial. The prosecution was thus deprived of the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt was strong, and the defense was denied the chance to prove otherwise.

The Court stressed that the prosecution's failure to submit evidence did not justify granting bail without a hearing. Even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose any objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions from which it may infer the strength of the State's evidence of guilt. A judge is required to include in the order granting or refusing bail a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution; otherwise, the order would be uncontrolled and may be deemed capricious or whimsical. The Court quoted its earlier ruling:

xxx admission to bail as a matter of discretion presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance with law and guided by the applicable legal principles. The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. in other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due process, that is, after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim, caprice and arbitrariness.

On the second issue, however, the Court tempered its ruling. It noted that the prosecution's failure to present evidence was not entirely the fault of the respondent judge. The prosecution itself raised other issues that sidetracked the hearing on the petition for bail, and it was the prosecution that refused to heed the judge's order to proceed with its evidence on August 12, 1997. Under the circumstances, the Court found that the imposition of a fine on the respondent judge would not be justified. The error merited only a reprimand.

On the third issue, the Court deemed it proper to refer to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, recommendation, and report the allegations of the respondent judge that complainant Marallag knowingly made untruthful statements of fact in his complaint and exhibited disrespect toward her during the hearings.

Doctrine

First, bail is a matter of right before conviction, except for persons charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong, in which case bail is a matter of discretion. Second, where bail is discretionary, a hearing is mandatory, and both the prosecution and the defense must be given a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt. Third, even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to object to the motion for bail, the court must still conduct a hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions from which it may infer the strength of the State's evidence. Fourth, the order granting or refusing bail must include a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution; without it, the order is uncontrolled and may be deemed capricious or whimsical. Fifth, discretion in bail must be exercised regularly, legally, and within the confines of procedural due process, meaning after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution; any order issued in the absence of such evidence is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim, caprice, and arbitrariness.

Disposition

The respondent judge was reprimanded and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely, and the charges against Atty. Marallag were referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report, and recommendation.

Remember This

Memorize this line: in capital offenses, bail is discretionary, and discretion can be exercised only after a hearing where the prosecution is heard and the order contains a summary of the evidence. Examiners use this case to test the mandatory hearing rule in bail petitions and the consequences of a judge granting bail without it.