OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE AGUSTIN T. SARDIDO, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF KORONADAL, SOUTH COTABATO, RESPONDENT.
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Sardido versus Office of the Court Administrator
The Case
This is an administrative case brought by the Office of the Court Administrator against Judge Agustin T. Sardido, formerly the presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato, for gross ignorance of the law. The charge arises from a single order the judge issued in a criminal case for falsification, in which he dropped a sitting Regional Trial Court judge from the amended information and forwarded the case records to the Supreme Court, relying on a Supreme Court circular that, as it turns out, governs only administrative complaints filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The case matters because it draws the clean line between the administrative discipline of judges, which belongs exclusively to the Supreme Court, and the criminal jurisdiction of trial courts, which is not displaced merely because the accused happens to be a judge.
Procedural History
The matter began not as a disciplinary complaint but as an order inside a criminal case. After Judge Sardido issued his order excluding Judge Braulio Hurtado, Junior from the amended information, the acting clerk of court of the Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal forwarded the criminal case against Judge Hurtado to the Court Administrator. The Court Administrator issued a memorandum pointing out that the circular invoked refers only to administrative complaints filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and does not apply to criminal cases filed before trial courts. The Supreme Court then issued a resolution directing that the records be returned to the Municipal Trial Court and requiring Judge Sardido to explain why he should not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law. After Judge Sardido filed his explanation, the Court referred the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report, and recommendation. The Office recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that a fine of 5,000 pesos be imposed. Judge Sardido submitted the case for decision on the pleadings, and the Court resolved it as an administrative matter.
Facts
Private complainant Teresita Aguirre Magbanua accused Oscar Pagunsan and Danilo Ong of falsification by a private individual and use of a falsified document. In a deed of absolute sale dated 8 August 1993, Magbanua and six other vendors allegedly sold two parcels of land in the commercial district of Koronadal to Davao Realty Development Corporation, represented by Ong, with Pagunsan as broker. Judge Hurtado, who was then the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court of Koronadal and an ex officio notary public, notarized that deed. Magbanua denies signing it, and asserts that what she and the other vendors signed was a different deed dated 6 August 1996 for a much larger consideration. The earlier deed apparently undervalued the property, and the Bureau of Internal Revenue later assessed the vendors a deficiency capital gains tax.
The amended information in the criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case Number 14071, included Judge Hurtado as an accused, and the case was raffled to Judge Sardido. Judge Hurtado moved that the criminal complaint against him be forwarded to the Supreme Court, invoking the circular that requires all cases involving justices and judges of lower courts to be forwarded to the Court. The provincial prosecutor opposed the motion, arguing that the circular covers only cases initiated by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and that the offense charged was committed in 1993, when Judge Hurtado was still a clerk of court and notary public.
On 20 October 1998, Judge Sardido issued the order now under scrutiny. He ruled that the circular admits of no qualification as to whether the crime was committed before or during tenure, reasoning that if the law does not qualify, the court must not qualify, and adding that it would be awkward for a first level court to try an incumbent judge of a second level court. He excluded Judge Hurtado from the amended information and ordered the case against him forwarded to the Supreme Court. The acting clerk of court thereafter forwarded the criminal case to the Court Administrator. When required to explain, Judge Sardido insisted that he had acted in all honesty and good faith.
Issues
- Whether or not Judge Sardido is liable for gross ignorance of the law for excluding Judge Hurtado from the amended information on the basis of the Supreme Court circular.
- Whether or not the circular requiring cases involving justices and judges of lower courts to be forwarded to the Supreme Court applies to criminal cases filed before trial courts, as distinguished from administrative complaints filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Applicable Provisions
Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, on the discipline of attorneys, provides:
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those in the government service.
The circular clarified that the phrase "attorneys in the government service" does not include justices of appellate courts and judges of lower courts, who are not subject to the disciplining authority of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Supreme Court circular of 6 February 1989, issued to clarify the earlier en banc resolution, provides in part:
The IBP (Board of Governors and Commission on Bar Discipline) shall forward to the Supreme Court for appropriate action all cases involving justices and judges of lower courts, whether or not such complaints deal with acts apparently unrelated to the discharge of their official functions, such as acts of immorality, estafa, crimes against persons and property, etc.
This is the very circular Judge Sardido invoked, and the Court read it as addressed to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and limited to administrative cases, not to criminal prosecutions in trial courts.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held Judge Sardido liable for gross ignorance of the law. The circular he relied upon was issued to clarify that administrative cases against justices and judges of lower courts fall exclusively within the Supreme Court's disciplinary jurisdiction, and it directs the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, not the trial courts, to forward such cases to the Court. The case against Judge Hurtado was not an administrative case filed with the Integrated Bar; it was a criminal case filed with a trial court under its jurisdiction as prescribed by law. The Court explained that the acts or omissions of a judge may at the same time constitute both a criminal act and an administrative offense, and that whether the criminal case relates to an act committed before or after he became a judge is of no moment. Neither is it material that a municipal trial court judge will be trying a regional trial court judge in the criminal case. A criminal case against an attorney or judge is distinct and separate from an administrative case against him, and the two proceed independently, with different quanta of proof. The Court quoted its own doctrine:
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
On the second issue, the Court ruled that the circular does not refer to criminal cases against erring justices or judges, and that trial courts retain jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of offenses committed by them. Judge Sardido's reading of the circular was therefore plainly wrong, and his claim of good faith did not excuse a misreading of so clear a rule.
Doctrine
First, the power to discipline justices of appellate courts and judges of lower courts administratively is vested exclusively in the Supreme Court, and the circular directing the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to forward such cases to the Court implements that exclusive power. Second, that circular governs administrative complaints only; it does not divest trial courts of jurisdiction over criminal cases against justices and judges, for a criminal case is distinct from and may proceed independently of an administrative case arising from the same facts. Third, the two proceedings carry different burdens of proof, preponderance of evidence in the administrative case and proof beyond reasonable doubt in the criminal case. Fourth, a judge who excludes an accused from an information and forwards a criminal case to the Supreme Court on the strength of a circular that plainly does not apply is guilty of gross ignorance of the law, and good faith is no defense to so patent a misreading.
Disposition
The Court found Judge Sardido guilty of gross ignorance of the law and imposed on him a fine of 5,000 pesos, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
Remember This
Memorize the line: the circular on cases involving judges covers administrative complaints filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, not criminal cases in trial courts, which retain jurisdiction and proceed independently. Examiners use this case to test the separation of administrative discipline from criminal prosecution, the exclusive disciplinary power of the Supreme Court over judges, and gross ignorance of the law as a ground for administrative liability.