JOSE B. PEÑA AND JUAN B. BAÑEZ, JR., COMPLAINANTS, VS. NESTOR M. ANDRADA, RESPONDENT.

Peña versus Andrada

The Case

This is an administrative case for disbarment. Jose B. Peña and Juan B. Bañez, Jr. filed a verified petition asking the Supreme Court to remove or suspend Nestor M. Andrada from the Philippine Bar, on the ground that he unjustly retained money due his client, which they say amounts to gross misconduct. The case matters for two reasons: it fixes the quantum of proof in disbarment proceedings, and it shows the Court's impatience with complainants who file a disbarment charge and then abandon it.

Procedural History

The complainants filed their verified petition directly with the Supreme Court in January 1970. The Court required the respondent to answer within ten days from notice, and he filed his answer in March 1970. The Court then referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report, and recommendation. The Solicitor General conducted hearings, but the complainants did not appear at the scheduled hearings. The Solicitor General submitted his report and recommendation in May 1979, recommending dismissal. The case was thus an original administrative action in the Supreme Court, not an appeal from any lower court.

Facts

Jose B. Peña engaged the services of the respondent, then a practicing attorney, as private prosecutor in a criminal case for estafa in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The accused were Juan B. Bañez, Jr. and his wife, Amelita Joaquin. With the conformity of the court, the parties agreed to settle the case amicably, with the accused undertaking to pay Peña the amount of the loan involved plus interest.

Pursuant to that agreement, Bañez paid Peña, through the respondent, the amount of 10,000 pesos covered by three checks, and the respondent acknowledged receipt. The complainants also alleged that from December 1968 to March 1969 the respondent, directly or through a representative, obtained various amounts totaling 4,050 pesos from the Bañez spouses on the assurance that he would pay them to his client. The complainants alleged that Peña never received these amounts, that the respondent misappropriated them, and that he refused to deliver them despite repeated demands. A criminal complaint for estafa was filed against the respondent.

The respondent admitted receiving the 10,000 pesos but denied the other amounts. He explained that he held the money pending settlement of his attorney's fees, and that the dispute arose from a misunderstanding with his client over those fees. He was appointed Provincial Fiscal of Oriental Mindoro in June 1969 and withdrew as private prosecutor. In June 1970 he returned the amount of 14,050 pesos to the Bañez spouses, who delivered it to Peña in full settlement, and the criminal case was dismissed. In July 1971 the Bañez spouses executed an affidavit of desistance, stating that the respondent had no intention to defraud them and that they were no longer interested in prosecuting the criminal case. The criminal case against the respondent was dismissed in October 1971.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent should be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law for unjustly retaining money due his client and misappropriating it for his own use and benefit.
• Whether or not the complainants, who filed the disbarment petition but failed to prosecute it, should be held in contempt of court.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote a statute or rule; it applies the settled evidentiary standard for disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, which the Solicitor General quoted from the Court's own jurisprudence. The first statement of that standard provides:

Considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, We have consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of either penalty.

This fixes the quantum of proof the complainants had to meet, and it bears directly on why the charge failed.

The second statement of the standard provides:

It is a well-settled rule that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant and for the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by convincing proof.

This places the burden on the complainants and requires caution before the Court exercises its disciplinary power.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court dismissed the complaint, holding that the recommendation of the Solicitor General is well-founded. The complainants never took a clear and positive step to substantiate their charges. They did not appear at the hearings scheduled by the Office of the Solicitor General. The respondent, by contrast, appeared in all the proceedings and adduced documentary evidence that in effect exonerated him from the charge of unjustly retaining or misappropriating his client's money. Measured against the required standard, the charge was not established by clearly preponderant evidence, and the case against the respondent was not established by convincing proof. The Court also noted that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that the presumption is that an attorney is innocent of the charges and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath.

On the second issue, the Court did not impose contempt outright. It held that the complainants, by filing this disbarment case and later failing to prosecute it, wasted the valuable time of the Supreme Court and of the Office of the Solicitor General, and that this practice should be discouraged. It therefore ordered them to show cause within ten days from notice why they should not be held in contempt of court.

Doctrine

First, in disbarment proceedings the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the case against the respondent must be established by clearly preponderant evidence — proof that clearly preponderates — because disbarment or suspension carries serious consequences. Second, the power to disbar is exercised with great caution, and the presumption is that an attorney is innocent of the charges and has performed his duty in accordance with his oath. Third, a disbarment complaint that is filed but not prosecuted wastes the time of the Court and of the Office of the Solicitor General, and may subject the complainants to contempt.

Disposition

The complaint for disbarment against Nestor M. Andrada was dismissed, and the petitioners were ordered to show cause within ten days from notice why they should not be held in contempt of court for filing a petition for disbarment which they failed to prosecute.

Remember This

Memorize the line: disbarment requires clearly preponderant evidence, and the burden rests on the complainant. Examiners use this case to test the quantum of proof in disbarment proceedings and the consequences of a complainant's failure to prosecute.