A.C. No. 8451 (Formerly CBD Case No. 13-3982). September 30, 2020
ATTY. ESTHER GERTRUDE D. BILIRAN, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. DANILO A. BANTUGAN, RESPONDENT.
DELOS SANTOS, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a Letter-Complaint[1] dated August 24, 2009 filed by complainant Atty. Esther Gertrude D. Biliran[2]
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Danilo A. Bantugan (Atty.
Bantugan) for violation of Rule 1.01 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) for alleged misuse of funds and
property. In a Report and Recommendation[3]
dated September 1, 2016, Investigating Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco
(Investigating Commissioner) recommended the dismissal of the complaint
without prejudice to its re-filing with sufficient evidence. In a
Resolution[4] dated March 1,
2017, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Board of Governors
(IBP-BOG) reversed the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and
recommended the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two
years.
The Facts
Complainant is a member of the IBP-Bohol
Chapter (IBP-Bohol). On September 14, 2009, she filed a Letter-Complaint
before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging respondent
Atty. Bantugan with misuse of funds and property of the Legal Assistance
for Effective Law Enforcement Program (LAELEP) and claiming that the
IBP-Bohol failed to file the appropriate criminal and/or administrative
action against Atty. Bantugan.
Atty. Bantugan is a member of the IBP-Bohol and LAELEP. LAELEP
is a joint project of the Provincial Government of Bohol and the
IBP-Bohol aimed at assisting police officers in the performance of their
functions through litigation and education.[5] Subsequently, this project was extended to benefit barangay tanods
, firemen, jail officers, and provincial jail guards. The provincial
government provides for the funds while the IBP-Bohol implements the
project.
On April 19 and 20, 2002, the LAELEP held live-in
seminars which incurred expenses for food and accommodation. Complainant
alleged that Atty. Bantugan took a check payable to cash in the amount
of P27,500.00 from LAELEP/IBP-Bohol staff which was intended for JJ’s
Seafood Village as payment. Atty. Bantugan undertook to pay the
establishment and such payment was recorded in LAELEP’s accounting books
as paid. However, no payment was effected and demands were made by the
owner of JJ’s Seafood Village. Thus, during the succeeding
administration of IBP-Bohol (2005-2007), a Special Committee[6] was formed to investigate LAELEP and Atty. Bantugan, and make recommendations therefor.
On December 19, 2006, the Special Committee recommended “the filing of administrative, civil and/or criminal action to the person/persons concerned, if evidence so warrants.” [7]
During the course of their investigation, the Special Committee
discovered that in addition to the non-payment to JJ’s Seafood Village,
there were other instances of misappropriation which involved Atty.
Bantugan. For reference, the Special Committee’s Final
Report/Recommendation[8] is quoted as follows:
collected is a public fund hence, there must be a proper liquidation to
be prepared and submitted to the LAELEP Office.
paid but we cannot comprehend why personal checks [were] issued and
eventually dishonored by the bank. Payment was only effected after the
investigation was conducted and upon demands made by the restaurant
owner.
on December 03, 2002 and until now, the PNP [H]andbook is not yet
delivered. Presently, the draft is under proof reading by Atty.
Cristifil Baluma, who promised to complete the job by early [January of]
2007.
Danilo A. Bantugan on December I5, 2005 and returned on October 31, 2006
after written and oral demands were made by the Investigating
Committee.The Committee recommends that any property of the LAELEP
before it can be taken out by any borrower should accomplish a
borrower’s card indicating the date it was borrowed and the date to be
returned which must not exceed two days and must be duly approved by the
IBP President countersigned by the LAELEP Chairman.
expenditure must also be subject to liquidation, as this also involves
public funds. During the IBP Board Meeting on Sept. 14, 2006, Atty.
Danilo Bantugan committed to submit documents to support the liquidation
but until now, he has not yet complied.
Despite these findings, complainant claimed that the succeeding
administrations of IBP-Bohol ignored the Special Committee’s
recommendation to file charges against Atty. Bantugan. In view of the
aforementioned acts, complainant charged Atty. Bantugan for violating
the CPR, in particular, Rule 1.01[9] for engaging in unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful conduct, as well as Rule 7.03[10] for engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.
The OCA endorsed the Letter-Complaint to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for whatever action it deemed appropriate.[11] The Court directed the IBP-Bohol and Atty. Bantugan to file their respective Comments.[12]
Considering the seriousness of the allegations imputed against Atty.
Bantugan, the OBC recommended that the case be referred to the
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for investigation and
recommendation.[13] Meanwhile, receipt of evidence for the case was delegated to the President of IBP-Bohol.
In his Comment[14] and Position Paper,[15]
Atty. Bantugan denied the charges against him. He stated that he was a
City Councilor of Tagbilaran City, Bohol from 2001-2010; during which
time he concurrently held the following positions in LAELEP: (a)
technical committee member from 2001-2003; (b) pioneer committee member
from 2003-2005; and (c) committee member from 2005-2007 and 2007-2009.
As regards the alleged misuse of LAELEP funds, he claims that this issue
was pursued by then IBP-Bohol President Atty. Salvador Diputado
(2005-2007) as an election issue because he was seeking a seat in the
Provincial Board of Bohol and campaigned for Atty. Antonio Amora, Jr.,
who was a rival candidate of Atty. Diputado in the IBP-Bohol elections.
He claimed that complainant could have submitted this purported issue to
the Supreme Court as early as 2002 or thereabouts, yet sent the
Letter-Complaint not long after he acted as legal counsel for one
Nemesio Barafon[16] in filing a
Complaint for disbarment against complainant in 2009. In fine, he
averred that the filing of the Letter-Complaint was an act of
retaliation and a form of barratry on the part of complainant.
Further, Atty. Bantugan alleged that the accountability for
LAELEP funds is to the Provincial Government of Bohol. He underscored
that had there been anything irregular or unliquidated, the provincial
government would not have regularly and continuously released funds
since 2002. As regards the Philippine National Police (PNP) combat pay,
he claims that the Special Committee ignored the affidavit of PNP
Provincial Director Superintendent Sancho Bernales which he submitted to
them for consideration, which attested to the following facts: (1) he
was designated as a Training Director and conducted a series of
trainings; (2) he was tasked to manage the expenditures from the
trainings, with the approval of the PNP Provincial Director; (3) to
support the trainings, the PNP consented to a deduction from their
personnel’s combat pay, and thus, these money was purely a PNP Fund; and
(4) he recommended that the excess combat pay deductions be given to
LAELEP. With regard to the non-payment to JJ’s Seafood Village, he
claimed that he had a separate account with the establishment which was
co-mingled by the Special Committee. As regards the trip to Singapore,
he stated that he was one of the members of the IBP-Bohol delegation and
questioned why he was singled out when the trip was fully documented
and liquidated to the provincial government. As to the laptop, he denied
possession of the same.
In its Comment[17]
the IBP-Bohol averred that contrary to complainant’s claim, its
previous administrations had acted upon the investigation involving
Atty. Bantugan. The IBP-Bohol Board of Officers for 2009-2011 adopted
Resolution No. 17, Series of 2009[18]
which endorsed the Special Committee’s Final Report/Recommendation to
the Provincial Government of Bohol for action under the premise that the
funds allegedly misused were government funds. Likewise, the IBP-Bohol
Board of Officers for 2011-2013 issued Resolution No. 5, Series of 2011[19]
following up on the investigation conducted by the provincial
government and requesting a copy of the results of the audit. However,
no definite action was taken by the provincial government. The present
administration of IBP-Bohol adopted the position of its previous
administrations to the effect that it is the provincial government who
should file the proper charges. In consideration, however, of the fact
that IBP-CBD now possessed the records of the case, the IBP-Bohol
submitted the resolution of the investigation on Atty. Bantugan to its
sound judgment.
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Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
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In his Report and Recommendation[20]
dated September 1, 2016, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the
dismissal of the complaint without prejudice to its re-filing with
supporting evidence. After examining the records of the case, he found
that complainant failed to meet the quantum of proof of preponderance of
evidence before Atty. Bantugan could be held administratively liable.
He determined that the Special Committee’s Final Report/Recommendation
and the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the IBP-Bohol Board of Officers
and LAELEP, unsupported by documentary or any other evidence, cannot
sustain a finding of misconduct. In fine, while the accusations against
Atty. Bantugan portrayed him in a negative light, these were unfounded.
Finally, the Investigating Commissioner underscored that while the
IBP-BOG requested the submission of affidavits of the members of the
Special Committee, relevant witnesses whom the Special Committee
obtained evidence from or those with personal knowledge of the facts, as
well as supporting documents as to the acts attributed to Atty.
Bantugan, these were not complied with despite receipt of evidence for
both parties being delegated to the current President of IBP-Bohol.
Recommendation of the IBP-BOG
On March 1, 2017, the IBP-BOG issued Resolution No. XXII-2017-839,[21] which reversed the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to REVERSE the recommendations of the Investigating
Commissioner and IMPOSE the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of
law for two (2) years.RESOLVED FURTHER, to direct CIBD Assistant Director Juan
Orendain P. Buted to prepare an extended resolution explaining the
Board’s action.
In its Extended Resolution[22]
dated July 5, 2018, the IBP-BOG ratiocinated that Atty. Bantugan was
administratively liable for violation of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the CPR
for the following reasons: (a) he acted with dishonesty when he failed
to deliver the check for payment to JJ’s Seafood Village for food and
accommodation expenses and thereafter, attempted to pay the same by the
issuance of a personal check which was subsequently dishonored; (b) he
failed to contest substantially the allegations of misappropriation of
funds pertaining to the PNP combat pay deduction, unliquidated checks,
PNP Handbook, trip to Singapore, and his failure to return a laptop to
IBP-Bohol; and (c) he failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and discredited the IBP-Bohol when the aforementioned
acts were publicized in two local newspapers in Tagbilaran City.
On September 21, 2018, Atty. Bantugan filed a Motion for Reconsideration[23] and a Second Motion for Reconsideration with Leave to Admit Delayed Pleadings[24] dated September 30, 2019, both of which were opposed by complainant.
On December 6, 2018, the IBP-BOG issued a Resolution[25]
denying the Motion for Reconsideration for failure to raise new matters
which would otherwise convince the IBP-BOG to reverse its earlier
ruling.
The Issue
The essential issue in this case is whether Atty. Bantugan
should be held administratively liable for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03
of the CPR.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court adopts the findings and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner to dismiss the complaint against Atty.
Bantugan, without prejudice to its re-filing with sufficient evidence.
At the onset, it bears to emphasize that the quantum of proof in
administrative cases against members of the legal profession is
substantial evidence, and not preponderance of evidence as stated by
both the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP-BOG. This matter has
been settled in the case of Reyes v. Atty. Nieva,[26] thus:
Besides, the evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence – as opposed to preponderance of evidence – is
more in keeping with the primordial purpose of and essential
considerations attending this type of cases. As case law elucidates,
“[d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.”
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial
of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into
the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there
is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by
the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. x x x (Emphases supplied)
This was the same conclusion in the recent case of Spouses Nocuenca v. Atty. Bensi,[27] further citing Reyes and Dela Fuente Torres v. Dalangin[28]
which stated that substantial evidence, or “that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion” is the evidentiary threshold in administrative cases.
In this case, Atty. Bantugan was charged with violations of Rules 1.01
and 7.03 of the CPR which stemmed from his alleged misuse of LAELEP
funds and property. According to the Special Committee, Atty. Bantugan
committed the following acts:[29]
(1) received P150,000.00 as combat pay fee deductions; (2) paid
LAELEP’s obligation with JJ ‘s Seafood Village with the issuance of a
personal check which was dishonored, but now fully satisfied; (3) failed
to liquidate a total amount of P197,960.00 consisting of two checks in
his name for a trip to Singapore; (4) based on oral information from
different personalities, Atty. Bantugan was in prolonged possession of a
laptop belonging to IBP-Bohol; and (5) unduly retained possession of
the PNP Handbook whose reproduction was forestalled despite full
payment. The alleged commission of these acts were primarily established
by the complainant through the presentation of the Special Committee’s
Final Report/Recommendation and Minutes of the Joint Meeting by the IBP
Board of Officers and the LAELEP. It bears to note however that the
aforementioned acts were not supported by any other evidence,
documentary or otherwise.
In administrative proceedings, the
burden of proof lies upon the complainant. For the Court to exercise its
disciplinary powers, the case against a respondent must be established
by convincing and satisfactory proof.[30]
As aptly found by the Investigating Commissioner, the evidence
presented by complainant does not sufficiently establish the facts from
which her Letter-Complaint is based, to wit:
Scrutiny of the records of this case show that while the
minutes of IBP Bohol Chapter meetings and the final report of the
Special Committee, which paint an unflattering portrait of Atty.
Bantugan and concluded that he is guilty of the fiscal misdeeds
attributed to him, were indeed forwarded to the IBP-CBD, there is an
unfortunate absence of evidence to support these findings. There is
not a single dishonored check, demand letter, or any kind of documentary
or other evidence to buttress the finding of the Special Committee that
respondent Atty. Bantugan had failed to make a proper accounting or
liquidation of funds, refused to return LAELEP equipment, appropriated
for his personal use a check intended for payment to a restaurant, etc.[31] (Underscoring supplied)
The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from this finding
considering that our own review of the records of the case leads us to
the same conclusion. The Special Committee’s Final Report/Recommendation[32] and the Minutes of the Joint Meetings of the IBP Board of Officers and the LAELEP Special Committee dated January 15, 2007[33] and January 23, 2007[34]
alone cannot substantiate complainant’s allegations of misappropriation
against Atty. Bantugan. The Special Committee’s Final
Report/Recommendation does not cite any basis for its findings and
conclusions, considering the fact that what is involved in this
controversy are dishonored checks, demands for payment, liquidation, and
accounting. Moreover, in the Court’s assessment, a plain reading of the
Minutes of the Joint Meetings even weaken the case of complainant. In
response to a query as to why the Special Committee’s recommendation was
to file an administrative, civil and/or criminal action, but qualified
it with the statement, “if evidence so warrants;” a member of the
Special Committee replied that they were not making a conclusion on the
investigation, but were leaving it to the Board to decide.[35]
Similarly, the Special Committee also refrained from giving a
categorical assessment on the sufficiency of the evidence on hand to
substantiate Atty. Bantugan’s misconduct.[36]
The paucity of the evidence against Atty. Bantugan is further
underscored by the fact that IBP-BOG requested the submission of
affidavits by the members of the Special Committee and all the other
relevant witnesses which the Special Committee may have received
evidence from, or who may have personal knowledge of the facts, as well
as supporting documents relating to the acts attributed to Atty.
Bantugan.[37] Records show
that the reception of evidence for this disciplinary case was referred
to the President of IBP-Bohol; hence, the convenience in obtaining these
documents yet for some reasons, this was not accomplished.[38]
Lastly, it bears pointing out that complainant was neither a member of
the IBP Board of Officers or LAELEP, nor does she appear to have
attended the Joint Meetings to provide insight as to the deliberations
of its members and the context of their statements. Otherwise stated,
she has no personal knowledge of the facts relating to Atty. Bantugan’s
alleged misuse of LAELEP funds and the investigation conducted, save
from what she gleaned from the Final Report/Recommendation of the
Special Committee and the Minutes of the Joint Meetings between the IBP
Board of Officers and the LAELEP.
The burden of proof in
disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the complainant.
While administrative cases call for the lowest standard of proof, it
cannot be overemphasized that mere allegation is not evidence, nor is it
equivalent to proof.[39] The Court’s disquisitions, in the case of BSA Tower Condominium Corporation v. Atty. Reyes II[40] is instructive:
The Court has consistently held that an attorney enjoys the
legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until
the contrary is proved, and that as an officer of the court, he is
presumed to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath.
Burden of proof, on the other hand, is defined in Section 1 of Rule 131
as the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue
necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount evidence
required by law.In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary
for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence, which is that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. Further, the complainant has the burden of
proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. The
basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent
to proof. Likewise, charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence. (Emphases supplied)
A member of the Bar may be so removed or suspended from office
as an attorney for any deceit, malpractice or misconduct in his office.[41]
The word “conduct” used in the rules is not limited to conduct
exhibited in connection with the performance of the lawyers’
professional duties, but it also refers to any misconduct, although not
connected with his professional duties that would show him to be unfit
for the office and unworthy of the privileges from which his license and
the law confer upon him.[42]
Thus, lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times,
whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at-large, and a
violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies
the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and
disbarment.[43] It cannot be
gainsaid that the accusations against Atty. Bantugan certainly portray
him in a negative light. Neither can his defenses be characterized as
sufficient to wholly exculpate him from any liability insofar as he
primarily proffered the defenses of denial, ill motive on the
part of complainant, mere mismanagement of his affairs insofar as the
matter of issuance of a personal check for the balance of JJ’s Seafood
Village is concerned and finally, as proof of his proper accounting and
non-misuse of funds, the continued release by the provincial government
of funding for LAELEP’s projects. However, under the circumstances of
this case, the Court finds that the weakness of Atty. Bantugan to
substantially contest the charges against him does not evince his guilt
as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary action.
It has been
held that charges meriting disciplinary action against a member of the
Bar generally involve the motives that induced him to commit the acts or
acts charged, and that, to justify disbarment or suspension, the case
against him must be clear and free from doubt, not only as to the acts
charged, but as to his motive.[44]
As punishment by disbarment or suspension will deeply affect a lawyer’s
professional life, neither should be imposed unless the case against
him is free from doubt not only as to the acts charged, but as to his
motive.[45] Taking together
the plausibility of the defenses put forth by Atty. Bantugan coupled
with the absence of any substantial evidence as to characterize his acts
as willful and committed with wrongful intent, the Court cannot
discount the possibility that these stem from a mere error of judgment.
Indeed, while the Court will not hesitate to mete out the proper
disciplinary punishment upon lawyers who have failed to live up to their
sworn duties, neither will it hesitate to extend its protective arm to
them when the accusation against them is not indubitably proven.[46]
Except for complainant’s allegations, she failed to present sufficient
evidence to substantiate the allegations in her Letter-Complaint. The
standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable
ground to believe, based on the evidence submitted, that Atty. Bantugan
is responsible for the misconduct complained of. It need not be
overwhelming or preponderant, as is required in an ordinary civil case
or evidence beyond reasonable doubt as is required in criminal cases,
but the evidence must be enough for a reasonable mind to support a
conclusion. Here, the Court is not satisfied that the evidence presented
by complainant has met this threshold as to hold Atty. Bantugan
administratively liable and for this reason, dismisses the complaint
against him. The Court, however, must clarify that its ruling is limited
to the sufficiency of the evidence presented against Atty. Bantugan and
is not a final pronouncement as to his innocence of the charges imputed
against him.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court DISMISSES the Letter-Complaint against respondent Atty. Danilo A. Bantugan for lack of sufficient evidence.
SO ORDERED.
Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J., (Chairperson), Hernando, and Inting, JJ., concur.
Baltazar-Padilla, J., on leave.
[*] Also referred to as “Ester Gertrudes Biliran” in some parts of the rollo.
[1] Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 1-3.
[2] Per OBC Report and
Recommendation dated August 26, 2010, the correct name of complainant
is “Esther Gertrude Biliran,” as appearing in the Roll of Attorneys; id.
at 22.
[3] Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 499-508.
[4] Id. at 498.
[5] Rollo, Vol. I, p. 1.
[6] The Special
Committee constituted by IBP-Bohol is composed of Chairman Atty. Boler
Binamira and members Retired Judges Felicisimo Maisog, Jr. and Gervasio
Lopena.
[7] Rollo, Vol. I, p. 13.
[8] Id. at 12-13.
[9] Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
[10] Rule 7.03 – A
lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
[11] Rollo, Vol. I, p. 15-A.
[12] See Resolutions dated November 15, 2010 and March 21, 2012; id. at 26-27 and 48-49, respectively.
[13] OBC Report and Recommendation dated April 26, 2013, id. at 62-64. See also Resolution dated July 3, 2013, id. at 65-66.
[14] Id. at 50-52.
[15] Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 328-337.
[16] Rollo, Vol. I, p. 50.
[17] Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 78-80.
[18] Id. at 83-84; see
Board Resolution No. 17, Series of 2009 entitled, “A Resolution
Endorsing the Special Committee to the Provincial Government [Through]
the Governor and Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bohol for their Appropriate Action,” dated September 25, 2009.
[19] Id. at 81-82; see
Board Resolution No. 5, Series of 2011 entitled, “A Resolution
Requesting the Office of the Governor Through the Internal Audit Service
(IAS) of the Provincial Government of Bohol to Provide the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines-Bohol Chapter a Copy of the Official Result of
the Audit Conducted on the LAELEP Funds that was Subject of the
Investigation,” dated June 15, 2011.
[20] Supra note 3.
[21] Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 541-542.
[22] Id. at 509-517. Penned by Atty. Franklin B. Calpito, Deputy Director of the Committee on Integrity and Bar Discipline.
[23] Id. at 518-521.
[24] Id. at 574-577.
[25] Id. at 539-540.
[26] 794 Phil. 360, 379 (2016).
[27] A.C. No. 12609, February 10, 2020.
[28] 822 Phil. 80 (2017).
[29] Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 10-11 and 14.
[30] Villatuya v. Atty. Tabalingcos, 690 Phil. 381, 396 (2012).
[31] Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 551-552.
[32] Supra note 8.
[33] Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 4-6.
[34] Id. at 7-9.
[35] See letter G,
sub-item 1 of the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the IBP Board of
Officers and LAELEP Special Committee dated January 23, 2007, id. at 9.
[36] Id.
[37] Rollo , Vol. III, p. 508.
[38] Id. at 508 and 513.
[39] Atty. Dela Fuente Torres v. Atty. Dalangin, 822 Phil. 80, 101 (2017), citing Cabas v. Atty. Sususco, 787 Phil. 167, 174 (2016).
[40] A.C. No. 11944, June 20, 2018, 867 SCRA 12, 18-19.
[41] RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Sec. 27.
[42] Orbe v. Atty. Adaza, 472 Phil. 629, 633 (2004).
[43] Velasco v. Atty. Doroin, 582 Phil. 1, 8-9 (2008).
[44] Osop v. Atty. Fontanilla, 417 Phil. 724, 730 (2001).
[45] Id.
[46] Atty. Guanzon v. Atty. Dojillo, A.C. No. 9850, August 6, 2018, 876 SCRA 245, 253.