ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, PRECILLANA J. HONORICA, ARLEEN J. RAMOS, DR. ROGER PEREZ, DR. IMELDA DARAUG, DR. REMIGIA NATHANIELZ, CELEDONIA CORONACION, AND JOSE RABALO, COMPLAINANT…
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Dasig versus Vitriolo
The Case
This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig, an official of the Commission on Higher Education. The complainants, almost all of them high-ranking officers of the same Commission, charge her with gross misconduct in violation of the Attorney's Oath, for having used her public office to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on Higher Education. The case matters because it draws the line between misconduct committed as a government official, which ordinarily lies outside the Supreme Court's disciplinary reach, and misconduct that also violates the lawyer's oath, which brings the erring attorney squarely before the Court as a member of the Bar.
Procedural History
The complainants filed their sworn Complaint-Affidavit with the Supreme Court on December 4, 1998. The Court required the respondent to file a Comment, but the resolution sent to her residence was returned with the notation unclaimed. The Court then directed service by registered mail to her office address, and the postmaster reported that the mail had been delivered to and signed for by her authorized agent. On November 22, 2000, the Court granted the complainants' motion to refer the complaint to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report, and recommendation. The Commission twice directed the respondent to submit her Answer; she ignored both orders, and the case was resolved on the documents on record. In its report and recommendation dated April 5, 2002, the Commission found that she had unlawfully demanded money from persons with pending applications before her office and recommended suspension from the practice of law for three years. On August 3, 2002, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors adopted and approved that recommendation. The case then came before the Supreme Court for final action.
Facts
At the time of the acts complained of, the respondent was the Officer-in-Charge of the Legal Affairs Service of the Commission on Higher Education. In that capacity she had before her several applications for correction of name filed by teachers and students.
According to the complainants, she demanded money from four of these applicants as consideration for favorable action. She asked Betty C. Mangohon, a teacher, for 20,000 pesos, later reduced to 5,000 pesos. She asked Rosalie B. Dela Torre, a student, for 18,000 pesos to 20,000 pesos. She asked Rocella G. Eje, a student, for 5,000 pesos, and even suggested that Eje register her birth anew despite a prior registration. She asked Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, for a considerable amount later confirmed at 15,000 pesos with an initial fee of about 5,000 pesos, and suggested that Ng hire a lawyer of the respondent's choosing to facilitate the application.
The complainants further alleged that she violated her oath by filing eleven baseless suits before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, all of which were dismissed; that she willfully failed to pay just debts owing to two supply firms, evidenced by dishonored checks; that she instigated her son, a jail guard, to draw his gun and shoot two of the complainants, giving rise to a criminal case for grave threats; and that she authored and sent to the President a libelous report maligning eleven directors of the Commission in order to secure an appointment for herself. The respondent never answered any of these charges despite the opportunities given her by the Court and by the Commission on Bar Discipline, and the evidence against her remained unrefuted.
Issues
- Whether or not a lawyer holding a government office may be disciplined by the Supreme Court as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed in the discharge of her official duties.
- Whether or not the respondent's demands for sums of money from persons with applications pending before her office constitute a violation of the Attorney's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility warranting disciplinary action.
- Whether or not the penalty of three years' suspension recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is the correct penalty, or whether outright disbarment should be imposed.
Applicable Provisions
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by the Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
This is the very ground invoked by the complainants and the source of the Court's power to disbar or suspend.
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Canon 6. These Canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks.
This provision is decisive on the threshold question, because it shows that the Code governs lawyers in government service and not private practitioners alone.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
The respondent's extortionate demands fall squarely within this prohibition.
Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause.
This restates the duty in the Attorney's Oath to delay no man for money or malice, which the respondent violated by demanding payment to facilitate action on pending applications.
Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 6.02. A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
This is the specific rule against using public office for private gain, which the respondent's conduct breached.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that while a lawyer who holds a government office may not generally be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of official duties, if that misconduct also constitutes a violation of the lawyer's oath, she may be disciplined as a member of the Bar. The Court found that the respondent's misconduct was of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal to demand money as consideration for the approval of applications awaiting action by her office.
On the second issue, the Court held that the Attorney's Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer, and any violation thereof is a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The Oath imposes the duty to delay no man for money or malice, stressed further in Rule 1.03. The Court emphasized that a member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed professional obligations, and that lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service and are subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public. Their demands for money violated Rule 1.01 and Rule 6.02, and their conduct fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all lawyers. A lawyer in government service, the Court said, is a keeper of the public faith, burdened with a high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.
On the third issue, the Court held that for violation of the Attorney's Oath and of Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.03 of Canon 1 and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6, particularly for acts of dishonesty and gross misconduct, the respondent deserved not just three years' suspension as recommended by the Board of Governors, but outright disbarment.
Doctrine
A lawyer who holds a government office may not generally be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of official duties. But if the misconduct also violates the lawyer's oath, the Supreme Court may discipline her as a member of the Bar. A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed professional obligations, because Canon 6 applies the Code of Professional Responsibility to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks. A lawyer in government who uses her public position to promote or advance private interests, as by soliciting anything of monetary value in a transaction requiring the approval of her office, violates Rule 6.02. Demanding money to facilitate action on a pending application violates the duty to delay no man for money or malice under the Attorney's Oath and Rule 1.03, and constitutes unlawful and dishonest conduct under Rule 1.01. Such conduct is gross misconduct and dishonesty under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and warrants disbarment.
Disposition
The Supreme Court found the respondent liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty in violation of the Attorney's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, disbarred her, and ordered her name stricken from the list of attorneys upon finality of the decision.
Remember This
The one line to memorize: a lawyer in public office does not shed her professional obligations, and using public office to demand money for official action is gross misconduct and dishonesty warranting disbarment. Examiners like to use this case on the discipline of lawyers in government service, on the application of Canon 6 and Rule 6.02, and on the distinction between misconduct as a public official and misconduct as a lawyer.