ALEEM AMERODDIN SARANGANI, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. WYNNE B. ASDALA, ATTY. PACA-AMBUNG MACABANDO AND ATTY. TINGARA-AN BANGKIRO, RESPONDENTS.

Sarangani versus Asdala

The Case

This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Aleem Ameroddin Sarangani, a candidate for Governor of Lanao del Sur in the May 1998 elections, against three lawyers — Attorneys Wynne Asdala, Paca-ambung Macabando, and Tingara-an Bangkiro — who sat as chairman, vice-chairman, and third member of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Lanao del Sur in those same elections. The complainant charges that the three connived to proclaim a rival candidate as governor on the basis of incomplete results, in violation of the election laws and their oaths of office. The case matters to every bar candidate because it is the Supreme Court's reminder that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers must themselves observe due process, and that a lawyer's reputation may not be taken away on the strength of a mere photocopy.

Procedural History

The complainant filed the disbarment complaint directly with the Supreme Court. The Court required the respondents to comment. Respondent Asdala and respondent Macabando each filed their comments; respondent Bangkiro failed to file his, and after a show-cause order was likewise ignored, the Court fined him and referred the entire case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report, and recommendation.

The Integrated Bar's Commission on Bar Discipline designated an investigating commissioner. Hearings were set, but the complainant never appeared. The investigating commissioner issued an order treating the case as submitted for resolution on the pleadings, and thereafter submitted a report recommending a two-year suspension of the respondents. The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar approved and adopted that recommendation. Before the Court could act on the resolution, respondents Asdala and Macabando moved to set it aside, insisting that no formal investigation had ever taken place and that they had been denied full opportunity to defend themselves. The case thus reached the Supreme Court as an administrative matter, with the Court itself reviewing the proceedings conducted by the Integrated Bar.

Facts

Sarangani and Dr. Mahid Mutilan were rival candidates for governor of Lanao del Sur in the May 1998 elections. The three respondents sat on the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the province. On the first of July 1998, according to the complainant, the respondents, conniving and cooperating with one another, clandestinely and surreptitiously proclaimed Mutilan as the winning candidate for governor, as shown by a document entitled Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates for Provincial Governor and Provincial Vice-Governor, signed by all three respondents. The complainant alleged that the proclamation rested on incomplete results, because twelve towns had suffered a total failure of elections and ten towns a partial failure, involving an aggregate of about one hundred twenty-seven thousand votes.

The Commission on Elections, through a Minute Resolution dated the fourteenth of July 1998, refused to recognize the validity of that proclamation. It declared the proclamation null and void for having been made without authority from the Commission, with the first copy never filed with the Commission, and it noted that special elections would still be held in certain areas of the province on the eighteenth and twenty-fifth of July 1998, which would materially affect the results.

In their defenses, respondent Asdala claimed that the entries in the xerox forms of the certificate were filled up merely to guide the board in preparing an official proclamation in the event the Commission granted authority, and that the board never proclaimed any candidate. Respondent Macabando denied that the board met in Manila on the first of July, argued that the alleged proclamation was nothing but a xerox copy and a mere scrap of paper, and pointed out that no original copies were ever distributed as the rules required. The complainant replied that Mutilan himself had talked about the proclamation in a television appearance in Marawi City, and submitted a translation of the speech. Respondent Bangkiro never filed a comment at all.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondents were denied their full opportunity to defend themselves when the investigating commissioner submitted the case for resolution on the pleadings without conducting a formal investigation.
• Whether or not a trial-type hearing could be dispensed with in this administrative proceeding against the lawyers.
• Whether or not the complaint should be resolved on the merits at this stage, given that its central document was an unauthenticated photocopy.

Applicable Provisions

Section 8 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, as quoted in the decision, governs the conduct of the investigation:

Section 8. Investigation. Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his behalf, and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.

This provision bears directly on the case because the respondents invoked it to insist that no investigation was ever conducted before the recommendation of suspension was made.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court found that no formal investigation of the case was ever conducted on the tenth of September 2002. The records did not include the minutes of that hearing, and the Court was confronted with conflicting accounts: the investigating commissioner's order stated that the respondents had manifested their willingness to submit the case on the pleadings, while the respondents insisted they had moved to dismiss for failure to prosecute. The Court held that while it would normally give credence to the commissioner's order, it could not brush aside the respondents' vehement exception, especially since it was undisputed that the complainant did not appear at that hearing. One thing was certain: no formal investigation took place.

On the second issue, the Court acknowledged that a trial-type hearing is not always necessary in administrative proceedings, but held that there are instances when it may not be dispensed with. The recommended suspension was heavily based on a document whose authenticity had not been conclusively or even convincingly established. If the respondents were to be believed, the document presented was a mere xerox copy, and given the ease by which documents could be fabricated, it was imperative to first determine its authenticity. The Court observed that the complainant's absence despite notice may well have sprung from his awareness that the document in his possession was a mere photocopy.

On the third issue, the Court stressed that the success of a lawyer in his profession depends almost entirely on his reputation, and that anything which will harm his good name is to be deplored. While courts will not hesitate to impose disciplinary punishment on lawyers who fail to live up to their sworn duties, they will protect them from the unjust accusations of dissatisfied litigants. The Court recalled its cautionary words that if a complaint is clearly wanting in merit it is outrightly dismissed, but if further inquiry is needed, a referral is made for a formal investigation during which the parties are accorded an opportunity to be heard, and that an ex parte investigation may be conducted only when the respondent fails to appear despite reasonable notice. Here the parties had contrasting positions on the existence of the original certificate and the authenticity of the signatures and thumbmarks on the photocopy, so a formal investigation could not be dispensed with.

Doctrine

First, a lawyer in a disbarment proceeding is entitled to a full opportunity to defend himself under Section 8 of Rule 139-B, and while a trial-type hearing is not always required in administrative proceedings, it becomes indispensable when the recommended penalty rests on a document whose authenticity is disputed and unproven.

Second, a photocopy is not proof of itself. Where the existence of the original and the genuineness of the signatures on a copy are contested, the investigating body must first determine authenticity before concluding that misconduct was committed.

Third, disciplinary power over lawyers is protective, not punitive for its own sake. The Court will punish the erring lawyer, but it will equally protect him from unjust accusations, because his reputation is the very foundation of his practice.

Disposition

The Court did not rule on the merits of the complaint; it remanded the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for further proceedings to determine the authenticity of the certificate of canvass and proclamation, and directed the Integrated Bar to act with dispatch.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a trial-type hearing may be dispensed with in administrative proceedings, but not when the lawyer's suspension rests on a mere photocopy whose authenticity has never been established. Examiners use this case in legal ethics and administrative due process questions, particularly on the procedure under Rule 139-B and on the protection of a lawyer's reputation against unfounded complaints.