PRISCILLA CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ (RETIRED), RESPONDENT.

Mijares versus Villaluz

The Case

This is an administrative case for disbarment. Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares, a sitting Regional Trial Court judge, charged retired Court of Appeals Justice Onofre A. Villaluz with gross immorality and grave misconduct. The case matters because it tests whether a lawyer's moral fitness survives the private choices he makes about marriage, and because the Court reminds us that the duty of good moral character is not a one-time requirement for admission but a continuing condition for remaining in the profession.

Procedural History

The complainant filed a sworn complaint for disbarment with the Supreme Court on June 6, 1995. The respondent filed an answer, and the complainant filed a reply. In a Resolution dated February 27, 1996, the Court referred the administrative case to Associate Justice Fidel P. Purisima of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report, and recommendation. On March 4, 1997, Justice Purisima submitted his report recommending that the respondent be found guilty of gross misconduct and suspended from the practice of law for two years. The case was thus an original administrative action commenced directly in the Supreme Court, which decided it upon the report of the investigating justice.

Facts

The complainant was widowed when her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, disappeared. She obtained a decree declaring him presumptively dead after an absence of sixteen years. She had known the respondent since 1977, when he was a trial judge and became a close family friend. On January 7, 1994, she and the respondent were married in a civil wedding before Judge Myrna Lim Verano in Carmona, Cavite.

That same evening, at the respondent's condominium, the complainant answered a telephone call from a woman who insulted her. When she confronted the respondent, he dismissed the call and then berated her, calling her a nagger and telling her to get the marriage contract and have it burned. She left, and they lived separately thereafter. The respondent never got in touch with her and never apologized.

Several months later, at a Bible study session, the complainant learned that the respondent had married a certain Lydia Geraldez. The marriage contract, dated May 10, 1994, stated his civil status as single. The respondent's defense was that his marriage to the complainant was a sham, entered into only to help her in an administrative case for immorality filed against her, and that his first marriage to Librada Peña was still subsisting because the annulment decree had not yet become final. The investigating justice found that all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage were present when the respondent married the complainant.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent is guilty of gross immorality and grave misconduct for entering into a marriage with the complainant while his prior marriage had not been finally annulled, and for later marrying another woman while stating in his marriage license application that his previous marriage had been annulled.
• Whether or not the respondent's claim that his marriage to the complainant was a sham excuses him from liability.
• Whether or not the penalty of disbarment should be imposed, or a lesser penalty of suspension is warranted.

Applicable Provisions

Article 2 of the Family Code, on the essential requisites of marriage, provides:

No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present: (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and (2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer.

The Court used this provision to show that the marriage between the complainant and the respondent had all the essential requisites and was therefore valid, regardless of the respondent's claimed intention.

Article 3 of the Family Code, on the formal requisites of marriage, provides:

The formal requisites of marriage are: (1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; (2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

The Court found that these formal requisites were also satisfied, so the respondent could not deny the validity of the marriage he had freely entered into.

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

This is the standard the respondent violated by his deceit and his mockery of marriage.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, on disbarment or suspension of attorneys, provides:

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.

This provision supplies the grounds for the disciplinary penalty imposed on the respondent.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court found the respondent guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. He himself admitted that when he married the complainant, the decision annulling his marriage to his first wife had not yet attained finality. Worse, four months after marrying the complainant, he married Lydia Geraldez after falsely stating in his application for a marriage license that his previous marriage had been annulled. The Court held that he had made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the sham marriage defense. Even if the marriage was a caper of levity in bad taste, it did not speak well of the respondent's sense of social propriety and moral values. This was aggravated by the fact that he was not a layman but a former judge and appellate justice who could not but have been fully aware of the consequences of a marriage celebrated with all the legal requisites. The investigating justice stressed that a wrong cannot be righted by another wrong, and that no one can make a mockery of marriage with impunity.

On the third issue, the Court held that the respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for continued membership in the legal profession. Good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. Considering his advanced age, his impulsive conduct during the investigation, and his years of commendable service in the judiciary, however, the Court found disbarment too harsh and imposed suspension instead.

Doctrine

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Grossly immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is essential for remaining in the practice. A marriage validly celebrated with all the essential and formal requisites under Articles 2 and 3 of the Family Code cannot be converted into a sham by the parties' secret intention, and a lawyer who treats the sanctity of marriage lightly commits gross misconduct.

Disposition

The Court found retired Justice Onofre A. Villaluz guilty of immoral conduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and suspended him from the practice of law for two years, with a warning that a more severe penalty would be imposed for a repetition.

Remember This

Memorize this line: good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is essential for remaining in the practice. Examiners use this case to test the continuing requirement of moral fitness and the rule that a validly celebrated marriage cannot be dismissed as a sham to escape professional discipline.